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Abstract 
Agency theory is one of the principal frameworks utilized in explaining the family 
business phenomena. The objectives of this dissertation are to (1) identify the unique 
agent-principal dynamics that differentiate family firms from non-family firms, (2) 
determine the effects of these unique agency dynamics on family firm performance, and 
(3) evaluate these unique agency dynamics within family businesses, as moderated by 
differing forms of governance and management practices.  
This dissertation proposes that family firms are defined by two unique and 
opposing agency dynamics. On one hand, it is posited that family firms are defined by 
their ability to deploy concomitant forms of relational governance that reduce 
information asymmetry and associated agency costs. On the other hand, it is posited that 
family firms are distinctly encumbered with agency costs from non-economic family-
oriented goals. These distinct agency cost-savings, termed as family gains, and agency 
costs, termed as family costs, contribute to the study on how and why family firms 
perform differently than non-family firms.  
In addition, the study proposes that the ensuing trade-off between family gains 
and family costs may lead to competitive advantages for family firms in highly 
competitive environments. This agency trade-off provides a link between agency theory 
and the resource-based perspective of the family firm.  
Finally, this dissertation seeks to investigate these agency dynamics among family 
firms that employ differing governance and management practices. In particular, this 
study looks at how the agency dynamics of family firms that employ the most 
concentrated forms of management and governance, manifested as owner-manager led 
family firms, compare against other forms of family firms. This study posits that owner-
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manager led family firms, on one hand, have greater family gains and, on the other hand, 
have greater family costs when compared against other forms of family firms. Moreover, 
it is proposed that under highly competitive environments, the trade-off between family 
gains and family costs lead to greater competitive advantages for owner-manager led 
family firms over other family firms. 
This dissertation employs cross-sectional linear regression as the primary tool for 
empirical analysis on Australian business data. In addition, non-parametric testing is 
utilized to support the above analysis. These analyses are complemented by proper 
robustness checks to support the study’s validity. 
The results from empirical analysis corroborate this study’s propositions. First, 
the research suggests that family firms have family gains driven by lower information 
asymmetries, but have family costs driven by greater divergence in firm objectives. 
Second, the results indicate that family firms outperform non-family firms, which is 
consistent with extant family business literature. Likewise, the results suggest that family 
firms under managerial ownership have greater family gains and greater family costs than 
other family firms. Finally, the results show that owner-manager led family firms 
outperform other family firms. Accordingly, this study discusses the governance and 
management implications of the aforementioned agency dynamics within family 
businesses. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 The Research Question 
The objective of this thesis is to identify the unique drivers of family firm 
behavior that differentiate family firms from non-family firms based on an agency-
theoretic framework. The research highlights distinct agency cost-savings, termed as 
Family Gains, and agency costs, termed as Family Costs1, characteristic among family 
firms vis-à-vis non-family firms. Understanding these distinguishing agency dynamics 
contributes to the study on how and why family firms, in general, perform differently 
than non-family firms. Moreover, this paper seeks to demonstrate that the trade-offs 
between these two family-based agency dynamics may create sustainable competitive 
advantages or disadvantages for family firms, and hence provide a link to the resource-
based explanation of their performances. Thus, this alternative framework integrates the 
agency and resource-based theory in identifying the behaviors that distinguish family 
firms from non-family firms. Subsequently, the relationship between the degree of family 
influence, specifically characterized as managerial ownership, and the abovementioned 
family firm agency dynamics, is established. This study evaluates the potential 
differences in firm performance of owner-manager led family firms against other forms 
of family firm governance through their underlying agency attributes. Hence, results from 
this analysis seek to highlight the governance and management implications of the 
aforementioned agency trade-offs in family businesses. The research question can thus be 
formulated as: 
                                                 
1 Technically, Family Gains and Family Costs refer to family firm agency cost-savings and family firm 
agency costs respectively. 
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What are the unique agency dynamics that differentiate family firms from non-family 
firms, how do they affect firm performance, and how does managerial ownership 
moderate this relationship? 
1.2 Research Overview 
Contemporary studies in corporate ownership of the modern corporation reveal 
that family businesses are the predominant firm structure around the world (La Porta, De-
Silanes, Shleifer, 1999; Astrachan & Shanker, 2003). Their significance to the global 
economy has been well-documented. For example, research indicates that family 
businesses contribute 45-70% of a country’s Gross National Product (GNP), and in 
Europe alone, account for about 45 million workers (Schwass, 2005). Mishra and 
McConaughy (1999) provide evidence that 65% to 80% of worldwide businesses are 
family controlled. They add that virtually all non-state owned Indian and Korean 
enterprises, and the majority of Canadian and mid-sized Austrian firms are family-
controlled. Based on conservative estimates from the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ 
Business Longitudinal Study, Moores and Mula (2000) suggest that at least half of all 
businesses are family-owned within Australia.  
There has been evidence to suggest that the economic performance of large, 
founding family firms outperform their non-family counterparts (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Miller & Le-Breton Miller, 2005). In contrast, studies done by Randoy and Goel (2003), 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Randoy, Dibrell and Craig (2007) among others, 
indicate that the distinction between family and non-family firm performance is more 
complex than what was suggested by earlier research. What is clear from these studies is 
that family firms perform differently than non-family firms. Chrisman, Chua and Sharma 
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(2005), using an agency theory framework, suggest that family firm governance may 
provide family firms with the distinctive properties that enable them to achieve this 
outcome. 
Dyer (2006) posits that there are two opposing schools of thought regarding 
principal-agent relationships. While traditional studies in agency theory suggest that there 
are less agency costs within family firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Daily & Dollinger, 
1992; Kang, 2000; Ng, 2005), more recent studies indicate that family firms incur greater 
costs from agency-related problems such as altruism and entrenchment than non-family 
businesses(Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001; Morck & Yeung, 2003; 
Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003). This dissertation posits that the two abovementioned 
schools of thought are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
This research identifies family-specific behaviors, termed  personalism and 
particularism (Carney, 2005), as the drivers of unique agency relationships within family 
firms. Using extant literature to disentangle the principal-agent relationship within family 
firms, it can be observed that these behaviors encourage a convergence of information 
asymmetry on one hand, and a divergence of corporate objectives on the other, among 
these firms. From this, it can be inferred that agency conditions in family firms have 
unique cost-saving (family gain) properties arising from the former, and unique cost 
(family cost) properties resulting from the latter. Accordingly, the objective of this study 
is to provide empirical validation of the presence of family gains from the convergence of 
information asymmetry, and family costs from the divergence of firm objectives. Further, 
this study incorporates a resource-based framework in evaluating the relationship of 
family gains and family costs. It is posited that each family firm possesses an 
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idiosyncratic trade-off between these two properties that inspire competitive advantages 
or disadvantages vis-à-vis non-family firms. Subsequently, this study analyzes the effects 
of this dynamic on firm performance on both types of firms. Finally, McConaughy, 
Matthews, and Fialko (2001) suggest the family’s influence on principal-agent conflicts 
among family businesses can be examined through an empirical study of the form of 
governance they adopt. Specifically, they suggest that the managerial ownership, or lack 
thereof, may influence agency relationships in family firms. Consequently, this study 
tests for the moderating effects of managerial ownership on family gains, family costs, 
and the resulting firm performance. 
1.3 Contributions to Knowledge 
This comparative study between (1) family versus non-family firms, and (2) 
owner-manager led family firms versus other family firms, is undertaken within the 
context of the Australian business environment. This research aspires to demonstrate that 
family firms have an underlying agency trade-off which differs from non-family firms, 
and provides better understanding of the contextual nature of family firms’ governance 
requirements. Implications arising from this study will potentially benefit researchers, 
educators, regulators, corporations, and investors.  
1.3.1 Researchers 
Results from this study contribute to the field of family business research in 
several ways. First, the concept of an agency “trade-off” in family firms harmonizes the 
two conflicting schools of thought in family business agency theory. Second, it provides 
an empirical link between the agency and resource-based frameworks in distinguishing 
family firms from non-family firms. Third, it provides a better understanding of 
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managerial ownership, and its governance and management implications, in family firms. 
Fourth, it extends the external validity of the above-mentioned family business 
framework to publicly-listed family businesses within Australia. Finally, it provides new 
avenues for future research and replication in markets outside Australia. 
1.3.2 Educators 
Educators of family business topics will have a better understanding of the agency 
relationships and implications with family firms. Analysis of family firm agency 
dynamics will assist in classroom discussion on the difference between family and non-
family firm. Moreover, it may assist in reconciling conflicts in agency-based family 
business literature, and hence provide students with a different viewpoint in evaluating 
extant literature. In addition, this study may help highlight the link between the agency 
perspective and the resource-based perspective of the family firm to students. The 
investigation of case studies may be employed within the context of conclusions derived 
from this research. Finally, empirical replication of the research design may be suitable 
projects for interested students. 
1.3.3 Regulators 
Current Australian regulations, as enforced by the ASIC and ASX (Collier, 2002), 
require significant safeguards against highly concentrated forms of management and 
governance (for instance, joint CEO-Chairmanship in public firms is discouraged). If this 
study’s findings successfully show the detrimental effects of family costs and their 
prevalence in owner-manager family firms vis-à-vis other forms of governance, this will 
validate the government’s above-mentioned stance in corporate governance. Conversely 
hand, if the relationship is shown to be insignificant, this may contradict current 
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regulatory prohibitions in Australian public firms. Thus, this research will provide a 
symmetrical contribution to Australian regulatory practitioners. Additionally, results from 
this study may become a reference for future corporate regulations that may involve 
ownership, governance and management issues. 
1.3.4 Corporations 
This study can potentially benefit both family and non-family companies. For 
family firms on one hand, this research highlights the agency cost-saving conditions and 
implications that will allow these firms to maximize their potential. Further, it provides a 
blueprint for firms to avoid the agency cost conditions and pitfalls unique among family 
businesses. Given the importance and role family businesses play around the world, this 
research aspires to have a global impact with its contribution. On the other hand, the 
analysis of family firm-specific agency dynamics can improve non-family corporations’ 
understanding of the drivers of competitive advantages and disadvantages that 
differentiate them from family corporations. As such, this study provides non-family 
firms with tools to emulate the competitive advantages potentially enjoyed by family 
firms. Moreover, it allows non-family firms to avoid agency inefficiencies and to 
formulate strategies in exploiting agency weaknesses in family firms. Finally, this 
dissertation illustrates the governance and management implications of agency trade-off 
which may be beneficial to both family and non-family corporations.  
1.3.5 Investors 
Results from this study may confirm or alter the current market perceptions of 
family firms and their governance and management choices, especially for publicly-listed 
Australian firms. This study serves as an additional tool for investors to analyze the 
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performance implications of governance and management decisions among family and 
non-family firms. Thus, results from this study may enable investors to make better 
business judgments and investment decisions. 
1.4 Definition of Terms 
1.4.1 Family Business 
Also refers to family firm. 
Academic research into family business as an independent and unique field is 
relatively young. As such, there has been a lack of consensus about the definition of a 
family firm. Chrisman, Chua and Sharma (2005) suggest that there are two general 
philosophies in defining a family business: (1) the components-of-involvement approach 
and, (2) the essence-based approach.  
The components-of-involvement approach believes that family involvement is a 
sufficient condition to classify a firm as a family business. Typically, family involvement 
is characterized by a combination of ownership, governance, management and/or 
succession. 
Conversely, the essence-based approach is established upon the belief that the 
family’s involvement is not a sufficient condition. It is necessary that family’s 
involvement and behavior, such as ownership, governance, management, succession, 
vision and culture, influence certain idiosyncrasies within the firm before it could be 
effectively classified as a family firm. Further, the essence-based approach emphasizes 
that the intention to pass the business to the family’s subsequent generation is a key 
element in family firms. Chua, Chrisman and Sharma (1999) provide a conceptual 
definition of this essence-based approach to family business: 
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The family business is a business governed and/or managed with the intention to 
shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition controlled by 
members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is potentially 
sustainable across generations of the family or families (Chua, Chrisman and Sharma, 
1999). 
Based on the above definition, family influence on businesses is a key construct 
that overlays this study. As such, this thesis provides a comparative study on the 
behaviors and performance between family and non-family firms. Moreover, the degree 
of family involvement within a firm varies from one family business to the next. Ward’s 
(1987) typology illustrates this by suggesting that family firms may be viewed as family-
first, business-first, or family-enterprise first firms, depending on the degree of family 
involvement. Moreover, Miller, Le-Breton Miller, Lester and Cannella (2007) warns that 
empirical findings in family business research may be affected by endogeneity and 
selection bias issues in the definition of what constitutes a family business.2 Cognizant of 
these issues, this thesis examines the effect of varying degrees in family involvement 
through a comparative study of owner-manager led family firms against other types of 
family firms. 
Chua, Chrisman and Sharma (1999) suggest that the components-of-involvement 
approach in defining family businesses should preferably be used with appropriate 
theoretical guidance via an essence-based approach. By adopting this definition, this 
research’s theoretical framework relies on an essence-based definition on the family firm. 
This concurrently provides the conceptual guidance that enables empirical testing to 
                                                 
2 Specifically, Miller, Le-Breton Miller, Lester and Cannella (2007) attribute the superior performance of 
family firms to a specific class of founder-led businesses. 
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utilize a components-of-involvement approach in operationalizing family-related 
variables. Given that not all family firms are alike (Chrisman, Sharma & Taggar, 2007), 
such a definitional approach highlights that the key attributes of family firms arise from: 
• A dominant family coalition that is involved in either ownership or 
management of the firm, and; 
• A vision to continue the business as a family enterprise in the future. 
Consequently, the varying degree to which family influence and involvement affects 
these attributes result in the differences in behaviour and performance amongst family 
firms. 
Some studies suggest that the most basic form of family businesses are ones that 
are under a managerial ownership form of governance (Chua, Chrisman & Sharma, 1999; 
Ng, 2005). This research evaluates the effects of differing agency conditions within 
family firms by specifically comparing owner-manager led family firms with that of other 
types of family businesses. For the purpose of this study, an owner-manager led family 
firm is defined as one that has a member of the dominant family coalition occupying a 
dual directorship and top management role within the business. 
1.4.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory refers to the principal-agent problem wherein the principal faces 
the problem of motivating the agent to act on its behalf. Costs associated with mitigating 
this problem are referred to as agency costs. Within the context of separation of 
ownership and management, agency costs are brought about by the presence of 
information asymmetry and misalignment of goals between principal and agent that 
impedes the efficient allocation of resources in the market. Information asymmetry arises 
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when agents have better information than principals about the value of business 
investment opportunities. When investors delegate management roles to the manager, 
there is an incentive for the latter to pursue their personal goals. Hence, when the pursuit 
of these objectives is divergent from the owners’ own objectives, they can lead to 
expropriation of resources via economic decisions that may be detrimental to the owners’ 
investment, eventually leading to agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Morck, 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1988; Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling and Dino (2005) classify agency threats that arise from 
principal-agent conflict generally into moral hazard, hold-up and adverse selection. Moral 
hazard is the incentive to seek additional compensation in the form of (1) perquisites, (2) 
non-compensatory means such as withholding effort (ie. shirking and free-riding) and 
information, or (3) misappropriation of firm’s resources. James (1999) describes moral 
hazard as agency activities that either change the likelihood of the firm incurring losses or 
affect the size of losses incurred. Hold-up occurs when managers use power stemming 
from rights of co-ownership and/or control to force investors to accept changes that are 
not in their best interest. Adverse selection is the risk of hiring and/or promoting 
unqualified individuals.  
Further, Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling and Dino (2005) describe subsequent agency 
costs as the cost of monitoring, supervision, negotiation, and performance incentives, as 
well as residual opportunity costs and potential loss in productivity, engendered by any of 
these agency threats. 
 
 
Agency Trade-offs in Family Firms: Theoretical Model, Empirical Testing and Implications 
Mark Yupitun 11089061 11
1.4.3 Personalism 
Personalism refers to the unification of ownership and control into an 
organizational entity such as a dominant family coalition or an owner-manager (Carney, 
2005). Personalism is consistent with the family firm’s inward-regarding perspective. 
1.4.4 Particularism 
Particularism refers to the decision-making authority of an entity, such as a 
dominant family coalition or an owner-manager, based upon discriminative or 
“particularistic” criteria of their own choosing, as opposed to rationally-calculative 
criteria (Carney, 2005). Particularism is consistent with the family firm’s outward-
regarding perspective. 
1.4.5 Parsimony 
Parsimony refers to the tendency of family firms towards prudent resource 
conservation and resource allocation, vis-à-vis non-family firms (Carney, 2005). 
Parsimony arises from the family firm’s ability to strategically influence decisions 
pertaining to the allocation of the company’s wealth (Carney, 2005). The family firm’s 
strategic influence, in turn, is dependent on the level of unification of ownership and 
control (ie. personalism, or inward-regarding behavior) and discriminative decision-
making criteria (ie. particularism, or outward regarding behavior) available to the 
dominant family group (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003). 
1.4.6 Economic Objectives 
While there seems to be a lack of general definition of family businesses’ 
economic and non-economic objectives within the family business literature, for the 
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purposes of this thesis, economic objectives refer to the company’s goal to maximize 
shareholder wealth. Thus, economic objectives are the business’ responsibility to 
shareholders. These are measured by financial performance appertaining to the business. 
1.4.7 Non-Economic Objectives 
Concurrently, the family business’ non-economic objectives refer to goals that 
seek to maximize the tangible wealth and/or intangible welfare of the family stakeholders. 
Thus, non-economic objectives are the family business’ responsibility to the stakeholders 
belonging under the dominant family group. These are measured by benefits, financial or 
otherwise, appertaining to the family. The presence of non-economic objectives is 
consistent with Sharma, Chrisman & Chua’s (1997) view that family firms have multi-
faceted objectives, which are not necessarily in harmony with the firm’s economic 
objectives. 
It is emphasized that, for the purposes of this paper, non-economic objectives do 
not refer to non-pecuniary benefits in general. Instead, these refer to pecuniary and/or 
non-pecuniary benefits that do not contribute to the firm’s well-being but accrue to 
family stakeholders instead. 
1.4.8 Resource-based View 
The resource-based view of organizations examines the specific, complex, 
dynamic and intangible resources that are unique to a particular firm. These resources, 
under certain circumstances, provide the firm with competitive advantages against rival 
organizations (Barney, 1991). Habbershon and Williams (1999) utilized this resource-
based organizational perspective to argue that successful family businesses possess 
valuable, rare and inimitable resources that sustain their competitive advantages over 
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their non-family firm rivals. These unique resources, coined as familiness, enable family 
firms to develop sustainable competitive advantages. Sirmon & Hitt (2003) distinguishes 
between five sources of these family firm resources: human, social, patient, survivability 
and governance structures. Further, they argue that family firms acquire, evaluate, shed, 
bundle and leverage these resources in ways that are dissimilar from non-family firms 
(Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Chrisman, Chua & Sharma, 2005). 
Specific examples of how family firms transmute these resources into sustainable 
competitive advantages include: 
• higher overall corporate productivity and longer term commitment to investments 
in people and innovation resulting from a concentrated ownership structure; 
• Focus on customers and market niches that result in higher returns on investments; 
• The desire to protect the family name which translates into higher product and 
service quality; 
• Ownership commitment that supports patient capital; 
• Product enhancement via reputational capital;  
• Enhanced skill and knowledge transfer across generations arising from family 
unity and culture; and 
• Overlapping responsibilities of owners and managers, which result in lower 
administrative costs (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Simon & Hitt, 2003; Poza, 
2006). 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
This research specifically seeks to address the following questions: 
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• What are the unique agency dynamics that differentiate family firms from non-
family firm? 
• How do these dynamics affect firm performance between family and non-family 
firms? 
• How does managerial ownership moderate this relationship? 
A model of this thesis’ research topic is illustrated in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Model of the study.  
 
The thesis is organized as follows: earlier, Chapter One discussed the research 
proposal and provided an overview of the scholarly developments in family business 
studies that encompasses the aforementioned area of research. Further, it summarized 
core concepts of the study and highlighted the study’s contributions to knowledge. 
Finally, a definition of terms predominantly used in this thesis was detailed. 
Chapter Two integrates the extant literature in family business studies, and 
develops the theoretical framework underlying the proposed empirical model. Theoretical 
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constructs are identified and validated within the current literature. Finally, this chapter 
forwards propositions and discusses related assumptions and limitations.  
Chapter Three presents the research method and empirical techniques used in 
testing the propositions stated in Chapter Two. This chapter restates the propositions into 
hypotheses, and describes the operationalization of constructs discussed in the previous 
chapter. Further, a description of the selected sample, study period and data collection 
procedures are presented. Finally, the appropriate statistical analysis techniques 
employed are explained. 
Chapter Four presents the results from the empirical procedures detailed in 
Chapter Three. Initially, descriptive statistics and correlation analysis is presented. The 
results and inferences from hypothesis testing are subsequently described. Finally, checks 
in statistical robustness of the results are provided. 
Chapter Five summarizes the findings of the above study, and assimilates the 
results with the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two. Further, this chapter 
describes the limitations of the study, and potential impact in future research. Finally, the 
chapter concludes by integrating the study’s findings with its expected contributions 
described in Chapter One. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theory Development 
2.1 Conflicts in Literature 
Agency theory, as defined earlier, provides the theoretical framework for this 
research. Traditional agency theory suggests that there is less need for complex 
governance mechanisms and formal supervision for these firms therefore, their agency 
costs are not significant vis-à-vis non-family firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976) assume 
that the blurring of the boundary between principal and agent in family contracting makes 
agency threats largely inconsequential (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001). 
This framework suggests that family businesses may be less reliant on formal governance 
mechanisms and their presence may even be deleterious to firm performance (Schulze, 
Lubatkin, Dino, Buchholtz, 2001). Subsequently, Daily and Dollinger (1992) and Kang 
(2000) suggest that family firms represent one of the most efficient forms of 
organizational governance. Ng (2005) demonstrates evidence from Asian family firms 
that support Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) convergence of interest propositions. 
Recent research however, suggests that agency costs in family businesses are 
more complex than originally thought, and who may in fact have one of the more costly 
forms of organizational governance (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003; Steier, Chrisman 
& Chua, 2004). This paradox occurs because of two agency problems within family 
businesses: entrenched ownership and asymmetric altruism (Chrisman, Chua & Sharma, 
2005). Entrenchment refers to the relational contract between owners and managers that 
enable both to occupy key positions in the firm for a significant duration. Asymmetric 
altruism is an agency problem that is specific to family businesses, hence, provides a 
distinguishing characteristic against non-family firms. It is a self-discipline problem 
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within the family firm that ultimately translates into agency costs (Chrisman, Chua & 
Sharma, 2005). 
Although there are conflicts in the extant literature, it is clear from both schools of 
thought that principal-agent dynamics in family businesses are fundamentally different 
from non-family firms. For this reason, governance structures such as oversight boards, 
monitoring mechanisms, incentives and strategic planning systems of family firms may 
need to differ from those of non-family firms (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling & Dino 2005; 
Mishra, Randoy & Jenssen, 2001). Understanding how agency relationships impact upon 
family firm performance and governance is of great relevance to family business research 
and serves as the primary motivation for this research. 
The conflict between various above-mentioned family business literatures may 
have resulted from the aggregation of agency relationships utilized in their analyses. An 
inherent problem is that principal-agent conflict tends to be causally and sequentially 
entwined in a manner that makes their effects difficult to tease apart (Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino & Buchholtz, 2001). Subsequently, this research attempts to decouple various 
principal-agent relationships in order to identify agency dynamics peculiar to family 
businesses. Initially, this is facilitated by understanding what defines a family firm.    
2.2 Drivers of Family Business Agency Dynamics 
Earlier, family businesses, based on an essence-based approach, was defined as 
follows: 
The family business is a business governed and/or managed with the intention to 
shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition controlled by 
members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is potentially 
Agency Trade-offs in Family Firms: Theoretical Model, Empirical Testing and Implications 
Mark Yupitun 11089061 18
sustainable across generations of the family or families(Chua, Chrisman and Sharma, 
1999). 
This definition suggests that a family business is a function and amalgamation of 
a dominant family coalition and a long-term vision. Chua, Chrisman and Sharma (1999) 
define the dominant coalition to include the powerful actors in an organization who 
control the overall agenda of the family and business. Vision is defined as a notion of a 
better future for the family, with the business operated as a vehicle to achieve that desired 
future state. The combination of a dominant coalition and a long-term vision provide 
family businesses a unique personality that affects agency dynamics. This personality 
engenders idiosyncratic principal-agent behaviors that when viewed from a behavioral 
economics point-of-view (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003), can be separated into 
inward-regarding and outward-regarding behavior.  
It is inferred from existing studies that this inward-regarding and outward-
regarding behaviors are sometimes referred to as personalism and particularism, 
respectively. Carney (2005)3 identifies personalism and particularism as organizational 
propensities that enable family firms to develop unique governance and hence, agency 
relationships. 
                                                 
3 In addition to personalism and particularism, Carney (2005) posits a third family business propensity, 
parsimony, which refers to the conservative and sparing use of resources by family firms. Carney (2005) 
suggests that parsimony arises from the dominant family group’s ability to influence strategic decisions 
pertaining to the allocation of the company’s wealth. Chrisman, Steier & Chua (2006) refines Carney’s 
(2005) proposition by illustrating that the family’s strategic decision-making influence (and by association, 
its ability to be parsimonious) is driven by personalism and particularism. Similarly, this study focuses on 
the agency effects of personalism & particularism on the family firm’s behavior (including parsimony), and 
its subsequent ability to generate competitive advantage. From the perspective of this thesis, personalism 
and particularism are behaviors that closely mirror the concept of behavioral economics in agency theory 
(Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003), and the issues of altruism and entrenchment (Chrisman, Chua & Sharma, 
2005). These behaviours shape the unique personalities of family firms, and as discussed later, give rise to 
consequences such as parsimony, that enable competitive advantages and/or disadvantages amongst these 
firms. 
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Personalism is the inward-regarding aspect of the family business. Personalism 
occurs when the organizational authority is incorporated in the personality of the family 
business’ dominant coalition (ie. owner and/or manager). Personalism inspires unique 
benefits and costs to the family firm. On one hand, personalism encourages fewer internal 
and external constraints relating to accountability, transparency and disclosure within the 
firm. Hence, decision-making speed and initiative are nurtured. On the other hand, 
personalism may also result in entrenchment and aforementioned agency problems 
associated with it.  
Particularism is the outward-regarding aspect of the family business. 
Particularism occurs when the dominant coalition in the family firm substitutes the 
rational and calculative decision criteria with particularistic criteria for specific members 
or beneficiaries of the dominant coalition. As above, there is a trade-off between the 
unique costs and benefits associated with particularism. One on hand, particularism 
enables the owner-management team greater liberty to exercise authority. On the other 
hand, it leads to asymmetric altruism and its associated agency costs. 
Particularism follows from the personalization of authority and stems from the 
tendency of the dominant coalition to view the firm as “our business” (Carney, 2005). In 
other words, under altruistic circumstances, wherein the welfare of the individual is 
positively linked to the welfare of others (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003), personalism 
gives rise to particularism.  
Based on these insights, it is posited that the combination of a dominant family 
coalition and family vision leads to distinctive behaviors of personalism and 
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particularism which drive unique agency relationships in family firms. This relationship 
is illustrated in Figure 2.1: 
 
Figure 2.1: Family business and agency behavior  
 
Personalism and particularism impact agency relationships in family firms by 
altering the core dynamics of this relationship. As defined earlier, agency conflict arises 
from the presence of information asymmetry and the misalignment of goals between 
principal and agent, which impede the efficient allocation of the firm’s resources. From 
this definition, it can be observed that a firm’s agency relationship is a function of (1) 
information asymmetry and (2) the asymmetry of interests and objectives between 
principals and agents.  
Within family firms, personalism and particularism allow decision-making and 
authority to coalesce with a bias towards the dominant family coalition. This results in 
cost-savings arising from lower information asymmetry between owners and managers as 
described by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
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Conversely, unlike non-family firms, whose sole objective is to maximize 
shareholders’ economic wealth, the dominant coalition’s vision in family firms may 
include non-economic family-centric objectives (Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2004, Dyer 
2006; Lubatkin, Durand & Ling, 2007). These divergent non-economic goals, driven by 
the dominant family’s personalism and particularism, may encourage the development of 
agency costs unique among family firms.  
Thus, it can be summarized that, on one hand, personalism and particularism 
reduce information asymmetry in family firms. On the other hand, personalism and 
particularism increase divergent interests among stakeholders in family firms. Figure 2.2 
provides an illustration of how converging information asymmetry and diverging 
interests and objectives change the emphasis of agency threats and subsequently the 
agency costs needed to remedy them, in family firms vis-à-vis non-family firms. 
Agency Relationships
Principal Agent
Information Asymmetry
Conflict of Interest / Objectives
Agency Threats
NON FAMILY FIRMS
Principal Agent
Converging Information Asymmetry
Diverging Conflict of Interest / Objectives
Agency Threats
FAMILY FIRMS
 
Figure 2.2: Differing nature of agency relationships in family and non-family firms. 
Family firms have converging information asymmetry and diverging objectives 
between principals and agents within the organizations. 
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Figure 2.2 is an illustration of the fundamental difference between agency 
relationships in family firms vis-a-vis non-family firms. In this illustration, suppose 
that within a non-family firm, the agency threats borne from the relationship between 
principal and agent arises equally from information asymmetry and diverging principal-
agent interests. Thus, due to an equal distribution from both information asymmetry and 
diverging principal-agent interests, the level of agency threat encapsulated between 
principal and agent within a non-family business is shaped like a rectangle. Under ceteris 
paribus conditions, it is theorized that for family firms, there should be lower levels of 
information asymmetry but greater levels of diverging principal-agent interests. Thus, the 
illustration shows that the level of agency threat encapsulated between principal and 
agent within a family business is shaped like a triangle. This suggests that within family 
firms, the convergence information asymmetry reduces the risk of agency threats on one 
hand, but the divergence of firm objectives increases the risk of agency threats on the 
other hand. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates that the underlying agency relationships are fundamentally 
different between family and non-family firms because of personalistic and particularistic 
behaviors in the former. This explains why agency dynamics, when evaluated as an 
agglomeration of information asymmetry and agent-principal objectives, lead to 
disagreements in family business literature. Consequently, it is necessary to examine the 
disaggregate effects of personalism and particularism on information asymmetry and 
agent-principal objectives within the family business, as linked to extant literature. 
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2.3 Information Asymmetry in Family Firms 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that family firms have insignificant agency costs 
because of the natural alignment between owners’ and managers’ roles in family 
businesses. Therefore, the convergence of ownership and management ensure that 
information asymmetry regarding the firm’s resources, risk orientation and growth 
prospects are reduced. Subsequently, the firm’s resources are not misallocated and 
monitoring and transaction costs are minimized (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, Buchholtz, 
2001). Various literature in family business studies provide evidence of the positive 
agency effects of the convergence of information asymmetry via personalism and 
particularism. 
2.3.1 Personalism 
Le-Breton Miller and Miller (2006) suggest that the alignment of managerial and 
ownership information asymmetry within family firms are driven by personalism. For 
instance, personalism is demonstrated by a dominant family coalition that has the ability 
to appoint executives and directors who control major decisions. Moreover, dominant 
family coalitions exhibit a vested interest, motive and power to monitor the business. 
Finally, they tend to have a long-term involvement from long tenures, hence greater 
knowledge of the business, and thus contribute to the reduction of the information gap 
between them and lower management (Le-Breton Miller & Miller, 2006; Demsetz, 1998). 
In family businesses, Kelly, Athanassiou and Crittenden (2000) demonstrate that 
personalism resulting from the founder and the founder’s legacy is central to strategy 
setting, strategic management and decision-making. High founder centrality is positively 
related to congruence in the firm’s strategic vision, behavior and goals between founder 
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and the top management team. Moreover, corporate culture is inexorably influenced by 
the personality, values and beliefs of the founding generation. Finally, founders shape the 
firms’ interaction with the external environment. Miller and Le-Breton Miller (2005) find 
that these personalistic traits, which the authors collectively name as the family firm’s 
“command priority”, manifest not only in founder-led family firms, but may also be 
found in successful long-run family firms. 
The personalism from family managers facilitates the adoption of a longer time 
horizon than that of non-family managers. This “patient capital” has the potential to 
reduce the moral hazards of combining ownership and control (Mishra, Randoy, Jenssen, 
2001). Personalism from family ownership can help guarantee stability of business and 
long-term planning. Moreover, the dominant family coalition can make decisions more 
quickly and be more flexible (Le-Breton Miller & Miller, 2006; James, 1999). The 
dominant family coalition’s long-term perspective can extend the firm’s opportunities for 
organizational learning, growth and development. Further, longer investment horizons 
means families will be less tempted with myopic decisions that boost short-term profits at 
the cost of long-term growth (James, 1999). Family businesses invest more efficiently 
because they view their firm as an asset to pass on to succeeding generation (Lee, 2004). 
Le-Breton Miller and Miller (2006) suggest that family firms favor far-sighted and 
patient investments that (1) invest deeply in competencies and facilities required to attain 
core mission and vision of the firm, (2) invest in the people who operate such business, 
and/or  (3) invest in sustaining relationships with outside parties such as customers, 
suppliers, partners, community. 
Agency Trade-offs in Family Firms: Theoretical Model, Empirical Testing and Implications 
Mark Yupitun 11089061 25
James (1999) shows how a long-term horizon inextricably links personalism and 
particularism in family firms. The author demonstrates that the dominant family 
coalition’s welfare extends beyond its physical presence in the business when there are 
potential inheritors present. This reduces their incentive to squander resources and 
increases their preference for long-term investment. Therefore, this characteristic of 
extended horizons in family firms may provide an incentive for decision makers to limit 
agency costs within the firm. 
2.3.2 Particularism 
Particularism allows family firms to align managerial and ownership information 
asymmetry. This flows from a kinship network that is characterized by norms of 
reciprocity, strong social ties, a shared identity, and a common history. (Schulze, 
Lubatkin & Dino, 2003; Ouchi, 1980; Moores & Mula, 2000). As discussed earlier, when 
there is an intention to maintain ownership within the family, there is an incentive to 
make investments that will benefit the subsequent generations of owners. As such, the 
dominant family coalition develops a long term perspective arising from long tenures and 
a life-long involvement in the business, which fosters profound knowledge, making them 
better equipped to evaluate risk and make strategic investments (Schulze, Lubatkin & 
Dino, 2003; Kang, 1999). Further, particularism facilitates trust, commitment and 
reciprocity (symmetric altruism).  
Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) suggests that symmetric altruism compels 
parents to care for their offspring, encourage family members to be considerate with one 
another, and make family firm membership valuable in promoting and sustainable family 
bonds. This fosters a set of exchange practices with emphasis on the interest of family 
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members’ mutual welfare. Further, this reinforces the aforementioned family bond, which 
in turn helps to align incentives, and reduce information asymmetries among the family 
firm’s key decision makers. Subsequently, this results in better communication and 
decision-making facilitated by intimate knowledge among family members, and 
generates loyalty and commitment towards a long-run prosperity (Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino & Buchholtz, 2001; Chrisman, Chua & Sharma 2005; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling & 
Dino 2005). Since the family’s welfare is closely tied to firm performance, family 
members have strong incentives to monitor professional managers and reduce agency 
costs (Lee, 2004). Further, Lubatkin, Durand and Ling (2007) suggests that, based on a 
co-evolving social process, a particular form of psychosocial altruism allows families to 
develop norms, values, bonds and enforcements that, in turn, establish governance 
efficiencies. Moreover, symmetric altruism can extend to non-family employees, 
promoting a sense of stability and commitment to the firm among all employees (Lee, 
2004). 
Particularism breeds trust among family members. Trust, as a concept, is not 
unique to family businesses. However, Steier (2001) contends that trust plays an 
exceptional and distinctive role in family firm governance. In particular, trust is a key 
driver in achieving a sound relational governance structure within the family firm. The 
author explains that for family firms, trust represents a fundamental basis for cooperation 
within the family firm, and provides a potential source of competitive advantage. 
Empirical evidence shows that reliance on trust as a governance mechanism (hence a 
platform for relational governance) reduces transaction and monitoring costs. Gomez-
Mejia, Nunez-Nickel and Guttierez (2001) describe family firms as high trust 
Agency Trade-offs in Family Firms: Theoretical Model, Empirical Testing and Implications 
Mark Yupitun 11089061 27
organizations because they are governed by underlying informal agreements rather than 
utilitarian logic or contractual obligation. Parties under family contracting may attach 
value to the relationship that goes beyond the economic value created by the transaction, 
rather than from perceived contributions based on kinship and blood-ties. Chami (1999) 
shows theoretically how trust mitigates the moral hazard problem between the parents 
(principal) and the children (agents), raises the children’s efforts and productivity, and 
thus enhances firm performance. Since trust induces the children to internalize the cost of 
their actions on the parents’ welfare, it obviates the need for parents to monitor their 
children’s work effort or to rely on incentive-based wages (Lee, 2004). 
Mustakallio, Autio and Zahra (2002) suggests that as the dominant family 
coalition plays multiple roles in managing and governing the business, the blurring of 
governance and management relationships encourages a duality in the form of 
governance systems. These are: (1) contractual governance that provides formal controls 
and management supervision to minimize opportunism and alleviate information 
asymmetry, and (2) relational governance that provides social controls that promote 
social interactions to guide the management towards the family’s shared vision. 
Relational governance, which is a function of the family’s social interaction and the 
family’s shared vision, is positively correlated with the decision-making quality of the 
firm (Mustakallio, Autio & Zahra, 2002). Thus, the particularistic trust and symmetric 
altruism that emanate from the presence and vision of the dominant family coalition are 
essential ingredients of relational governance. Further, relational governance minimizes 
information asymmetry to an extent that it renders contractual governance redundant and 
enables family members to achieve advantages in monitoring and disciplining decision 
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agents (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 2001; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Finally, 
Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling and Dino (2005) posit that the ability of the dominant family 
group to self-govern makes each family member a de facto owner of the firm, hence 
aligning their preferences for risk and growth. 
2.3.3 Agency Cost-Savings from Converging Information Asymmetry 
Personalism and particularism lead to a more stable management and more 
influential relational governance in family firms than in non-family firms.  Consequently, 
this results in a convergence of information asymmetry among family firms. Lesser 
information asymmetry means that owners are less susceptible to the detrimental effects 
of managerial discretion (Fama & Jensen, 1983). While Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 
(2005) suggest that managers are willing to give up real economic benefits in order to 
satisfy the implicit expectations of owners, these opportunity costs are reduced in family 
firms. Thus, the cost-savings from the convergence of information asymmetry between 
owners and managers arise from the reduction of the potential unfavorable results in 
managerial discretion. 
Moreover, the reduction in information asymmetry via personalism and 
particularism in family firms also results in significant cost-savings in monitoring and 
other agency costs. This arises because as information asymmetry is reduced, detrimental 
effects of managerial discretion are also reduced such that monitoring costs can be made 
redundant (Lev, 1989; Wang, Swift & Lobo, 1994; Ali & Hwang, 1995; Bugshan, 2005). 
For instance, it has been observed that family ties between the principal and agent 
influence the magnitude and composition of executive pay package. There is an inverse 
relationship between the concentration of ownership in the hands of family members and 
Agency Trade-offs in Family Firms: Theoretical Model, Empirical Testing and Implications 
Mark Yupitun 11089061 29
the compensation of family executives (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana & Makri, 2003). 
Family CEOs earn less and receive less incentive pay than non-family CEOs after 
controlling for size and tenure (McConaughy, Matthews & Fialko 2001). Gomez-Mejia, 
Larraza-Kintana and Makri (2003) show that firms which invest heavily in research and 
development pay their executives more since “self-monitoring” rather than external 
monitoring becomes important under these conditions. This is because information 
asymmetries between managers and shareholders increase in tandem with R&D 
investments. However, the positive influence of R&D intensity on CEO’s total 
compensation is lower for family firms vis-à-vis non-family firms because family ties 
counteract the information asymmetries associated with the greater R&D expenditure. 
Carney (2005) suggests that family firms’ propensity to be parsimonious4 arising from 
lower information asymmetries may be advantageous in environments with resource 
scarcity. 
In summary, as personalism and particularism converge information asymmetry 
between principal and agent in family firms, the resultant congruence in managerial 
discretion leads to cost-savings from (1) direct reduction in agency threats and (2) 
indirect reduction in the agency costs of ameliorating these threats. Henceforth, the term 
family gains (AG) will be used to describe these cost-savings. Subsequently, the following 
proposition can be postulated: 
Proposition 1: Family firms have lower information asymmetry; hence attain family 
gains vis-à-vis non-family firms, ceteris paribus.  
                                                 
4  Thus, as a consequence of lower information asymmetries brought about by personalism and 
particularism, Carney (2005) suggests that family firms’ propensity for parsimony may manifest as a driver 
for competitive advantage in family firms. 
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2.4 Firm Objectives in Family Firms 
Family firms can be distinguished from non-family firms by the presence of their 
own personal needs and goals. These non-economic objectives (as defined earlier), driven 
by the personalism and particularism of the dominant family coalition’s presence and 
vision, incur agency costs unique to family firms.  
The manner in which agency costs arise can be viewed from a behavioral 
economics perspective. Behavioral economics suggest that individuals (or in the case of 
family firms, the dominant family coalition) are motivated by an idiosyncratic set of 
preferences. These preferences may be economic or non-economic in character; 
moreover, they may be egoistic (ie. personalism) or altruistic (ie. particularism). It 
follows that the dominant family coalition is driven to maximize the utility gain from 
each preference. Conflicts of interest arise because resource constraints prevent the 
dominant family coalition from maximizing its different type of preferences 
simultaneously, thus resulting in opportunity costs (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003; 
O’Donaghue & Rabin, 2000; Lubatkin, Durand & Ling, 2007). In other words, the 
presence of non-economic objectives results in the difficulty of aligning various non-
economic objectives of owners, and thus cannot guarantee the alignment of owners’ 
attitudes and risk-tolerance towards growth opportunities (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & 
Buchholtz, 2001). Paradoxically, this situation is compounded by the informal 
relationships and governance described earlier, which reduces the formal safeguards that 
mitigate potential agency costs (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001).  
Moreover, the effects of these agency costs are more severe on minority, 
especially non-family, shareholders. The dominant family coalition has the power and 
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incentive to act in its own interests at the expense of outside shareholders. This occurs 
from the family stakeholders’ inability to separate their own needs from the profit 
maximization goals of the outside shareholders and stakeholders outside the coalition.. 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Morck & Yeung, 2003; Chrisman, Chua & Litz 2004; Lee, 
2004; Ng, 2005). Current family business literature provides a description of the negative 
agency effects arising from the presence of the family’s non-economic objectives as 
driven by personalism and particularism. 
2.4.1 Personalism 
Carney (2005) suggests that personalism in family firms leads to executive 
entrenchment and its subsequent agency problems. Personalism allows the dominant 
family coalitions tend to be less subject to constraints relating to accountability and 
transparency (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988; Carney, 2005). This negative aspect of 
personalism subsequently translates into the phenomenon known as executive 
entrenchment. Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) suggest that entrenchment arises from 
the disproportionate power awarded to the family management stemming from 
personalistic familial sources. Although executive entrenchment is a phenomenon that is 
not exclusive to family businesses it is nevertheless more prevalent in family firms. 
Entrenchment issues that arise from family relational contracting are likely to increase 
agency costs because of the tendency of family firms to decouple the family agent’s 
employment from performance and employment risk. This is because a relational contract 
between the family and family agent involves a set of mutual expectations that are more 
likely to be based on the family’s non-economic goals and their residual effects (for 
instance, emotions and sentiments) than non-family contracting. Thus, family bonds 
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engender agency contracts that are prone to depart from economic rationality (Gomez-
Mejia, Nunez-Nickel and Guttierez, 2001). 
Entrenchment is more prevalent in family firms because the presence of a 
dominant family group can allow emotions and relationships to color the perception of 
competence of executives. Morck and Yeung (2003) for instance find agency problems 
resulting from entrenched management is common among family firms that use pyramid 
cross-holdings to separate ownership from control. Examples of ways executives 
legitimize their entrenchment include: (1) hiding or obscuring negative performance, (2) 
hiring consultants to legitimize decisions, (3) manipulating biased information, and (4) 
embarking on business strategies that capitalize on their idiosyncratic skills and abilities, 
thus making them irreplaceable (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel and Guttierez, 2001). 
Entrenchment may lead to significant agency costs in the form of hold-up 
problems. Hold-up occurs when family management, who acquire a disproportionate 
amount of power which emanate from their family status instead of their skills, impose 
their self-interest onto the firm by keeping the owners hostage (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-
Nickel & Guttierez, 2001).. Thus, entrenched family executives in the firm can make 
both inside and possibly outside directors beholden to them. This situation threatens the 
autonomy of the board and undermines the effectiveness of its oversight role. Eventually, 
agency costs arise when family CEOs remain in the office long after they have ceased to 
be effective, thus harming firm performance (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 
2001). Further, strengthening the rights, influence and power of family management 
reinforces a vicious cycle towards further entrenchment, thereby having a negative 
impact on overall shareholders’ welfare (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 2001; 
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Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003; 
Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri, 2003). 
Entrenchment exacerbates adverse selection problems in family firms because of 
the limited career opportunities within the executive positions available to outsiders. 
Family firms are likely to maintain top management positions for family members rather 
than hiring more qualified or competent outsiders. Further, entrenched family members 
are capable of redistributing benefits to themselves through excessive compensation or 
special dividends that may adversely affect employee morale and productivity (Lee, 
2004). Likewise, Morck and Yeung (2003) argue that entrenchment inhibits opportunities 
for more skilled non-family managers to undertake key roles within the business, and in 
turn allow less-skilled family-member managers to extract private benefits from 
ownership. Thus, adverse selection results from a smaller pool of labor market of 
uncertain quality (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino & Buchholtz, 2001). The adverse selection problem is most severe in high R&D 
industries. Entrenched family firms might have difficulty accepting professional 
managers who are capable of responding to new technology and increased competition 
but rather prefer home-grown family executives. However, family management may face 
greater cognitive constraints in these industries resulting from a narrower market 
exposure, more parochial work experience, and firm-specific knowledge base (Mishra, 
Randoy, Jenssen, 2001; Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri, 2003). This could 
possibly explain why family firms tend to survive less in high technology industries 
(Carney, 2005). 
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Agency problems associated with moral hazard are aggravated by personalism-
based entrenchment because family firm ownership and control may free family 
management from discipline and monitoring, which subsequently fosters self-control 
problems (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 2001).  Examples of moral hazard 
problems that arise from entrenchment include (1) management’s attention to short-term 
profit moreso than long-term goals, (2) reluctance to be innovative, (3) pursuing pet 
projects than enhance the executive’s image, (4) focus on sales maximization at the 
expense of profits (empire building), and (5) consumption of executive perquisites and 
hubris, among others (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001; Lee, 2004). 
Finally, hold up, adverse selection and moral hazard agency problems that arise 
from entrenched family management have the tendency to cascade towards non-family 
management and low-level employees. This may lower employee morale and may 
encourage them to shirk, free-ride, and basically mimic the top management’s example. 
Overall, Mishra, Randoy and Jenssen (2001) find that family management can enhance 
performance when the family influence does not create entrenchment issues, or when the 
family’s non-economic objectives are more aligned with the firm’s economic objectives. 
2.4.2 Particularism 
Particularism can be associated with altruism emanating from a dominant family 
coalition that attaches a psychological possession,to the business (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Carney, 2005). As discussed earlier, particularism fosters a set of exchange practices with 
an emphasis on the members of the dominant family group’s interests. However, because 
these interests (including non-economic objectives) may not always align with the firm’s 
economic objectives, the resulting asymmetric form of altruism, based on the dominant 
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family coalition’s self-control disposition, can cause agency problems. Thus, the negative 
aspect of particularism manifests as asymmetric altruism. Chrisman, Chua and Sharma 
(2005) conceive asymmetric altruism as a detrimental self-discipline problem 
idiosyncratic among family firms. 
Generally, asymmetric altruism takes the form of (1) informal monitoring and 
control mechanisms, which may result in avoiding disciplinary issues that have 
repercussions for familial relation within and without the firm (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 
2003), (2) biased judgments and perceptions on family members’ decisions and actions 
(Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel and Guttierez, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003), (3) 
non-pecuniary benefits to family members, (4) increased governance requirements due to 
family-based conflict (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling & Dino, 2005), (5) diminished threat of 
unemployment, and (6) aversion to outside directors and external monitoring, or 
undermining their effectiveness (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 2001), among 
others. Lubatkin, Durand and Ling (2007) suggests that family-oriented and paternalistic 
forms of altruism may lead to spoiled or resentful family agents, and can give these 
family agents an incentive to behave opportunistically, and ultimately result in  
governance inefficiencies. 
Similar to entrenchment, asymmetric altruism can have deleterious effects on 
adverse selection problems in family firms. The dominant family coalition may limit top 
management positions and promote within family members rather than hire outsiders 
even if family members are less qualified. Moreover, the dominant family coalition, 
spurred by non-economic family-based interests, is capable of channeling firm benefits, 
compensations and incentives to family members rather than employees, thus reducing 
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the firm’s attractiveness to the labor market. Consequently, adverse selection takes the 
form of a smaller labor pool whose quality may be inferior to those available to non-
family businesses (James, 1999; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001; Schulze, 
Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 2001). 
Asymmetric altruism alters the incentive structure of a family firm, thereby 
increasing its moral hazard agency costs (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 2001). 
Moral hazards that affect firm efficiency include: (1) free-riding, (2) shirking, (3) 
consumption of perquisites, (4) special privileges and compensation beyond industry 
standards, (5) secure employment for family members, (6) uneconomical risk-aversion to 
investments that may affect family members’ future endowment (Schulze, Lubatkin & 
Dino, 2003), (7) entitlement to divert firm resources from profit-maximizing projects to 
family members’ personal projects or consumption, (8) nepotism, and (9) opportunity 
costs arising from family conflict, among others. 
Furthermore, the dominant family coalition’s non-economic objectives may be 
contradictory to the pursuit of innovation. Morck and Yeung (2003) suggests that a key 
determinant of innovation and economic growth is management’s willingness to 
undertake “creative destruction” of the firm’s assets and capabilities. Because the 
dominant family group may internalize the destructive aftermath  from this form of self-
evaluation, they may have the incentive to block creative destruction as an altruistic 
protection to family members. Therefore, family firms may deny capital from innovative 
upstarts and subvert investments in innovation (Morck & Yeung, 2003). 
Agency costs based on asymmetric altruism are compounded in the case of 
private and closely-held family firms. The combination of market illiquidity, non-
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economic and emotional factors results in high exit costs from the firm. Because high exit 
costs make board conflict resolution more costly and magnify the sense of entitlement 
within the family, double moral hazard or owner opportunism, wherein hopeful family 
heirs become locked into a dependent relationship with the firm, occurs. Such a situation 
gives dependent family members an incentive to prefer consumption over investment, 
and preclude alternative use of funds that are consumed (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 
2003). 
When family-controlled firms are organized into business groups and obtain 
outside equity financing, unique agency issues pertaining to asymmetric altruism emerge. 
The use of pyramidal groups to separate ownership from control in these family firms 
creates moral hazard problems called “tunneling” (Morck & Yeung, 2003). Tunneling or 
self-dealing refers to the transfer of wealth and benefits between related family-controlled 
firms wherein the family benefits from the transactions. In a pyramidal structure for 
instance, wealth from low-tier firms are transferred to firms near or at the apex wherein 
the family can benefit the most. This suggests that the dominant family coalition can 
redistribute rents from stakeholders to themselves, and those non-family stakeholders 
near or at the bottom of the business group suffer the greatest agency costs. Le-Breton 
Miller and Miller (2006) posit that the higher the ratio of family votes to family 
ownership, and the more the family’s use of devices such as pyramiding and super-voting 
shares, the less likely the family firm will invest for the long-term (and prefer 
consumption instead). 
As in entrenchment, adverse selection and moral hazard agency problems that 
arise from asymmetric altruism in family firms have the tendency to negatively affect the 
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morale and efficiency of non-family management and staff. Asymmetric altruism acts as 
an implicit disincentive because it is based on norms of equality and un-metered 
reciprocity whose benefits non-family members cannot fully participate in (Lubatkin, 
Schulze, Ling & Dino, 2005). 
2.4.3 Agency Costs from Diverging Firm Objectives 
Personalism and particularism, when combined with the presence of non-
economic goals peculiar to family firms, pose the risk of developing family-related 
agency problems of entrenchment and asymmetric altruism. Invariably, entrenchment and 
asymmetric altruism warps the family management’s perception of risk. Because family 
firms have personal wealth, undiversified human capital, and quasi-rents related to non-
economic objectives tied up with the firm, they incur greater personal risk (with profound 
implications to future generations) as a consequence of executive action  (Mishra & 
McConaughy, 1999; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001). Combined with 
the fact that the family’s non-economic objectives will divert resources from investments; 
entrenched family management would therefore prefer lower business risks than large 
diversified firms (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & 
Guttierez, 2001). Paradoxically, although entrenched family managements are more risk-
averse, they are less likely to be penalized by taking on high business risk because of 
hold-up issues related to family contracting. 
Further, the presence of non-economic objectives provides a greater incentive for 
family members to maintain control over the firm (Harijono, Ariff & Tanewski, 2004; 
Bebchuck, 1999). Since these non-economic objectives may not be congruent with the 
objectives of stakeholders outside the dominant family coalition, family managers would 
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therefore be motivated to maintain decision-making control in order to ensure that these 
non-economic objectives remain within the company’s agenda. This situation could lead 
to family firm-specific agency costs. For instance, Claessens, Djankov and Fan (2002) 
and Villalonga and Amit (2006) provide evidence of these costs when control rights 
exceed cashflow rights in family firms. Carney (2005) suggests that family firms’ 
propensity to be parsimonious, arising from diverging firm objectives and resultant risk 
aversion, may be competitively disadvantageous in industries with high capital and 
research and development requirements5. 
In summary, personalism and particularism create divergent firm objectives and 
interests between principal and agent in family firms. The resultant increase in moral 
hazard, adverse selection, and hold-up agency threats lead to an increase in agency costs, 
specifically in greater opportunity costs of investments arising from the diversion of 
resources and lower risk tolerance exhibited by the dominant family coalition. Henceforth, 
the term family costs (FC) will be used to describe these family-specific agency costs. 
Thus, the following proposition can be postulated: 
Proposition 2: Family firms have greater divergence in firm objectives; hence attain 
family costs vis-à-vis non-family firms, ceteris paribus.  
2.5 Family Gains and Family Costs in a Nutshell 
It can be deduced from the discussion of family gains and family costs that the 
conflict in family business literature described earlier is in fact merely the paradoxical 
                                                 
5 Therefore, as a consequence of diverging firm objectives brought about by entrenchment (personalism) 
and altruism (particularism), Carney (2005) suggests that family firms’ propensity for parsimony may 
manifest as a driver for competitive disadvantage in family firms. 
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result of various literatures describing different disaggregate aspects of the agency 
relationships in family firms.  
On one hand, the presence of personalism and particularism inspires the 
convergence of ownership and management in family firms, and allows for the reduction 
of information asymmetry and related agency costs. On the other hand, personalism and 
particularism make it difficult for family stakeholders’ to separate their own non-
economic objectives from the profit maximizing economic objectives of the outside 
shareholders, and hence create family-specific agency costs. These paradoxical 
observations are illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: Effects of personalism and particularism to agency relationships.  
2.6 Moderating Effects of Family Involvement 
Family involvement is a crucial ingredient in the above agency dynamics. 
Specifically, the choice of the family firm’s governance and management structures alters 
the conditions of information asymmetry and diverging principal-agent objectives.  
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Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that an evaluation of polar opposites is advantageous in 
theory building. In the case of agency theory, while there has been ample literature on 
diffusely-owned professionally-managed firms, there has until recently been a dearth of 
attention paid to its polar opposite, that of the family-owned and managed firms (La Porta, 
De-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). Moreover, Mishra and McConaughy (1999) suggests that 
firms with higher levels of managerial ownership are more likely to be family controlled, 
thus are salient components of family firm studies. In fact, Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma 
(1999) suggest that the definition of family business is sometimes interpreted as family 
involvement in ownership and management. Ng (2005) maintains that managerial 
ownership is a useful proxy for family businesses in Asia. 
Hence, this dissertation examines the moderating effects of managerial ownership 
as a special case of governance and management symmetry in family firms, in evaluating 
agency family gains and family costs. For an owner-manager led family firm, it is posited 
that the distinctiveness of these two dynamics is even more pronounced than other types 
of family firms. On one hand, owner-manager led family firms maximize the benefits of 
agency-cost savings by eliminating all information asymmetry between owner and 
manager within the firm; on the other, they are more susceptible to agency costs arising 
from the divergence between economic and non-economic objectives within the firm. 
2.6.1 Information Symmetry in Managerial Ownership 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that the cost of reducing information 
asymmetries and their accompanying agency threats is lowest when owners directly 
participate in the management of the firm. Further, Fama and Jensen (1983) assume that 
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separation of ownership from control is the principal source of agency costs, and 
therefore these costs are eliminated when the firm is managed by a single owner. 
The positive effects of personalism and particularism between owners (principal) 
and managers (agent) are enhanced in family firms. Daily and Dollinger (1992) argue that 
organizations are potentially most efficient when decision-making and ownership 
functions are shared, since the potential for conflicting optimization paths is minimized 
(James, 1999). This implies that owner-manager led family firms are less prone to the 
detrimental effects of managerial discretion than other family firms. Mishra, Randoy and 
Jenssen (2001) find that family managers have the potential to reduce the moral hazards 
of combining ownership and control. Lee (2004) suggests that the concentration of 
ownership and control in family firms provides an advantageous position of monitoring 
the firm. Subsequently, Le-Breton Miller and Miller (2006) hypothesize that firms 
controlled and managed by family owners will generate more resources due to lower 
agency costs, and therefore will have more assets available to fund long-term investments. 
Consequently, the preceding discussion suggests that managerial ownership in 
family firms will have an advantage in converging information asymmetry between 
owners and managers over other types of firms. Therefore, this suggests that owner-
manager led family firms maximize the benefits of family gains by eliminating or 
reducing information asymmetry from owner-manager agency conflicts within the firm. 
2.6.2 Non-economic Objectives in Managerial Ownership 
Agency theory, as proposed by Berle and Means (1932), and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), assumes a rational model of wealth maximization. However, behavior economics 
assumptions note that individual (and, it could be inferred, dominant family coalitions) 
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are not perfectly rational, and have idiosyncratic tastes and preferences (Schulze, 
Lubatkin & Dino, 2003). These preferences may be economic or non-economic in 
character. For instance, McMahon and Stanger (1995) and Le Cornu, McMahon, Forsaith 
and Stanger (1996) suggest that these preferences may be influenced by firm-specific 
factors that deviate from an owner-manager’s wealth-maximization objective. McMahon 
and Stanger posit that an owner-manager’s concern over a firm’s risk, liquidity, 
diversification, transferability, flexibility, control and accountability are non-economic 
objectives that could influence the firm to adopt policies that are not congruent with a 
profit maximization objective. It is therefore difficult to simultaneously attain goal 
alignment and maximization of a myriad of preferences (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling & Dino 
2005). In other words, owners of widely-held firms prefer growth-oriented risking-taking 
with the ultimate goal of maximizing firm returns. In contrast, owner-managers define 
their value in terms of utility, hence, would be more amenable to taking risks 
commensurate with the preferences for certain outcomes, economic or otherwise 
(Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003). Managerial ownership, therefore, hampers the ability 
of stakeholders to agree on actions that affect the business (Lee, 2004). Moreover, Kelly, 
Athanassiou and Crittenden (2000) posit that owner-managers include their personal 
goals along with the strategic context in establishing the family firm’s business strategy. 
The authors also suggest that goals related to family roles may tend to take equal or 
greater importance than maximizing profits. This may then result in a negative effect on 
the firm’s performance despite a positive effect on the performance of the family’s 
objectives. 
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When owner-managers (agents) advance the family’s interest at the expense of 
stakeholders outside of the dominant family coalition (principals), the negative effects of 
personalism and particularism exacerbate agency cost problems (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino 
& Buchholtz, 2001). This implies that owner-manager led family firms have more 
undiversifiable personal risks in the business than other family firms. Further, managerial 
ownership reduces the effectiveness of external control mechanisms and exposes the firm 
to a self-control problem created by incentives that allow owner-managers unchallenged 
discretion over the use of the firm’s assets, potentially resulting in greater agency 
problems (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling & Dino 2005; Mishra, Randoy & Jenssen, 2001). 
Based on these analyses, it can be posited that owner-manager led family firms 
are more susceptible to divergent non-economic objectives between family and non-
family stakeholders than other types of firms. When family stakeholders expropriate 
value from the family firm, non-family stakeholders are adversely affected, hence giving 
rise to agency conflict. Thus, especially from the point-of-view of stakeholders not 
belonging within the dominant family group, it is posited that the additional non-
economic objectives pursued by owner-manager led family firms exacerbate family costs 
within the firm. 
2.6.3 Summary 
As a special case wherein ownership and management is unified, managerial 
ownership in family firms is viewed as having the maximum levels of family gains and 
family costs. As such, the following proposition is posited: 
Proposition 3: Family gains and family costs are greater in family firms under 
managerial ownership vis-à-vis other family firms, ceteris paribus.  
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2.7 Agency Trade-offs in Family Firms 
From the above discussion of agency theory, it is evident that family firms’ 
principal-agency conflict is more complex than non-family firms. Initially, family gains 
and family costs were deduced individually. In this section, the joint effects of family 
gains and family costs within the family firm is evaluated. Since, as discussed under 
Proposition 3, the levels of family gains and family costs among family firms differ 
across varying levels of ownership and management dominance, it can be posited that the 
effects from the trade-off between family gains and family costs on family firms differ 
across these same factors. This section begins its analysis by focusing on the simplest 
form ownership and management relationship, the owner-manager led family firm. Thus, 
assuming that the dominant family coalition is personified by an owner-manager, the 
agency dynamic is then captured by the following corollary: 
Corollary: An owner-manager will not undertake any action that is perceived to be 
adverse to the economic objectives of the family business; unless there are sufficient non-
economic objective incentives to do so. 
Consistent with the earlier discussion, this corollary implies that for a family firm 
with an owner-manager, there is zero agency costs related to the firm’s economic 
objectives due to zero information asymmetry between owner and manager. When 
compared equally to a non-family firm, the family firm will have potential cost-savings 
resulting from zero agency costs, ceteris paribus, hence attaining family gains. 
It can also be surmised from this corollary that for a family firm with an owner-
manager, actions detrimental to the economic objective of the firm (ie. agency costs) 
wholly stem from diversion of resources towards non-economic incentives. Concurrently, 
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the loss of value that arises when an owner-manager pursues non-economic objectives of 
the business relate to family costs. 
The above corollary suggests that for an owner-managed family firm, all agency 
costs and cost-savings are purely family costs and family gains, respectively. 
Consequently, it is possible to analyze owner-manager family firms’ agency dynamic by 
comparing them against non-family firms under economic modeling. This corollary can 
be analyzed under a two-period utility maximization model. 
2.7.1 Welfare of the Non-family Firm 
For a non-family firm, the two-period utility maximization model was first 
proposed by Fisher (1930). Since this model is already broadly known, it is presented, as 
described by James (1999), in Appendix 1. This model suggests that economic objectives 
are the overarching driver of utility in widely-held non-family firms. Figure 2.4 illustrates 
this condition: 
Utility of Non-Family Firms
Non-Family Business
Economic Objectives
Financial Performance
Agency Costs
Separation of Ownership
& Management
 
Figure 2.4: Drivers of utility in widely-held non-family firms 
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2.7.2 Welfare of the Family Firm 
This study posits that family firms are intrinsically different from non-family 
firms such that the two-period welfare model presented in Appendix 1, which describes 
the dynamics within widely-held non-family firms, will also be different for family 
businesses. For family firms, the presence of family gains, family costs and the utility of 
the family’s non-economic objectives alters the profit-maximization function of the 
welfare model from Appendix 1. Thus, based on the aforementioned model, it is possible 
to incorporate these family-based factors to observe how the utility of family firms will 
differ from those of widely-held non-family firms. From our earlier governance 
assumption, consider the utility function of a family firm, represented by an owner-
manager. It is assumed that Wealth (W) of the firm is limited such that the owner-
manager will need to trade-off consumption today between the business’ needs 
(economic objectives) and the family’s needs (non-economic objectives). Further, α is a 
weighting factor that represents the owner-manager’s relative preference for the latter 
over the former. C1* represents the firm’s total consumption today of both economic and 
non-economic objectives. Thus, when α = 1, C1* represents the total consumption of the 
family’s non-economic objectives. Likewise, when α = 0, C1* represents the business’ 
economic needs today. Consequently, it can be surmised that *1C)1( ⋅−α and *C1⋅α are 
the family firm’s compromise of the current period’s consumption between economic and 
non-economic objectives, given wealth constraints. 
From the firm’s point-of-view, the family’s consumption of the firm’s resources is 
an agency burden borne by the firm. It is a value that is related to the combination of 
agency cost-savings and agency costs arising from the family pursuing its family (non-
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economic) objectives. Therefore, *C1⋅α  can be viewed as the family firm’s agency 
costs over its agency cost-savings. In other words, for an owner-managed firm this can be 
expressed as:  
G1 AF  *C −=⋅ Cα  
 
The above relationship for family firms can be incorporated into the two-period 
model discussed in Appendix 1, given: 
 U(C1*,C2*) utility function for consumption (C) in period 1 (now) and 2 
     (future) for the family firm’s owner-manager; 
  V(C1*)  The family firm (owner-manager)’s utility function for the  
    preferred non-economic consumption in period 1; 
  W  wealth; 
 K  investment in firm; 
 W-K   consumption; 
 F(K)  return on investment; 
 (1+d)  subjective discount factor; 
 (1+r)  market discount factor; 
 α  relative preference of owner-manager for family needs over 
    the business; 
 AG  family gains; 
 FC  family costs; 
 *C1⋅α  family costs (FC) - family gains (AG). 
The owner-manager’s utility function can be modeled as follows: 
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)u(C2 )C1 v( )C1)1(u(  )C2,U(C1
*
****
++⋅+⋅−= αα    (equation 2.1) 
This assumes that the standard economic condition of diminishing returns in utility holds. 
This equation is maximized subject to a budget constraint: 
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**
++−=+++− αα    (equation 2.1a) 
Or as simply: 
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Taking the lagrangian process for the choice variables:   
 
(equation 2.2) 
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Combining the terms in the investment equations (equation 2.2a) and (equation 2.2b): 
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When combined with (equation 2.2c), results in: 
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Note that when d=0, the manager does not prefer to consume today or in the future: 
[ ]
*
2
*
1
*
1
k u
u)1(v
F
αα −+⋅=  
Subsequently, the family firm’s welfare function is evaluated under different 
family trade-off scenarios. These scenarios are examined from the perspective of the 
business’ stakeholders who are interested in the outcome of the economic objectives of 
the firm. 
2.7.2.1 Case 1 [α=0] 
Observe that when family gains (AG) equals family costs (FC): 
0AF gc =− ,  then 
0  *C1 =⋅α , and hence 0  =α . 
The ) v(C1*⋅α and *C1⋅α  terms cancel out in equation 2.2, which transforms into 
equation 1.2. This means that the family’s consumption is exactly satisfied by the firm’s 
family gains (AG) such that there is no further agency burden to the firm. Subsequently, 
the model can be optimized to result in equation 1.3. In other words, when family gains 
and family costs are equal, family firms behave similarly to that of ordinary non-family 
firms. 
2.7.2.2 Case 2 [α>0] 
If family costs (FC) are greater than family gains (AG), observe that:  
0AF gc >− ,  then 
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0  *C1 >⋅α , and hence 0  >α .6 
When compared against the utility function of a non-family firm, the family firm is 
unable to derive the same utility from its current consumption, without sacrificing future 
consumption. The optimal investment function for both family firm and non-family firm 
can be compared as 
[ ]
2
1
*
2
*
1
*
1
k u
u
u
u)1(vF =−+⋅= αα  respectively. When 1*1 uu)1( =− α , 
then 2
*
2 uu >  , and likewise 2*2 CC <  . Thus, the family firm will have to consume less 
in the future period in order to attain the same utility as a non-family firm in the current 
period from a business perspective. Therefore, in terms of the businesses’ economic 
objectives, family firms are worse off than non-family firms when 0  >α . 
Concurrently, this implies that the family firm is worse off than the non-family 
firm when family costs (FC) are greater than family gains (AG). Moreover, this implies 
that there is a need to satisfy two distinct utility functions (the economic and non-
economic objectives) for family firms, instead of only one (the economic objectives) for 
non-family firms.  
This is intuitively verified with an analysis of the budget constraints: 
r)(1
C2  C1)( C1)1(
*
**
+++− αα  and r)(1
C2  C1 ++  
for the family and non-family firm respectively. When 0  >α , then C1C1)1( * <−α  
if C2C2* = ; and conversely, C2C2* <  if C1C1)1( * =−α . Such findings are consistent 
with proposition 2. 
                                                 
6 It can be reasonably assumed that X ≥ 0 since X is the family’s preferred consumption of the firm’s 
wealth today. When X is negative, this suggests the family is infusing wealth (or capital) into the firm 
which would increase the value of W. Thus, a negative value of X can simply be viewed as X = 0 and a 
greater value for W. 
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2.7.2.3 Case 3 [α<0] 
Finally, if family gains (AG) are greater than family costs (FC), observe that: 
0AF gc <− ,  then 
0  *C1 <⋅α ,and hence 0  <α . 
When compared against the utility function of a non-family firm, the family firm has the 
ability to derive the same utility from its current period’s business consumption while 
increasing future consumption. The optimal investment function for both family firm and 
non-family firm can be compared as:  
[ ]
2
1
*
2
*
1
*
1
k u
u
u
u)1(v
F =−+⋅= αα   
respectively. When 1
*
1 uu)1( =−α , then 2*2 uu <  , and likewise 2*2 CC >  . Thus, the 
family firm will be able to consume more in the future period while maintaining the same 
welfare as a non-family firm in the current period from a business perspective. Therefore, 
in terms of the business’ economic objectives, family firms are better off than non-family 
firms when 0  <α . 
Concurrently, this implies that the family firm is better off than the non-family 
firm when family costs (FC) are less than family gains (AG). This is intuitively validated 
with an analysis of the budget constraints: 
r)(1
C2  C1)( C1)1(
*
**
+++− αα  and r)(1
C2  C1 ++  
for the family and non-family firm respectively. When 0  <α , then C1C1)1( * >−α  
if C2C2* = ; and conversely, C2C2* <  if C1C1)1( * =−α . This implies that the firm will 
be able to consume more for today than what is optimally required by the business. In 
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general, this means that family firms are wholly better off than non-family firms when 
family gains (AG) are greater than family costs (FC) because they will attain excess gains 
to supplement their overall wealth ( *C1W ⋅+ α ) or greater investment opportunities. 
Such findings are consistent with proposition 1. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates economic objectives and non-economic objectives as the 
drivers of utility in family firms. 
Utility of Family Firms
Family Business
Economic Objectives Non-Economic Objectives
FAMILY GAINS FAMILY COSTS
 
Figure 2.5: Drivers of utility in family firms 
 
Thus, from the above examination, it can be inferred that the distinctive mix 
between family gains and family costs observed from owner-manager led family firms 
lead to either advantages or disadvantages unique from one firm to another. Initially, 
agency trade-offs were analyzed under the lens of managerial ownership to disaggregate 
family gains and family costs from the principal-agent dynamics and model them under a 
two-period model. However, it can be inferred that although the study initially isolates 
family gains and family costs from owner-manager led family firms, agency trade-offs are 
indigenous to all family firms because the conditions that allow these relationships to 
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exist (primarily personalism, particularism and non-economic utility) can be found in all 
types of family businesses.  
The trade-off between these agency cost-savings and costs (AG - FC) results in 
competitive advantages (if family gains are larger than family costs; AG > FC) or 
disadvantages (if family gains are less than family costs; AG < FC) for a family firm vis-à-
vis a non-family firm (all else being equal). Such an analysis is compatible with the 
resource-based perspective of the family business. 
2.7.3 Integrating Agency Trade-offs and RBV 
The resource-based view in family business describes the unique and inimitable 
resources in family firms essential in developing competitive advantages against non-
family firms. When a family firm’s family gains exceed family costs, the resultant 
competitive advantages against rival firms (ceteris paribus) over a sustained period of 
time can be viewed as a particular type of this familiness resource. 
Mathematically, such a relationship can be expressed as: 
1. When AG > FC for the family firm; 
2. Then AG - FC = Competitive Advantage for the family firm; 
3. And as t → ∞, where t = time; 
4. Then ∑( AGt - FCt ) = Sustainable competitive advantage for the family firm. 
On the flipside, sustained competitive disadvantage against rival firms occurs 
when a family firm’s family costs exceed family gains over an extended period of time, 
and can be viewed as a resource favoring the rival firm.  
Conceptually, in an owner-manager led family firm, the overlap of ownership and 
management may create advantages from streamlined and efficient monitoring systems, 
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lower administrative costs, and speedy decision making (Poza, 2006). When these 
advantages continually surpass family costs pertaining to non-economic objectives of the 
family firm, then the family firm has a sustainable competitive advantage over an equal 
non-family firm that does not have access to such cost-savings. Such a sustainable 
competitive advantage could in part explain why family businesses have been found to 
consistently outperform non-family businesses (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). 
Other family business literature has suggested there is a significant link between 
the agency and resource-based framework (Chrisman, Chua & Sharma, 2005; Dyer, 2006; 
Blanco-Mazagatos, Quevedo-Puente & Castrillo 2007). Indeed, Blanco-Mazagatos, 
Quevedo-Puente and Castrillo (2007) recommend the combination of both the agency 
view and the resource-based view in studying family business phenomena. The 
implication of the agency trade-off approach proposed in this dissertation is that it is 
possible to define agency theory as a subset, albeit an essential one, of the resource-based 
framework. To a certain extent, agency trade-offs give rise to the conditions necessary for 
family firms to develop familiness resources. This in turn becomes the source of the 
firms’ sustainable competitive advantage. Based on Habbershon’s (2006) ecosystem 
familiness approach, family gains and family costs can be viewed as f+ familiness and f- 
familiness respectively. In RBV parlance, positive agency trade-offs result in capabilities 
that provide familiness resources necessary in establishing competitive advantages. This 
validates agency trade-offs as part of the family business ecosystem. Further, this implies 
that family firms with governance strategies might really be able to develop resources 
that enable sustained competitive advantages. In other words, manipulation of agency 
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relationships in family firms can be viewed as the means (agency trade-offs) to an end 
(RBV competitive advantage).  
2.7.4 Mean-reversion of Agency Trade-offs 
The above discussion has shown that it is possible for family firms to have 
competitive disadvantages resulting from lower family gains vis-à-vis family costs ( AG < 
FC). However, in a highly competitive environment, it is unlikely such a sustained 
competitive disadvantage would be allowed to perpetuate across time. Lubatkin, Schulze, 
Ling and Dino (2005) suggest that family firms that reach the third generation are 
products of selection bias and have managed to put systems in place to avoid such 
sustained competitive disadvantages. This suggests that sustainable competitive 
advantages that arise from agency trade-offs can only diminish up to a point wherein 
family gains equals family costs or (AG - FC = 0). Therefore, the following can be posited 
that a family firm cannot sustain competitive disadvantage in governance (AG<FC) 
indefinitely. 
Similar to an investor holding a liquidation option on an investment, family 
businesses will not tolerate a sustained competitive disadvantage over a period of time. 
Owners and members of the family beholden to the business will have an option to either: 
(1) close down the family business, (2) have some members sell off, (3) split the business, 
or (4) adopt governance measures that would essentially transform the business into a 
professionalized business. In other words, a family business with sustained AG < FC either 
dies off, becomes a non-family business, or finds a fit that would create a congruence 
towards an AG > FC or AG = FC equilibrium. From a portfolio perspective, a collection of 
family firms should behave as having an AG > FC or AG = FC equilibrium in the long-run. 
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This selection bias view of the family firm is consistent with Jensen’s (2001) enlightened 
stakeholder theory, which suggests that the organizational structure of the firm adopts the 
long-term value maximization of its various stakeholders. Consistent with this notion, 
Blanco-Mazagatos, Quevedo-Puente and Castrillo (2007) provide empirical evidence to 
show that family firms have a progressive bias towards adopting resource structure 
conditions similar to non-family firms over succeeding generations. The following 
proposition encapsulates the preceding concepts: 
Proposition 4: In competitive environments, the trade-off between the family gains and 
family costs of a family firm result in competitive advantages against rival non-family 
firms, ceteris paribus. 
2.8 Moderating Effects of Family Involvement 
So far, the previous discussions have highlighted the distinctive qualities of 
family business over non-family business under static governance circumstances. 
Moreover, it was earlier suggested that agency trade-offs are indigenous to all family 
firms without elaborating on the conditions that moderate these agency dynamics. 
However, extant literature suggests that the performance of family firms differ across 
varying definitions and levels of family involvement (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester & 
Cannella, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Clearly, the degree to which families 
influence and are involved within the business moderates the behaviour and performance 
of family firms. 
The level of family influence within a firm varies, thus leading to differing levels 
of personalism and particularism, and hence, differing levels of agency gains and agency 
costs among different family firms. The model in Section 2.6 utilizes managerial 
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ownership within family firms as a proxy for a high degree of family involvement with 
the notion that as the dominant family coalition undertakes more roles within the business, 
the more involved and influential they become (Mustakallio, Autio & Zahra, 2002; 
Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007). Hence, by relaxing the initial assumption of managerial 
ownership, it is possible to highlight the effects of the varying degrees of family 
involvement. Consequently, the following question is analyzed: what is the agency trade-
off environment when this initial assumption of the owner-manager led family firm is 
relaxed? 
Agency trade-off analysis provides a conceptual notion of how owner-manager 
led family business outperforms non-family firms. Research into the performance of 
founder-led firms such as James (1999), Villalonga and Amit (2006) and McConaughy, 
Matthews and Fialko (2001), among others, provides empirical evidence to support this 
concept. In a related vein, Miller, Le-Breton Miller, Lester and Cannella (2007) suggest 
that only lone-founder businesses exhibit superior market valuation performance. Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) indicate that the relationship between agency costs and 
managerial ownership is curvilinear. The authors find evidence to suggest that agency 
problems are most severe in the midrange of managerial ownership distribution. They 
argue that in this range, owner-managers enjoy sufficient power to pursue their own 
personal (for instance, the family’s non-economic) objectives at the expense of other 
shareholders, with relatively less harm to their own cashflow rights than owner-managers 
who have higher concentration of ownership. In a family business context, this can be 
rationally viewed as: the trade-off between family gains and family costs will approach to 
negative as family interests in the firm decrease. On the other end of the spectrum, as 
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concentration of ownership becomes more highly-diffused, professionalization of the 
firm’s governance eliminates potential family costs, albeit at the expense of potential 
family gains. For instance, Blanco-Mazagatos, Quevedo-Puente and Castrillo (2007) 
illustrate that agency costs advantages progressively disappear as the concentration of 
family ownership is diffused over time. This lends credence to the notion that when 
assumption of managerial ownership as the form of family firm governance is relaxed, 
agency trade-off relationships vary across different forms of governance at a diminishing 
rate comparative to the concentration of family ownership and management. 
Proposition 5: Sustained competitive advantages from the trade-off between family gains 
and family costs diminish as family ownership and/or family management in the firm 
decrease. 
Empirical evidence of the performance effects of the family’s leadership in 
governance and management roles is mixed. Steier (2001) suggests that when governance 
and management roles within the family firm reside among separate family members, it is 
possible to sustain positive agency trade-offs (AG > FC) albeit competitive advantages are 
somewhat depleted. Villalonga and Amit (2006) provide empirical evidence that when 
governance and management roles within the family firm reside in a family member and 
a non-family member respectively, either (AG > FC) if the firm is founder led or (AG = FC) 
if the firm is non-founder led, is observed. Finally, when governance and management 
roles within the family firm reside in a non-family member and a family member 
respectively, Randoy and Goel (2003), and Villalonga and Amit (2004) both provide 
empirical evidence that (AG < FC) is generally observed among family businesses. Table 
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2.1 summarizes this synthesis of agency trade-offs and extant empirical literature in 
family firm governance. 
Table 2.1. Literature on family firm governance and inferred agency trade-off 
Authors Governance and Management 
Roles in Family Firms 
Agency Trade-off Inferred 
Miller, Le-Breton 
Miller, Lester & 
Cannella (2007) 
 
Lone Founder (AG > FC) 
Steier (2001) Family member Chairman and 
Family member CEO 
 
(AG > FC) 
Villalonga & Amit 
(2006) 
Family member Chairman and 
Non-family member CEO 
 
(AG > FC) or (AG = FC) 
Randoy & Goel (2003) 
Villalonga & Amit 
(2006) 
 
Non-family member Chairman 
and Family member CEO 
(AG < FC) 
 
It is necessary to note that several factors may play an important moderating role 
to this relationship. First, the level of successor commitment, and hence, the family’s 
lifecycle, may affect the level and quality of family involvement within the business. 
Sharma and Irving (2005) argue that the type of successor commitment (affective, 
normative, calculative and imperative) produce differing types of discretionary 
behaviours. In turn, this will lead to varying levels of firm performance and effectiveness. 
Empirical findings from Villalonga and Amit (2006),  Miller, Le-Breton Miller, Lester 
and Cannella (2007) and Blanco-Mazagatos, Quevedo-Puente and Castrillo (2007), 
among others, support this notion. 
Second, the family firm’s business and legal environment may affect the family’s 
involvement within the firm. La Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) argue that the 
quality of shareholder protection moderates the level of family ownership within a certain 
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country or territory. Countries with poor investor protection tend to have controlling 
shareholders who wield greater control rights than cashflow rights. This implies that in 
countries with weak legal rules for protecting minority shareholders, family cost related 
agency problems is exacerbated. The empirical findings detailed above were undertaken 
in countries in which there is an environment of strong legal protection. On the other 
hand, Ng (2005) provides empirical evidence that for Hong Kong, which she argues has 
less a developed legal environment, agency problems are least severe in the mid-range of 
the managerial ownership spectrum. Agency costs are severe under managerial 
ownership since owner-managers face less legal obstacles to pursue their non-economic 
objectives and expropriate wealth from other stakeholders. Likewise, agency costs are 
also severe under a widely-held professionally managed governance structure since 
managers have less legal obstacles to obtain private benefits at the expense of owners. 
Interestingly, although also curvilinear, these findings are opposite than that of Morck, 
Shliefer and Vishny’s (1988) results. 
2.9 Assumptions and Limitations 
This research adopts Chua, Chrisman and Sharma’s (1999) definition of the 
family business. The presence of the dominant family group and their future vision is 
necessary to highlight the personalistic and particularistic behaviors in family agency 
relationships. Birley (2002, 2003) finds that family businesses worldwide can be 
clustered into two groups. Firms under the Family-In group believe that the business is 
stronger with the family members involved. Firms under the Family-Out group believe 
that the family should not be involved with the business whatsoever. Chua, Chrisman and 
Sharma’s (1999) definition is more consistent with the Family-In cluster. Subsequently, it 
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is interesting to see how family firm behavior and hence, agency relationships suggested 
above, interacts with the Family-Out cluster. This also, opens further avenues for future 
research. 
This conceptual research may be limited by endogeneity issues. This pertains to 
the problem of establishing causality. Specifically, family firm value could be a 
determinant of the ownerships structure and behavior rather than being determined by it 
(Ng, 2005). To establish causality, empirical tests such as linear regression analysis on 
dependent variables adequately representing family gains and family costs against 
independent variables such as family ownership, lifecycle stage and family governance 
strategies is incorporated in the succeeding research design. 
2.10 Summary 
As illustrated in Figure 2.6, this chapter is conceptually organized as follows: 
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FAMILY BUSINESS
moderated by the family’s 
influence & involvement
is defined by 
Dominant Family Coalition 
&
Long-Term Family Vision
characterized by
Personalism & Particularism
which leads to
Lower information 
asymmetries
resulting in
Agency Cost-Savings
Family gains 
Greater divergence in 
Firm objectives
resulting in
Agency Costs
Family costs 
 
Figure 2.6: The Agency Ttade-off Model: Conceptual framework of the study.  
 
This study suggests that agency relationships in family firms are different and 
more complex than those in non-family firms. Family firms’ personalistic and 
particularistic behavior influences the convergence of information asymmetry, and 
divergence of conflicts in interest and objectives, vis-à-vis non-family firms. Their effects 
can be disaggregated into family gains and family costs which are then jointly evaluated 
under an Agency Trade-off Model. Subsequently, the family’s personalism and 
particularism can be managed to attain competitive advantages from agency trade-offs. 
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From a resource-based viewpoint, these imply that family firms that develop strategies in 
firm governance may be able to extract resources and capabilities necessary in building 
sustainable competitive advantages. The Agency Trade-off Model, therefore, provides the 
link that integrates the agency framework and resource-based view in family firms. 
The following table summarizes the propositions and the accompanying corollary 
posited in this paper. 
Table 2.2 Summary of Propositions 
Proposition Description 
Proposition 1 Family firms have lower information asymmetry; hence attain family 
gains vis-à-vis non-family firms, ceteris paribus. 
 
Proposition 2 Family firms have greater divergence in firm objectives; hence attain 
family costs vis-à-vis non-family firms, ceteris paribus. 
 
Proposition 3 Family gains and family costs are greater in family firms under 
managerial ownership vis-à-vis other family firms, ceteris paribus.  
 
Corollary An owner-manager will not undertake any action that is perceived to 
be adverse to the economic objectives of the family business; unless 
there are sufficient non-economic objective incentives to do so. 
 
Proposition 4 In competitive environments, the trade-off between the family gains 
and family costs of a family firm result in competitive advantages 
against rival non-family firms, ceteris paribus. 
 
Proposition 5 Sustained competitive advantages from the trade-off between family 
gains and family costs diminish as family ownership and/or family 
management in the firm decrease. 
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Chapter 3. Research Design 
3.1 Introduction 
The prior two chapters identified agency theory in family firms as a critical link in 
family business research, and provided a theoretical framework, via managerial 
ownership, to conduct empirical analysis of family firms’ agency dynamics. This chapter 
describes the research method used in empirically testing propositions established in the 
previous chapters. 
Chapter 3 proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 provides an overview of the research 
design. Section 3.3 describes the sample period, sample selection and data collection 
procedures employed in the research method. Section 3.4 details the operationalization of 
the constructs used to test the hypotheses. Section 3.5 highlights the statistical techniques 
to be undertaken in the research. Finally, Section 3.6 summarizes the chapter. 
3.2 Research Design 
The propositions set out in the previous chapters lay the foundations for the 
subsequent empirical testing of six hypotheses. Our earlier analysis suggests that the 
presence of a dominant family coalition and family vision provide sufficient and 
necessary conditions for family firms to develop personalistic and particularistic 
behaviors. These behaviors lead to the formulations of Proposition One and Proposition 
Two. Proposition One suggests that personalism and particularism reduces information 
asymmetry in family firms and generate agency-cost savings (family gains). Proposition 
Two suggests that personalism and particularism engender non-economic objectives and 
hence and generate agency-costs (family costs). Proposition Three describes a special 
case wherein family gains and family costs are at optimal levels when family involvement 
Agency Trade-offs in Family Firms: Theoretical Model, Empirical Testing and Implications 
Mark Yupitun 11089061 67
in governance and management is unified. Proposition Four suggests the interaction 
between family gains and family costs, in the long-run, creates sustainable competitive 
advantages that explain why family firms perform differently than non-family firms. 
Finally, Proposition Five suggests that family firms under managerial ownership will 
have greater family gains and family costs than other types of family firms. 
Consequently, the research design utilizes six hypotheses to test the validity of 
these propositions within an Australian business setting. Hypothesis 1a seeks to show that 
family gains are significantly observable among family firms, as described in Proposition 
One. Conversely, Hypothesis 2a seeks to show that family costs can be observed among 
family firms, as described in Proposition Two. Hypothesis 1b attempts to identify the 
incremental family gains in managerial ownership described in Proposition Three. 
Hypothesis 2b specifically deals with isolating the incremental effects of managerial 
ownership on family costs that is likewise described in Proposition Three. Hypothesis 3a 
is a conditional hypothesis dependent on the results of Hypothesis 1a and 2a. This 
hypothesis may show whether the presence of family gains and/or family costs translate 
in performance differences between family and non-family firms, as described in 
Proposition Four. Finally, Hypothesis 3b is a conditional hypothesis that tests for the 
incremental agency trade-off effects of managerial ownership in family firms, consistent 
with Proposition Five. Subsequently, this study performs inductive validations of these 
propositions utilizing statistical analysis on ex-post facto archival data. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the links between the theoretical propositions and, as will be discussed in 
further detail in later sections, the empirical hypotheses. 
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual propositions and empirical hypotheses. 
 
Subsequently, Table 3.1 illustrates the causal relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables within these theoretical hypotheses. These 
relationships are further explained in the succeeding sections. 
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Table 3.1 Causal relationships of variables within hypotheses 
Hypothesis 
 
Test Relationship Description 
Hypothesis 1a: Family firms 
positively influence family 
gains from lower earnings 
management than that of non-
family firms. 
 
 Family ownership (independent 
variable) reduces the level of 
earnings management 
(dependent variable) among 
firms. 
Hypothesis 1b: Family firms 
under managerial ownership 
have greater family gains from 
lower earnings 
management than other family 
firms. 
 
 Family ownership, moderated by 
managerial ownership, 
(independent variable) reduces 
the level of earnings 
management (dependent 
variable) among family firms. 
Hypothesis 2a: Family firms 
positively influence family 
costs from higher capital 
structure variation than that of 
non-family firms. 
 
 Family ownership (independent 
variable) increases the capital 
structure variation (dependent 
variable) among firms. 
Hypothesis 2b: Family firms 
under managerial ownership 
positively influence family 
costs from higher capital 
structure variation than that of 
other family firms. 
 
 Family ownership, moderated by 
managerial ownership, 
(independent variable) increases 
the capital structure variation 
(dependent variable) among 
firms. 
Hypothesis 3a: Family firms 
have higher performance 
measures than non-family 
firms, consistent with the 
outcome of Hypotheses 1a and 
2a. 
 
 Family ownership (independent 
variable) increases firm 
performance (dependent 
variable) among firms. 
Hypothesis 3b: Family firms 
under managerial ownership 
have higher performance 
measures than other forms of 
family firms, consistent with 
the results of Hypotheses 1b 
and 2b. 
 
 Family ownership, moderated by 
managerial ownership, 
(independent variable) increases 
firm performance (dependent 
variable) among firms. 
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3.2.1 Family Gains Construct 
The presence of family gains in family firms is identified via Hypothesis 1a. 
Moreover, the presence of incremental family gains in owner-manager family firms over 
other family firms is identified via Hypothesis 1b.  
Family gains is operationalized in this research as earnings management. 
Earnings management is the outcome of some discretion and flexibility in decision-
making managers have in reporting their financial performance (Bugshan, 2005). 
Measurement of earnings management represents the cost-savings that accrue from a 
convergence in information asymmetry among owners and managers. Family gain 
drivers such as lower monitoring costs, leadership stability and relational governance 
create cost-savings because information asymmetry convergence reduces the threat of 
detrimental managerial discretion in decision-making. For public companies, a key area 
of discretion managers exercise authority on is accounting discretion, which can be 
empirically tested as earnings management (Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005). 
The subsequent hypotheses can be expressed as: 
Hypothesis 1a: Family firms positively influence family gains from lower earnings 
management than that of non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 1b: Family firms under managerial ownership have greater family gains from 
lower earnings management than other family firms. 
Hypothesis 1a substantiates Proposition One which posits that family firms in 
general have family gains above non-family firms ceteris paribus. Hypothesis 1b relates 
to Proposition Three which posits that an owner-manager led family firm has zero 
information asymmetry, hence incur greater family gains vis-à-vis other types of firms.  
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Bowen, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2004) suggest that agency cost-savings 
from managerial ownership may result from lesser propensity for owner-managers to 
manage accounting earnings. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) indicate that 
managers are willing to give up real economic benefit and pursue earnings management 
in order to satisfy the implicit expectations of owners. Consequently, owner-manager 
firms are expected to exhibit lower earnings management than family firms, and family 
firms are expected to exhibit lower earnings management than non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 1a can be modeled as follows: 
Earnings Management = β0 + β1Family + β2Age + β3Size + β4Asset_  Tangibility + 
β5Industry_Consumer + β6Industry_Staples + β7Industry_Energy + 
β8Industry_Financials + β9Industry_Healthcare + β10Industry_Industrials + 
β11Industry_Information Technology + β12Industry_Materials + β13Industry_Telecom + 
β14Industry_Utilities + ε 
 
And Hypothesis 1b can be modeled as follows: 
Earnings Management = β0 + β1Family*Governance + β2Age + β3Size + β4Asset_  
Tangibility + β5Industry_Consumer + β6Industry_Staples + β7Industry_Energy + 
β8Industry_Financials + β9Industry_Healthcare + β10Industry_Industrials + 
β11Industry_Information Technology + β12Industry_Materials + β13Industry_Telecom + 
β14Industry_Utilities + ε 
 
Where: 
Earnings Management is the firm’s absolute value of modified Jones’ abnormal accruals 
as described in section 3.4.1; 
Family is a binary dummy variable wherein 1 represents a family firm and 0 represents a 
non-family firm; 
Governance is a binary dummy variable wherein 1 represents an owner-manager form of 
governance and 0 if otherwise. A firm follows an owner-manager form of governance 
when the firm’s CEO and directorship are represented by a family member; 
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Family*Governance is an interaction variable7 that reveals whether or not the owner-
manager form of governance is significantly different from other forms of family firm 
governance; 
Age is a measure of the firm’s age and is measured as one plus the log of years from 
incorporation; 
Size represents firm size and is measure as the log of firm’s total assets for 2006; 
Asset Tangibility represents the ratio of fixed assets within the firm is measured as the 
ratio of property, plant, and equipment over total assets at the end of the financial year; 
Industry is a binary dummy variable wherein 1 represents each firm’s particular industry 
(consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financials, healthcare, industrials, 
information technology, materials, telecommunication and industry) according to the  
Australian Stock Exchange Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) classification, 
and 0 if otherwise. 
The expectations of Hypothesis 1a can be written mathematically as: 
H1a0: β1 ≥ 0 
H1aa: β1 < 0 
This indicates that Hypothesis 1a is substantiated if the estimator of earnings 
management is significant and negative for family firms. 
The expectations of Hypothesis 1b can be written mathematically as: 
H1b0: β1 ≥ 0 or β1 ≥ β1(H1a)   
H1ba: β1 < 0 and β1 < β1(H1a) 
                                                 
7 Note that this variable represents the interaction between two variables, Family and Governance, that 
employ binary values. In this situation, there is no need to include both direct and interaction variables for  
Family and Governance into the model since doing so will introduce multi-collinearity problems. Within 
this context, the inclusion of (only) the interaction variable into the model is more appropriate. 
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Results from Hypothesis 1b is contingent upon Hypothesis 1a. The above expectations 
indicate that Hypothesis 1b is substantiated if (1) the estimator of earnings management 
is significant and negative for family firms under managerial ownership and, (2) the 
estimator of earnings management of owner-managed family firms in this hypothesis is 
less than the estimator of earnings management of family firms in Hypothesis 1a. 
3.2.2 Family Costs Construct 
The presence of Family Costs in family firms is identified via Hypothesis 2a. 
Moreover, the presence of family costs in owner-manager family firms is identified via 
Hypothesis 2b.  
Family costs are operationalized in this research as capital structure variation. On 
one hand, Mishra and McConaughy (1999) and Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) 
suggest that entrenchment and altruism make some family firms more risk averse, and 
would hence prefer lower leverage requirements. On the other hand, Harris and Raviv 
(1988) and Stultz (1988) provide the conceptual foundation to suggest that family firms 
may prefer higher levels of debt than that of issuing new equity, in order to maintain 
control over the family firm. In both situations, the capital structure decisions of family 
firms may deviate from optimal capital structure levels in the market. Proposition Two 
shows that when family firms transfer capital towards family objectives instead of 
maximizing the firm’s future growth, hence making capital structure decisions under the 
presence of non-economic objectives, these firms may be willing to sacrifice potential 
future profitable opportunities. These opportunity costs distinguish family firms from 
non-family firms, ceteris paribus, and are identified as family costs. Further, consistent 
with our two-period family firm utility model in Section 2.7.2.2, the family firms’ 
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reduction in future consumption opportunities arising from excess family costs may 
coincide with greater variations from optimal leverage requirements. Therefore, it can be 
inferred from these analyses that the family firms’ adoption of capital structures that have 
greater variation to the market’s optimal capital structure than that of non-family firms 
ceteris paribus signals the presence of family costs. 
The subsequent hypotheses can be expressed as: 
Hypothesis 2a: Family firms positively influence family costs from higher capital 
structure variation than that of non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 2b: Family firms under managerial ownership positively influence family 
costs from higher capital structure variation than that of other family firms. 
Hypothesis 2a seeks to validate Proposition Two which posits that family firms in 
general have family costs above non-family firms ceteris paribus. Hypothesis 2b relates to 
Proposition Three which posits that owner-manager led family firms have a greater 
divergence in non-economic objectives vis-à-vis other types of family firms, hence incurs 
greater family costs.  
Hypothesis 2a can be modeled as follows: 
Capital Structure Variation = β0 + β1Family + β2Age + β3Size + β4Asset_  Tangibility + 
β5Industry_Consumer + β6Industry_Staples + β7Industry_Energy + 
β8Industry_Financials + β9Industry_Healthcare + β10Industry_Industrials + 
β11Industry_Information Technology + β12Industry_Materials + β13Industry_Telecom + 
β14Industry_Utilities + β15Profitability + β16Operating Risk + β17Non-Debt Tax Shield + 
β18Effective Tax Rate + ε 
 
And Hypothesis 2b can be modeled as follows: 
Capital Structure Variation= β0 +β1Family*Governance + β2Age + β3Size + β4Asset_  
Tangibility + β5Industry_Consumer + β6Industry_Staples + β7Industry_Energy + 
β8Industry_Financials + β9Industry_Healthcare + β10Industry_Industrials + 
β11Industry_Information Technology + β12Industry_Materials + β13Industry_Telecom + 
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β14Industry_Utilities + β15Profitability + β16Operating Risk + β17Non-Debt Tax Shield + 
β18Effective Tax Rate + ε 
 
Where: 
Capital structure variation represents the variation between the firm’s ratio of debt-to-
market value of equity and the optimal capital structure ratio represented by the market’s 
ratio of debt-to-market value of equity; 
Family is a binary dummy variable wherein 1 represents a family firm and 0 represents a 
non-family firm; 
Governance is a binary dummy variable wherein 1 represents an owner-manager form of 
governance and 0 if otherwise. A firm follows an owner-manager form of governance 
when the firm’s CEO and directorship are represented by a family member; 
Family*Governance is an interaction variable that reveals whether or not the owner-
manager form of governance is significantly different from other forms of family firm 
governance; 
Age is a measure of the firm’s age and is measured as one plus the log of years from 
incorporation; 
Size represents firm size and is measure as the log of firm’s total assets for 2006; 
Asset Tangibility represents the ratio of fixed assets within the firm is measured as the 
ratio of property, plant, and equipment over total assets at the end of the financial year. 
This measure controls for control risk among firms (Mishra & McCounaghy, 1999; 
Titman & Wessels, 1988); 
Industry is a binary dummy variable wherein 1 represents each firm’s particular industry 
(consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financials, healthcare, industrials, 
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information technology, materials, telecommunication and industry) according to the  
Australian Stock Exchange GICS classification, and 0 if otherwise; 
Profitability is measured as the firm’s pre-tax profits divided by its operating revenue; 
Operating risk is represented by the firm’s beta and is measured via the capital asset 
pricing model; 
Non-debt tax shield is measured as the firm’s depreciation deflated by the firm’s 
operating revenue; 
Effective tax rate is measured as the firm’s tax expenditure divided by its earnings before 
tax. 
The expectations of Hypothesis 2a can be written mathematically as: 
H2a0: β1 ≤ 0 
H2aa: β1 > 0 
This indicates that Hypothesis 2a is substantiated if the estimator of capital structure 
variation is significant and positive for family firms. 
The expectations of Hypothesis 2b can be written mathematically as: 
H2b0: β1 ≤ 0 or β1 ≤ β1(H2a) 
H2ba: β1 > 0 and β1 > β1(H2a) 
This indicates that Hypothesis 2b is substantiated if (1) the estimator of capital structure 
variation is significant and positive for family firms under managerial ownership, and (2) 
contingent upon Hypothesis 2a, the estimator of capital structure variation for owner-
managed family firms are greater than the estimator of capital structure of family firms in 
Hypothesis 2a. 
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3.2.3 Firm Performance Construct 
Proposition Four infers that family firms have family gains and/or family costs 
that distinguish them from non-family firms. The trade-off between family gains and 
family costs, when non-zero, should result in family firms performing differently than 
non-family firms. This is captured in Hypothesis 3a. Hypothesis 3a is conditional upon 
the results of Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a. 
Among family firms, Proposition Five suggests that the interaction between 
family gains and family costs is greatest in owner-manager led family firms. Since their 
performance is driven by this interaction, it is expected that owner-manager led family 
firms should outperform non-family firms with a greater magnitude than other forms of 
family firms, consistent with the outcome of Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2b. 
Firm performance is operationalized as: (1) the firm’s approximate Tobin’s Q (Q) 
and alternatively, (2) the firm’s Return-on-Assets (ROA). Tobin’s Q is the ratio between 
the firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its physical assets. Morck, Schleifer 
and Vishny (1988) have suggested that Tobin’s Q is an appropriate measure of 
managerial performance and utilized this signal to illustrate the relationship between 
managerial equity ownership and firm value. This study extends their work to highlight 
the effects of family managerial ownership. Return-on-assets is a widely used 
performance measure that highlights the firm’s efficiency on its accounting-based 
resources.   
Subsequently, these hypotheses can be expressed as: 
Hypothesis 3a: Family firms have higher performance measures than non-family firms, 
consistent with the outcome of Hypotheses 1a and 2a. 
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Hypothesis 3b: Family firms under managerial ownership have higher performance 
measures than other forms of family firms, consistent with the results of Hypotheses 1b 
and 2b. 
Hypothesis 3a can be modeled as follows: 
Firm Performance = β0 + β1Family + β2Age + β3Size + β4Asset_  Tangibility + 
β5Industry_Consumer + β6Industry_Staples + β7Industry_Energy + 
β8Industry_Financials + β9Industry_Healthcare + β10Industry_Industrials + 
β11Industry_Information Technology + β12Industry_Materials + β13Industry_Telecom + 
β14Industry_Utilities + ε 
 
And Hypothesis 3b can be modeled as follows: 
Firm Performance = β0 + β1Family*Governance + β2Age + β3Size + β4Asset_  
Tangibility + β5Industry_Consumer + β6Industry_Staples + β7Industry_Energy + 
β8Industry_Financials + β9Industry_Healthcare + β10Industry_Industrials + 
β11Industry_Information Technology + β12Industry_Materials + β13Industry_Telecom + 
β14Industry_Utilities + ε 
 
Where: 
Firm Performance is operationalized as either one of the following: 
• the firm’s market-to-book-value ratio or Approximate Tobin’s q, where market-
value is common equity plus book-value of preferred stock and debt (Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006; Randoy & Goel, 2003). This ratio approximates the firm’s ratio of 
market value to the replacement cost of its assets or Tobin’s q, or; 
• the firm’s return-on-asset accounting ratio; 
Family is a binary dummy variable wherein 1 represents a family firm and 0 represents a 
non-family firm; 
Governance is a binary dummy variable wherein 1 represents an owner-manager form of 
governance and 0 if otherwise. A firm follows an owner-manager form of governance 
when the firm’s CEO and directorship are represented by a family member; 
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Family*Governance is an interaction variable that reveals whether or not the owner-
manager form of governance is significantly different from other forms of family firm 
governance; 
Age is a measure of the firm’s age and is measured as the log of one plus the number of 
years from incorporation; 
Size represents firm size and is measure as the log of firm’s total assets for 2006; 
Asset Tangibility controls for the effects of intangibles in the firm’s Tobin’s Q, and is 
measured as the ratio of property, plant, and equipment over total assets at the end of the 
financial year; 
Industry is a binary dummy variable wherein 1 represents each firm’s particular industry 
(consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financials, healthcare, industrials, 
information technology, materials, telecommunication and industry) according to the  
Australian Stock Exchange GICS classification, and 0 if otherwise. 
The expectations of Hypothesis 3a can be written mathematically as: 
If H1a = H1aa & H2a = H2a0 
H3a0: β1 ≤ 0 
H3aa: β1 > 0 
 
If H1a = H1aa & H2a = H2aa 
H3a0: β1 ≤ 0 
H3aa: β1 > 0 
 
As discussed in Section 2.7.3 and Section 2.7.4, under a resource-based perspective, 
competitive advantages within family firms demonstrate mean-reverting properties in the 
long-run. Consequently, Hypothesis 3a assumes that the long-run trade-off between 
family gains and family costs within family firms yield cost-savings (ie. family gains > 
family costs). Hence, Hypothesis 3a is conditional on the results of Hypothesis 1a and 
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Hypothesis 2a. The expectations illustrated above indicate that if Hypothesis 1a is 
significant and Hypothesis 2a is not significant (ie. family gains > family costs as family 
costs = 0), it is expected that family firms will outperform non-family firms. Similarly, if 
both Hypothesis 1a and 2a are significant, then it should also be expected that the 
estimator of firm performance for family firms to be positive in order to substantiate 
Hypothesis 3a. However, if Hypothesis 1a is not significant and Hypothesis 2a is 
significant (ie. family gains < family costs as family gains = 0), then Hypothesis 3a cannot 
be substantiated.  
The expectations of Hypothesis 3b can be written mathematically as: 
If H1b = H1ba & H2b = H2b0 
H3b0: β1 ≤ 0 or β1 ≤ β1(H3a) 
H3ba: β1 > 0 and β1 > β1(H3a) 
 
If H1b = H1ba & H2b = H2ba 
H3b0: β1 ≤ 0 or β1 ≤ β1(H3a) 
H3ba: β1 > 0and β1 > β1(H3a) 
 
Hypothesis 3b is conditional on the results of Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2b. The 
expectations illustrated above indicate that if Hypothesis 1b is significant and Hypothesis 
2b is not significant ( ie. family gains > family costs as family costs = 0), it is expected 
that owner-managed family firms will outperform other family firms. Likewise, based on 
earlier discussions on the mean-reverting properties of agency trade-offs in family firms, 
it is posited that if both Hypothesis 1b and 2b are significant, then it could be similarly 
expected that owner-managed family firms will outperform other family firms. Moreover, 
under both scenarios, it is posited that owner-manager led family firms should 
outperform other forms of family firms, consistent with Proposition 5. Therefore, it is 
expected that the estimator of firm performance for owner-manager led family firms will 
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be greater than the estimator of firm performance for family firms in Hypothesis 3a. 
Finally, if Hypothesis 1b is not significant and Hypothesis 2b is significant (ie. family 
gains < family costs as family gains = 0), then it is not possible to accept Hypothesis 3b.  
The following figure illustrates how the hypotheses interact in relation to firm 
performance and managerial ownership. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Is there a difference in firm performance between owner-managed family firms with other 
family firms?  
3.3 Sample Selection and Data Collection Procedures 
3.3.1 Study Period 
The research design calls for cross-sectional statistical analysis and focuses on the 
financial year ending 2006 because this is the most contemporaneous set available 
wherein data on the variables of interest are complete.  
 
Agency Trade-offs in Family Firms: Theoretical Model, Empirical Testing and Implications 
Mark Yupitun 11089061 82
3.3.2 Sample Selection 
The study employs a complete sample of active and listed firms in the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) for the financial year ending 2006. This is done to ensure internal 
validity, cross-sectional generalizability, and sufficient statistical sample size of the study. 
3.3.3 Data Collection 
Data was collected from Aspect/Huntley databases and Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris 
database. The company’s age of incorporation and other governance characteristics is 
collated from Aspect/Huntley Data Analysis databases. Firm industry classification, 
financial performance and financial structure can be collected from Aspect/Huntley 
Financial Analysis databases. Supplemental variables are obtained from the Osiris 
database. 
3.4 Operationalization of the Constructs 
3.4.1 Earnings Management  
Earnings management represents an intentional intervention in the financial 
reporting process which could obtain private benefits to managers. Lower earnings 
management represents cost-savings that accrue from a convergence in information 
asymmetry among owners and managers. Peasnell, Pope and Young (2005) posit that 
personalism leads to a closer alignment of information, and that managerial ownership is 
associated with lower levels of earnings management. Further, studies have shown that 
management controlled firms are more likely to manage earnings than owner controlled 
firms (Dhaliwal, Salomon & Smith, 1982; Warfield, Wild & Wild, 1995; Teshima & 
Shuto, 2005).  
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Ronen and Yaari (2007) suggest that earnings management may be beneficial to 
owners ex-ante when hiring managers. They suggest that the cost of a truth-inducing 
contract that eliminates all earnings management would be greater than the cost of a 
contract that implicitly allows for earnings management (termed as a reporting 
management contract) plus the agency costs of earnings management. Thus, owners 
would prefer the latter over the former. Earnings management therefore, represents an 
incremental difference between a reporting management contract and the minimum value 
of a truth-inducing contract (Ronen & Yaari, 2007; Ari, Glover & Sunder, 1998). Within 
family firms, lower information asymmetry levels between ownership and management 
result in a lower nominal value for the truth inducing contracts, and hence, should result 
in lower earnings management. Consequently, cost-savings from the difference between 
the truth-inducing contracts of family firm and non-family firms is by definition, family 
gains.  
Within the context of our empirical sample (ASX listed firms), a key area of 
managerial discretion is financial discretion (Graham, Harvey, Rajgopal, 2005). Thus, for 
the purposes of this study, earnings management is operationalized as abnormal accruals. 
Although earnings management is a difficult construct to measure, accounting studies 
determine its presence by estimating the unmanaged portion of earnings (Bugshan, 2005). 
In accounting theory, accruals are used as empirical indicators of earnings management 
since accruals provide management the opportunity and discretion to modify earnings 
figures (Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995; Bugshan, 2005). Further, 
McNichols (2000) suggests accruals management are favored over cash manipulation 
since cash earnings are difficult to alter and manage. Thus, discretionary (abnormal) and 
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non-discretionary (normal) accruals are used as measures of managed and natural 
earnings, respectively (Bugshan, 2005). Subramanyam (1996) provides evidence of this 
distinction; the author suggests share returns have greater sensitivity to non-discretionary 
earnings than discretionary earnings. 
In relation to our research objective, an aggregate accruals model is the most 
suitable model to adapt because the model because it: 
• Is flexible in adapting control variables; 
• Improves the generalizability of the findings; 
• Enables linear association with the Family variable; 
• Captures net effects of all accounting estimations; 
• Has been the model primarily used by earnings management studies focusing 
on opportunistic earnings management; 
• Is consistent with our earlier propositions on managerial discretion and 
information asymmetry  (McNichols, 2000; Bugshan, 2005). 
Among aggregate accrual models, Dechow, Sweeney and Sloan (1995) find that the 
Modified Jones (1991) Model has the most potential to provide reliable estimates of 
discretionary accruals (Subramanyam, 1996; Bugshan, 2005). 
The Jones (1991) model is based on the assumption that all firms within the 
industry have similar operating cycles. This model estimates accruals as a function of the 
changes in revenue and the level of fixed-assets, scaled by the firm’s total assets. Thus, 
this model attempts to control for the effects of changing economic circumstances by 
controlling for changes in non-discretionary accruals (Bugshan, 2005). The Modified 
Jones Model corrects for a weakness in the earlier model by including changes in 
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receivables to capture sales-based manipulations (Dechow, Sweeney & Sloan, 1995). The 
Modified Jones Model assumes that, unlike the earlier model, only collected revenues are 
discretionary. 
Kothari (2001) suggests that opportunistic earnings management is a transitory 
event. This implies that aggregate accrual analysis is suitable for cross-sectional testing. 
Further, Subramanyam (1996) find that cross-sectional Modified Jones models performed 
better than their time-series counterparts. Consequently, consistent with our research 
focus, the cross-sectional Modified Jones model for abnormal accruals will be used as 
operationalization of earnings management. 
The Modified Jones Model measures discretionary (abnormal) accruals in a two-
step procedure: 
First, the model isolates non-discretionary accruals by regressing the total accruals of 
firms within an industry against the level of property, plant and equipment, and changes 
in revenue and receivables. These variables are scaled by lagged total assets to reduce 
heteroskedasticity (Bugshan, 2005; Jones, 1991). The regression estimation produces 
non-discretionary coefficients for each industry group. 
 
TAj,g/Aj,g = γ0 (1/Aj,g) + γ1 ((ΔREVj,g - ΔRECj,g)/Aj,g) + γ2 (PPEj,g/Aj,g) 
 
Where: 
 
 TA  =  Total accruals (see below); 
 A  =  Beginning of year total assets; 
 ΔREV  =  Change in net revenue; 
 PPE  =  Property, plant, and equipment; 
 j  =  denote firm from g industry group; 
 g  =  denote industry group; 
 ΔREC  = change in accounts receivables. 
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Next abnormal accruals for each firm j are estimated. This is achieved by fitting the 
estimated industry coefficients from step 1 on each firm j. The regression residual from 
this process is identified as the abnormal accrual of firm j. Consistent with other studies 
of this nature, our research is interested in the magnitude, rather than the level, of 
abnormal accruals. This is because earnings management is viewed as a deviation of 
reflected accounting earnings from the natural result of the firm’s transactions and events. 
Thus, earnings management is not conditioned by the direction of the change in earnings, 
but by the change itself (Bugshan, 2005). Therefore, the absolute-value of the abnormal 
accruals is used to compute for the effects of earnings management. 
AAj = TAj/Aj – [γˆ 0  (1/Aj) + γˆ 1  ((ΔREVj - ΔRECj) /Aj) + γˆ 2  (PPEj/Aj)] 
Where:  
 γˆ 0 , γˆ 1 , and γˆ 2  are the fitted coefficients from the previous equation; 
 AAj  = Abnormal Accruals for firm j; 
 AAAj  = Absolute-value of Abnormal Accruals for firm j. 
 
The Modified Jones Model requires the firm’s total accruals in order to estimate 
non-discretionary accruals. Recent accounting studies estimate total accruals via a 
cashflow approach wherein total accruals are measured as the difference between 
earnings before extraordinary and abnormal items and operating cash-flow 
(Subramanyam, 1996; Bugshan, 2005). 
TA = EBXA – OC 
Where: 
 TA  = Total Accruals; 
 EBXA  = Earnings before extraordinary and abnormal items; 
 OC  = Operating cash flow. 
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3.4.2 Capital Structure Variation  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggests that managers do not always adopt capital 
structures with a value maximizing level of debt. The optimal choice of debt for the 
family firm’s economic objectives may differ from the choice of debt when non-
economic objectives are included. The presence of non-economic objectives impacts the 
firm’s choices about capital structure such that the average level of leverage for firms 
with these problems may deviate from the optimal level (Berger, Ofek & Yermack, 1997). 
This may affect a family firm’s choice of capital structure in two paradoxical ways. On 
one hand, Mishra and McConaughy (1999) and Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) 
suggests that the presence of non-economic objectives make family firms more risk 
averse. On the other hand, Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stultz (1988) imply that debt may 
be used as an instrument for current owners to maintain control of the firm. Since the 
issuance of new equity dilutes the percentage of equity held by the controlling family, 
they would therefore prefer raising capital using debt over equity, when given the choice 
between the two.  
The presence of non-economic goals peculiar to family firms poses the threat of 
warping the family management’s perception of risk. Family firms shoulder greater 
personal risks from personal rents related to non-economic objectives invested within the 
firm (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001). 
Further, family firms would prefer lower business risks than that of large diversified 
firms in order to optimize the flow of resources towards its economic and non-economic 
objectives (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 
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2001). Hence, the family firm’s lower tolerance for business risk may make them biased 
towards adopting lower levels of debt in their capital structures than non-family firms. 
However, Bebchuk (1999) and Harijono, Ariff and Tanewski (2004) suggest that 
the extent of ownership’s concentration may be dependent on the private benefits the 
dominant family coalition obtain from their control over the firm. Therefore, a family 
coalition’s emphasis on non-economic objectives may result in an aversion to equity 
financing. Between debt leverage and equity capital, family firms may prefer the former 
over the latter, especially if the private benefits they acquire from controlling the firm is 
high (Harris & Raviv, 1988; Stultz, 1988). 
These studies have shown that on one hand, family firms have a natural aversion 
to risk, and hence, high debt levels. On the other hand, they have natural incentives to 
increase voting control by avoiding equity financing. Therefore, these two paradoxical 
views are consistent with Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory. Concurrently, 
Blanco-Mazagatos, Quevedo-Puente and Castrillo (2007) provide evidence to show that 
family firms adhere to this financial pecking order theory.  
One thing that remains consistent between both competing schools of thought is 
the implication that family firms’ idiosyncratic capital structure decisions deviate from 
optimal levels. Thus, agency costs arising from a sub-optimal leverage level may result 
from the pursuit of divergent firm goals. For instance, altruism may result in higher debt 
levels and impede growth since entrenched owners may have a vested interest in 
preserving the value of existing capital (Morck, Stangeland & Yeung, 2000; Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan & Lang, 2002; Harijono, Ariff & Tanewski, 2004). Concurrently, Friend 
and Lang (1988) and Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) find that the level of debt 
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decreases as personalism in the firm increases, reflecting the greater non-diversifiable 
risk of debt to agents than to principals.  
As illustrated from Fisher’s two-period consumption model, finance theory 
suggests that one of the key functions of leverage is to allow managers to maximize their 
firm’s growth opportunities exclusive from their owners’ own risk tolerance (see 
Appendix 1). Thus, a firm’s capital structure decision may be an indicator of its activities 
related to its future growth. The above extant literature are consistent with the two-period 
Family Firm Welfare Model (Section 2.7.2.2) which implies that contrary to Fisher’s 
two-period consumption model, the presence of non-economic objectives and family 
costs makes it difficult for family firms to optimize consumption and investment 
decisions. The model shows that family costs are drivers of sub-optimal capital structure 
decisions. That is, in order for family firms to maintain their consumption under these 
circumstances, the are required to make sub-optimal investment choices in potential 
growth opportunities.  
Therefore, capital structure variation in family firms may signal the presence of 
family costs. In this study, capital structure variation is operationalized as the variation 
between the firm’s debt-to-asset ratio and the optimal capital structure ratio represented 
by the market’s debt-to-asset ratio. 
2
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Where: 
CSi   = Capital Structure Variation in firm i; 
BVi(debt) = Book value of debt of firm i; 
BVm(debt) = Book value of debt of market m; 
BVi(asset) = Book value of asset of firm i; 
BVm(asset) = Book value of asset of market m; 
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Where market m is calculated from the (i) industry average or (ii) market average. 
 
The debt-to-asset ratio is a commonly used ratio in analyzing firms’ capital 
structure preferences (Berger, Ofek & Yermack, 1997; Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; 
Schulze Lubatkin & Dino). The above hypotheses are based on the assumption that an 
optimal capital structure exists within Australian markets. It is posited that the degree in 
which firms’ capital structure is lower or higher from the optimal level is greater in 
family firms than in non-family firms. Thus, this concept is operationalized by utilizing 
the squared value of the difference (ie. variation) between individual firms’ capital 
structure and the optimal level. Extant literature suggest that while it is difficult to 
measure this optimal capital structure level, industry average and market average may 
provide reasonable proxies of this concept. 
3.4.3 Firm Performance 
Firm performance is operationalized as the firm’s approximate Tobin’s q, where 
Tobin’s q is the ratio between the firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its 
physical assets. Chung and Pruitt (1994) and Perfect and Wiles (1994) have shown that 
Tobin’s q can be approximated using a simple formula: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=  
A
 LTD + STD + MVEQ  
Where: 
Q = Approximate Tobin’s Q 
MVE = Market value of the firm’s total equity and hybrid securities 
STD = Short-term liabilities 
LTD = Long-term liabilities 
A = Book-value of Total Assets 
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Approximate Tobin’s q is commonly utilized in family business studies as a 
measure of firm performance. Table 3.2 provides a summary of key family business 
literatures that have employed the abovementioned measure as a dependent variable of 
firm performance. 
Table 3.2 Summary of Literature 
Year Authors Title Journal Research Topic 
2001 Mishra, 
Randoy  & 
Jenssen 
The effect of founding 
family influence on firm 
value and corporate 
governance 
Journal of 
Int’l 
Financial 
Management 
& Accounting 
 
The relationship of founding family 
control and firm value, and the 
moderating effects of unique corporate 
governance conditions in Norway. 
 
2003 Anderson 
& Reeb 
Founding-family ownership 
and firm performance: 
evidence from the S&P 500.  
The Journal 
of Finance 
Effects of founding family ownership, 
active family control and large 
blockholdership to firm performance in 
the USA. 
 
2003 Randoy & 
Goel 
Ownership structure, founder 
leadership, and performance 
in Norwegian SMEs: 
implications for financing 
entrepreneurial opportunities. 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 
Effects and financing implications of 
ownership structure and founder 
leadership in family firm performance 
in Norway.  
 
2006 Villalonga 
& Amit 
How do family ownership, 
control and management 
affect firm value 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics 
The relative performance of family 
firms against non-family firm 
ownership in the USA.  
 
2004 McCo-
nuahgy, 
Matthews, 
Fialko 
 
Founding family controlled 
firms: performance, risk and 
value.  
Journal of 
Small 
Business 
Management 
The effects of Founding family control 
on performance, capital structure and 
value in the USA. 
 
 
As an additional test, this study will utilize Return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for 
firm performance. Amongst extant literature, Anderson and Reeb (2003), Randoy and 
Goel (2003) and Lee (2004) utilize the ROA ratio as a measure of firm efficiency parallel 
to that of Tobin’s Q. Return on Assets is measured as: 
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⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
A
 INROA  
Where: 
ROA = Return on Assets; 
NI = Net Income; 
A = Total Assets on beginning period. 
3.4.4 Family and Managerial Ownership Variables 
In Section 2, theory development was made under an essence-based definition of 
the family firm. However, due to data limitations, our operationalization of the family 
firm utilizes a components-of-involvement approach. Specifically, the components of 
management, ownership and governance are used to broadly define a firm as a family 
firm. For this research, Villalonga and Amit’s (2006) selection criterion, in which a firm 
is said to be a family firm when the family is the largest shareholder and has at least one 
family officer or one family director currently in the firm, was selected. 
An inherent problem in this approach is that the research findings could possibly 
suffer external validity problems. However, while there are differences between the 
components of involvement and essence-based approach in defining a family business, 
Chua, Chrisman and Sharma (1999) suggest that components such as ownership and 
management could be a useful means for sample selection, given proper theoretical 
guidance. They posit that the true population of family businesses is likely to a subset of 
a population that is identified via the components of involvement approach.  
Chua, Chrisman and Sharma (1999) recommends seeking theoretical guidance in 
delineating family from non-family firms using the components-of-involvement approach 
in evaluating family firm behavior. The inclusion of managerial ownership in our 
conceptual analysis above provides this theoretical link between concept and empirics. 
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Operationalizing the governance variable is straightforward: a firm follows an owner-
manager form of governance when the firm’s CEO and directorship are represented by a 
family member. The interaction between the family variable and governance variable are 
expected to yield owner-managed family firms. 
3.4.5 Control Variables 
The regression tests in all three hypotheses are controlled for the confounding 
effects of firm age, firm size, industry membership and asset tangibility. The inclusion of 
these control variables are discussed as follows: 
3.4.5.1 Firm Age 
Firm age is taken as the log of one plus the number of years from incorporation. 
The logarithmic form is imposed to reduce the effects of heteroskedasticity when the data 
is used in regression procedures (Mishra, Randoy & Jenssen, 2001; Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Randoy & Goel, 2003; Belen & Villalonga, 2006). Firm age controls for 
idiosyncratic life-cycle effects among firms (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2001; Anderson 
& Reeb, 2003; Gomez, Larranza-Kitana & Makri, 2003; Randoy & Goel, 2003; Mishra, 
Randoy & Jenssen, 2001; Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2004). Smith, Mitchell and Summers 
(1985) propose that firms’ management priorities change across the lifecycle of the 
business, and advocate the measurement of firm age as a proxy for firm-specific lifecycle. 
Moores and Mula (2000) provide evidence to support the association between the firm’s 
lifecycle and management among Australian family firms. Moreover, Mayer (1995) 
suggests that the firms’ corporate governance structures are affected by differences in the 
firms’ life-cycle development. 
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3.4.5.2 Firm Size 
Firm size is measured as the log of the firm’s total assets for 2006. Like firm age, 
the logarithmic form is imposed to reduce the effects of heteroskedasticity when the data 
is used in regression procedures (Mishra, Randoy & Jenssen, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin & 
Dino, 2001; Randoy & Goel, 2003; Ng, 2005; Belen & Villalonga, 2006). Similarly, firm 
size controls for the life-cycle effects particular to individual firms (Mishra & 
McConaughy, 1999; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2001; McConaughy, Matthews & Fialko, 
2001; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Gomez, Larranza-Kitana & Makri, 2003; Randoy & Goel, 
2003; Mishra, Randoy & Jenssen, 2001; Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2004). Smith, Mitchell 
and Summers (1985) advocate the measurement of firm size as a proxy for possible scale 
economy effects that may affect management’s strategic priorities. Further, Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson and Ellstand (1999) suggests that firm size may influence firm governance and 
strategic decision-making. 
3.4.5.3 Industry Affiliation 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) utilized industry affiliation as a moderating variable 
to highlight the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance. 
Accordingly, family business literatures have shown that the association between family 
ownership and the firm’s capital structure and/or performance is moderated by the 
industry where the firm is affiliated with (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; Mishra, Randoy 
& Jenssen, 2001; McConaughy, Matthews & Fialko, 2001; Gomez, Larranza-Kitana & 
Makri, 2003; Randoy & Goel, 2003; Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2004). This is achieved by 
assigning the firm a dummy variable (1) for the appropriate industry sector it is affiliated 
with according to the Australian Stock Exchange GICS classification. The GICS 
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classification stratifies firms according to ten industry sectors: consumer discretionary, 
consumer staples, energy, financials, healthcare, industrials, information technology, 
materials, telecommunication and industry.  
The association between earnings management and family ownership implicitly 
controls for industry affiliation. The modified Jones’ Model measures the firm’s non-
discretionary accruals separate for each industry group, ensuring the moderating effects 
of industry affiliation is controlled for (Dechow, Sweeney & Sloan, 1995).  
3.4.5.4 Asset Tangibility 
Firm performance is sensitive to the level of fixed assets a firm possesses (Mishra, 
Randoy & Jenssen, 2001; Randoy & Goel, 2003). Further, past outcomes have indicated 
that corporate governance outcomes are affected by asset tangibility (Randoy & Goel, 
2003). Subsequently, asset tangibility, measured as the ratio of the firm’s fixed assets 
over its total assets, is used to control for the effects of intangibles in the firm’s Tobin’s q. 
3.4.5.5 Capital Structure controls 
In addition to the above-mentioned controls, our empirical tests on capital 
structure (Hypothesis 2) require the inclusion of the following control variables: 
Profitability controls for the moderating effect of the firm’s profitability on the 
firm’s ability to source leverage (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; Friend & Lang, 1988; 
Berger, Ofek & Yermack, 1997). It is measured as the firm’s pre-tax profits divided by its 
operating revenue; 
Operating risk controls for the moderating effect of the firm’s riskiness vis-à-vis 
other firms in the market. The firm’s inherent riskiness affects its cost of borrowing and 
subsequently, its capital structure choice (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; Friend & Lang, 
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1988; Berger, Ofek & Yermack, 1997). Operating risk is obtained from Bureau van 
Dijk’s Osiris database, and is calculated as the covariance of the firm’s returns and the 
returns of the ASX index, scaled by the variance of the returns of the ASX index. 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=  
Returns)(Market  Variance
 Returns)Market  returns, (Firm  CovarianceBeta  
Non-debt tax shields may also affect the attractiveness of debt financing (Mishra 
& McConaughy, 1999; Berger, Ofek & Yermack, 1997). It is obtained by calculating the 
ratio of the firm’s depreciation deflated by the firm’s operating revenue; 
Effective tax rate controls for the firm’s tax liabilities as a potential moderator of 
its capital structure choice. It is measured as the firm’s tax expenditure divided by its 
earnings before tax. 
3.5 Techniques in Statistical Analysis  
Data analysis proceeds in four separate steps. The statistical techniques employed 
in each of these tests are outlined as follows: 
3.5.1 Step one: Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics 
The first step in our analysis is to manually collect the data from the Australian 
Centre for Family Business’ ASX database, Aspect/Huntley’s Financial Analyis database, 
Aspect/Huntley’s Data Analysis database and Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris database. These 
data are compiled and drawn together in a unified spreadsheet. To account for skewness 
and improve the data’s robustness, firm age and firm size will be transformed into their 
logarithmic form. 
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3.5.2 Step two: Data Organization and Transformation 
Family firms are defined as a series of combinations of firm characteristics. 
Family firms are identified in this study by sorting through these combinations of firm 
characteristics cataloged by the Australian Centre for Family Business’ ASX database. 
This allows the study to test the hypotheses on various definitions of the family firm. 
The next step of the analysis is to compute the absolute value of the firms’ 
abnormal accruals. This study utilizes the modified Jones model for abnormal accruals 
(Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995). Ordinary Least-Square regression is employed 
among the 10 GICS industry sector to identify their accrual expectation models. The 
calculated residuals among individual firms from their industry’s accruals expectation 
model are classified as abnormal accruals. 
Subsequently, the data’s descriptive statistics, differentiating family from non-
family firms, is tabulated. 
3.5.3 Step three: Multiple Linear Regression Tests 
 Multiple linear regression is employed across the six hypotheses with a focus to 
the significance, as opposed to the power, of the models. As discussed earlier,  
hypotheses 1b, 2b and 3b are contingent upon the results of hypotheses 1a, 2a and 3a 
respectively. Further, hypotheses 3a and 3b are contingent upon hypotheses 1a and 2a 
and 1b and 2b, respectively. Since the relative informativeness of these six hypotheses 
are dependent upon each other, discussion on the results of these tests must take these 
interdependencies under consideration. 
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3.5.3 Step four: Checks for Robustness 
Econometric issues such as residual normality, multicollinearity, autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity are tested, and appropriate remedies are to be employed if 
necessary. Multicollinearity is identified via analysis of the variance inflation factor. For 
cross-sectional studies, serial correlation issues are checked via Durbin-Watson statistics. 
Heteroskedasticity is determined via the White heteroskedastic test.  
The problem of Non-normal distribution of residuals is generally corrected by 
removing outliers and/or modeling an appropriate test distribution for the data set via 
bootstrapping. Multicollinearity issues are addressed by deflating dependent and 
independent variables with the endogenous variable or utilizing factor analysis to merge 
collinear variables. Autocorrelation of errors is corrected via the introduction of 
autoregressive processes or rearranging the ordering of observations. Finally, 
heteroskedasticity problems are corrected by the White model (Pindyck & Rubensfeld, 
1998). 
3.6 Summary 
Chapter Three discussed the research design, sample selection, data collection, 
variable definition and statistical procedures used in this study. Propositions from chapter 
two are presented empirically as hypotheses, and appropriate hypotheses-testing 
procedures are proposed to verify these propositions. The following tables provide a 
summary of the hypotheses and variable definitions. 
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Table 3.3 Summary of Hypotheses 
Construct 
 
Hypothesis Expected Outcome 
Family 
gains 
Hypothesis 1a: Family firms positively influence 
family gains from lower earnings management than 
that of non-family firms. 
 
H1a0: β1 ≥ 0 
H1aa: β1 < 0 
 
Family 
gains 
Hypothesis 1b: Family firms under managerial 
ownership have greater family gains from 
lower earnings management than other family firms. 
 
H1b0: β1 ≥ 0 or β1 ≥ β1(H1a)   
H1ba: β1 < 0 and β1 < β1(H1a) 
 
Family 
Costs 
Hypothesis 2a: Family firms positively influence 
family costs from higher capital structure variation than 
that of non-family firms. 
 
H2a0: β1 ≤ 0 
H2aa: β1 > 0 
Family 
Costs 
Hypothesis 2b: Family firms under managerial 
ownership positively influence family costs from higher 
capital structure variation than that of other family 
firms. 
 
H2b0: β1 ≤ 0 or β1 ≤ β1(H2a) 
H2ba: β1 > 0 and β1 > β1(H2a) 
 
Agency 
Trade-off 
Hypothesis 3a: Family firms have higher performance 
measures than non-family firms, consistent with the 
outcome of Hypotheses 1a and 2a. 
 
 
If H1a = H1aa & H2a = H2a0 
H3a0: β1 ≤ 0 
H3aa: β1 > 0 
If H1a = H1aa & H2a = H2aa 
H3a0: β1 ≤ 0 
H3aa: β1 > 0 
 
Agency 
Trade-off 
Hypothesis 3b: Family firms under managerial 
ownership have higher performance measures than 
other forms of family firms, consistent with the results 
of Hypotheses 1b and 2b. 
 
If H1b = H1ba & H2b = H2b0 
H3b0: β1 ≤ 0 or β1 ≤ β1(H3a) 
H3ba: β1 > 0 and β1 > β1(H3a) 
If H1b = H1ba & H2b = H2ba 
H3b0: β1 ≤ 0 or β1 ≤ β1(H3a) 
H3ba: β1 > 0and β1 > β1(H3a) 
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Table 3.4 Summary of Variable Definitions 
Variable Abbreviation Definition 
Earnings 
Management  
AAA The firm’s absolute value of modified Jones’ abnormal accruals as 
described in section 3.4.1. 
 
Capital structure 
variation 
Varida The variation between the firm and industry average’s debt-to-asset ratio as 
described in section 3.4.2. 
 
Capital structure 
variation 
Varmda The variation between the firm and market average’s debt-to-asset as 
described in section 3.4.2. 
 
Firm Performance Q The firm’s Approximate Tobin’s q as described in section 3.4.3. 
 
Firm Performance ROA The firm’s Return on Assets as described in section 3.4.3. 
 
Family Fam A binary dummy variable wherein 1 represents a family firm and 0 
represents a non-family firm as described in section 3.4.4. 
 
Governance OM A binary dummy variable wherein 1 represents an owner-manager form of 
governance and 0 if otherwise as described in section 3.4.4. 
 
Age Age A measure of the firm’s age and is measured as the log of one plus the 
number of years from incorporation as described in section 3.4.5.1 
 
Size Size Firm size and is measure as the log of firm’s total assets for 2006 as 
described in section 3.4.5.2 
 
Asset Tangibility Tan The ratio of property, plant, and equipment over total assets at the end of 
the financial year, as described in section 3.4.5.4 
 
Industry  A binary dummy variable wherein 1 represents each firm’s particular 
industry according to the  Australian Stock Exchange GICS classification, 
and 0 if otherwise, as described in section 3.4.5.3 
Profitability Profit The firm’s pre-tax profits divided by its operating revenue, as described in 
section 3.4.5.5 
 
Operating risk Beta The firm’s beta, computed as the covariance of the firm’s returns and the 
returns of the ASX index, scaled by the variance of the returns of the ASX 
index, as described in section 3.4.5.5 
Non-debt tax 
shield 
NDTS The ratio of the firm’s depreciation deflated by the firm’s operating 
revenue, as described in section 3.4.5.5 
 
Effective tax rate ETR The ratio of the firm’s tax expenditure divided by its earnings before tax,  
as described in section 3.4.5.5 
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Chapter 4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and evaluates the results of the research method as 
discussed in Chapter Three. As established in Chapter Three, six hypotheses are tested. 
Based on the results of these tests, conclusions are drawn in the context of the study’s 
earlier propositions. 
Hypothesis 1a tests whether family firms exhibit lower information asymmetries, 
as represented by abnormal accruals, than their non-family counterparts. Hypothesis 1b 
extends this test by focusing on whether managerial ownership reduces the level of 
information asymmetries amongst family firms. These tests measure the presence of 
family gains in family firms and owner-manager led family firms respectively. 
Hypothesis 2a examines whether family firms have greater non-economic 
objectives, as represented by capital structure variation, than their non-family 
counterparts. Further, Hypothesis 2b tests whether managerial ownership increases the 
influence of non-economic objectives amongst family firms. Thus, these tests measure 
the presence of family costs in family firms and owner-manager led family firms 
respectively. 
Employing performance measures such as Tobin’s Q and Return-on-Asset ratio, 
Hypothesis 3a evaluates whether family firms outperform their non-family counterparts. 
Moreover, Hypothesis 3b tests whether managerial ownership increases relative firm 
performance amongst family firms. These tests are meant to illustrate that the trade-off of 
family gains and family costs in family firms results in competitive advantages in the 
long-run. 
Agency Trade-offs in Family Firms: Theoretical Model, Empirical Testing and Implications 
Mark Yupitun 11089061 102
To further strengthen these results, additional alternative data collection 
procedures, and non-parametric testing methods which reinforce this study’s findings, 
were adopted. These are documented and outlined in Appendix 3 and are referred to 
throughout as appropriate. 
Chapter 4 proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the descriptive and 
correlation statistics. Section 4.3 presents the empirical results of Hypothesis 1a and 
Hypothesis 1b. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results of Hypothesis 2a and 
Hypothesis 2b. Section 4.5 presents the empirical results of Hypothesis 3a and 
Hypothesis 3b. Section 4.6 describes the robustness checks on the above hypotheses 
testing. Finally, Section 4.7 summarizes the findings and conclusions drawn from the 
empirical results. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Statistics 
This section presents the results of the data collection process. Moreover, the 
descriptive statistics and correlation statistics of key dependent and independent variables 
used in succeeding analyses are discussed.  
4.2.1 Data Collection Statistics 
Data from these key variables are collected from 1,375 samples based on the 
study period and sample selection procedure outlined in Section 3.3. A summary of the 
data collection breakdown is presented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Data Collection Statistics 
Description 
 
No. of Firms Percentage 
ASX-listed candidate firms (Section 3.3) 1,462 100.0%
Trusts, funds and other similar entities 62 4.2%
Outliers and firms with missing data 25 1.7%
Firms used in sample 1,375 94.0%
 
Initially, the sample selection procedure outlined in Section 3.3 yielded 1,462 
firms as potential sources for sample data. ASX-listed firms under the form of trusts and 
funds are excluded from the sample due to the following reasons: 
The foundation of this research relies on the application of agency theory on 
companies, as proposed by Berle and Means (1932). For empirical research involving 
listed firms, this conceptual framework extends primarily to corporations. Trusts and 
funds, being heavily regulated industries, are positioned to adopt conservative accounting 
practices and objectives (Bugshan, 2005) which may not accurately reflect the 
assumptions of agency theory. Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) and Bugshan (2005) 
suggest that these firms incorporate special accounting practices that make the estimation 
of abnormal accruals difficult. 
Twenty-five (25) firms with missing data or were identified as outliers were 
excluded. Outliers were identified using the Mahalabonis distance measure of 3 standard 
deviations (Tiwari, K., Mehta, K., Jain, N., Tiwari, R. & Kanda, G., 2007).These firms 
account for approximately 1.7% of the total potential sample, below the rule-of-thumb 
10% threshold traditionally used in statistical studies.  
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4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 illustrates the mean and standard deviation statistics of key variables 
utilized in the empirical analysis. The means were calculated using arithmetic averages, 
and subsequently, standard deviation figures were based on these on results. 
Table 4.2 General Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
  
Dependent Variables  
AAA 0.2246 0.5181 
Varida 0.0650 0.8991 
Varmda 0.0699 0.9079 
Q 2.1236 1.7470 
ROA -0.1616 0.6199 
  
Independent Variables  
Family Firm 0.1651 0.3714 
Owner-Managed Family Firm 0.1215 0.3268 
Age 2.6065 0.9524 
Size 17.5459 2.3101 
Tan 0.1626 0.2198 
Beta 0.3032 0.6465 
Profit -164.9886 2217.7377 
NDTS 12.6068 201.2085 
ETR 0.0842 0.5548 
  
Total Sample Size 1,375   
Legend : AAA – Earnings Management via Absolute-Value Abnormal Accruals; Varida – Industry Mean Debt-to-
Asset Variation; Varrmda – Market Mean Debt-to-Asset Variation; Q – Approximate Tobin’s Q; ROA – Return on 
Assets; Age – Logarithmic Firm Age; Size – Logarithmic Firm Assets; Tan – Asset Tangibility or PPE over Assets; 
Profit – Profitability or Pre-tax profit over Operating Revenue; Beta – Operating Risk or Beta to the Market index; 
NDTS – Non-debt Tax Shield or Depreciation over Operating Revenue; ETR – Effective Tax Rate or Tax-paid over 
Earnings before Tax. 
 
Based on the above summary, family firms comprise roughly 16.5% of active 
ASX listed firms in 2006. This is consistent with Mroczkowski and Tanewski’s (2004) 
findings which suggest that family firms comprise approximately 17% of the ASX listed 
firms. Further, the above summary shows that owner-manager led family firms comprise 
12.15% of all ASX listed firms. This is summarized in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Family Firm Composition in the ASX 
Family Firm Summary 
 
Count Percentage Count Percentage
Family Firms 227 16.51%   
Owner Manager Led Family Firms   167 12.14% 
Non Owner Manager Led Family 
Firms 
  60 4.37% 
Non-Family Firms 1148 83.49% 1148 83.49% 
Total 1,375 100.00% 1,375 100.00% 
 
 
Table 4.4 provides a summary of the industry sector composition of the ASX data 
evaluated. A majority of the firms evaluated, roughly 29% in 2006, are associated with 
the materials sector. On the other hand, the utilities sector provided the least samples, 
with approximately 0.95% of all samples in 2006. 
Table 4.4 Industry Statistics 
Industry 
 
Count Percentage Industry Count Percentage 
Consumer 142 10.33% Industrial 166 12.07% 
Staples 46 3.35% Technology 105 7.64% 
Energy 131 9.53% Materials 404 29.38% 
Financials 202 14.69% Communications 28 2.04% 
Health 138 10.04% Utilities 13 0.95% 
Total 1,375 100.00% 
 
4.2.2 Correlation Statistics 
Table 4.5 presents the Pearson paired correlations of the dependent variables 
(AAA, Vairda, Varmda, Q and ROA) amongst each other, and among their independent 
control variables. 
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Table 4.5 Correlation Statistics (Dependent Variables) 
   AAA   Varida   Varmda   Q   ROA  
 AAA  1*** 0.05* 0.05* 0.1*** -0.16*** 
 Varida  0.05* 1*** 0.99*** 0.21*** -0.23*** 
 Varmda  0.05* 0.99*** 1*** 0.2*** -0.23*** 
 Q  0.1*** 0.21*** 0.2*** 1*** -0.25*** 
 ROA  -0.16*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.25*** 1*** 
 Age  -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.07** 0.1*** 
 Size  -0.21*** -0.05* -0.05* -0.24*** 0.4*** 
 Tan  -0.09*** 0.01 0.01 -0.07** 0.12*** 
 Beta  0.03 -0.05* -0.05* -0.05 0.01 
 Profit  0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.03 
 NDTS  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 
 ETR  -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.07** 
Legend : AAA – Earnings Management via Absolute-Value Abnormal Accruals; Varida – Industry Mean Debt-to-
Asset Variation; Varrmda – Market Mean Debt-to-Asset Variation; Q – Approximate Tobin’s Q; ROA – Return on 
Assets; Age – Logarithmic Firm Age; Size – Logarithmic Firm Assets; Tan – Asset Tangibility or PPE over Assets; 
Profit – Profitability or Pre-tax profit over Operating Revenue; Beta – Operating Risk or Beta to the Market index; 
NDTS – Non-debt Tax Shield or Depreciation over Operating Revenue; ETR – Effective Tax Rate or Tax-paid over 
Earnings before Tax; * - Significant with 90% level of confidence; ** - Significant with 95% level of confidence ; 
*** - Significant with 99% level of confidence. 
 
As can be seen in the table, except between capital structure variation around 
industry means and market means (Varida and Varmda, respectively), the correlations 
among dependent variables are not very high, indicating that there is little redundancy in 
the testing method. Meanwhile, it is noted that Varida and Varmda are alternative 
measures of variation from an optimal capital structure level. As could be expected, they 
are highly correlated with each other (99%). The performance indicators of Approximate 
Tobin’s Q (Q) and Return on Assets (ROA) are not positively correlated (-25%) possibly 
because they are meant to measure different classes of firm efficiency. While Return on 
Assets measures how efficiently a firm utilizes its current recorded assets, Tobin’s Q 
measures the market’s current perception of a firm’s future performance, including the 
utilization of its intangible assets (Randoy & Goel, 2003). 
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Table 4.6 shows the Pearson paired correlation statistics of each independent 
control variables utilized in empirical testing against each other and against the dependent 
variables. 
Table 4.6 Correlation Statistics (Independent Variables) 
  Age Size Tan Beta Profit NDTS ETR 
 AAA  -0.02 -0.21*** -0.09*** 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
 Varida  0.02 -0.05* 0.01 -0.05* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 Varmda  0.02 -0.05* 0.01 -0.05* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 Q  -0.07** -0.24*** -0.07** -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.01 
 ROA  0.1*** 0.4*** 0.12*** 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.07** 
 Age  1*** 0.26*** 0.09*** -0.06** 0.02 -0.02 0.06** 
 Size  0.26*** 1*** 0.33*** -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.09*** 
 Tan  0.09*** 0.33*** 1*** -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.05* 
 Beta  -0.06** -0.01 -0.03 1*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
 Profit  0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 1*** -0.78*** 0.01 
 NDTS  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.78*** 1*** -0.01 
 ETR  0.06** 0.09*** 0.05* -0.04 0.01 -0.01 1*** 
Legend : AAA – Earnings Management via Absolute-Value Abnormal Accruals; Varida – Industry Mean Debt-to-Asset Variation; Varrmda – Market 
Mean Debt-to-Asset Variation; Q – Approximate Tobin’s Q; ROA – Return on Assets; Age – Logarithmic Firm Age; Size – Logarithmic Firm Assets; 
Tan – Asset Tangibility or PPE over Assets; Profit – Profitability or Pre-tax profit over Operating Revenue; Beta – Operating Risk or Beta to the 
Market index; NDTS – Non-debt Tax Shield or Depreciation over Operating Revenue; ETR – Effective Tax Rate or Tax-paid over Earnings before 
Tax; * - Significant with 90% level of confidence; ** - Significant with 95% level of confidence ; *** - Significant with 99% level of confidence. 
 
The regressor variables were checked for the presence of multicollinearity using a 
variance inflation factor technique (Marquard, 1970). As detailed in Section 4.6.1, there 
is no evidence of harmful multicollinearity amongst regressor variables. This suggests 
that the partial collinearity among independent control variables above do not pose a 
threat to the efficiency of the cross-sectional OLS regressions in hypotheses testing. This 
is verified by the SPSS statistical package’s condition indices (Belsley, Kuh & Welsch, 
1980) acquired during testing. 
4.3 Testing for Earnings Management 
Testing the interdependency of Earnings Management requires a two-stage 
procedure. Initially, a firm’s Modified Jones’ Absolute-value Abnormal Accruals (AAA) 
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must be calculated. Subsequently, the AAA data is utilized in OLS regressions for 
hypotheses testing. 
4.3.1 Stage 1: Acquiring AAA 
The Modified Jones’ Absolute-value Abnormal Accruals (AAA) is calculated in 
two steps. First, accrual coefficients are estimated using the following equation for each 
industry group, as discussed in Section 3.4.1: 
TAj,g/Aj,g = γ0 (1/Aj,g) + γ1 ((ΔREVj,g - ΔRECj,g)/Aj,g) + γ2 (PPEj,g/Aj,g) 
 
As proposed by Dechow, Sweeney and Sloan (1995), this regression provides an OLS 
expectation (“average” if you may) of a firm’s discretionary accrual level. Subsequently, 
the OLS regression undertaken yielded the following results for each industry sector: 
 Table 4.7 Accrual Estimators by Industry 
 γ0  γ1 γ2 
Industry Consumer 184,217.40 (0.0060) (0.0522) 
Industry Staples 12,352.28 0.0603 (0.0383) 
Industry Energy (743,230.50) 0.3936 (0.2282) 
Industry Financials (21,365.23) (0.1733) 0.0005 
Industry Health (442,265.20) 0.2864 (0.5116) 
Industry Industrial (18,075.41) 0.0391 (0.0620) 
Industry Technology 144,208.80 (0.0739) 1.3458 
Industry Materials (295,427.00) (0.0651) (0.0479) 
Industry Communications (25,545.99) 0.0014 (0.1955) 
Industry Utilities (369,540.50) (0.0760) (0.0284) 
 
The second step involves the calculation of non-discretionary accruals on the 
above estimated accrual coefficients. The Modified Jones’ Absolute-value Abnormal 
Accruals (AAA) is obtained from the following formula, as detailed in Section 3.4.1: 
 )}/A(PPEˆ   + ) /A)REC  - REV ((ˆ   + )(1/Aˆ  { - /ATA =AAA jj3jjj1j0jjj γγγ ΔΔ  
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The AAA data can then be applied to Stage 2’s hypotheses testing. 
4.3.2 Stage 2a: Testing Hypothesis 1a 
After data for the AAA dependent variables has been computed, Hypothesis 1a 
and Hypothesis 1b can then be tested via cross-sectional OLS regression outlined in 
Section 3.2.1. Hypothesis 1a tests the dependency of AAA on family involvement as 
presented in the OLS Regression equation 1a: 
Earnings Management = β0 + β1Family + β2Age + β3Size + β4Asset_Tangibility + 
β5Industry_Consumer + β6Industry_Staples + β7Industry_Energy + 
β8Industry_Financials + β9Industry_Healthcare + β10Industry_Industrials + 
β11Industry_Information Technology + β12Industry_Materials + β13Industry_Telecom + 
β14Industry_Utilities + ε 
 
The results of the above regression equation are presented in Table 4.8: 
Table 4.8 Results of Regression 1a 
Dependent Variable : AAA 
 Hypothesis 1a: Family Firms 
 Coefficient T-Statistic 
   
Intercept 0.8767 4.7734*** 
Family -0.0830 -2.2453** 
Age 0.0237 1.6040 
Size -0.0450 -6.5848*** 
Tangibility -0.0158 -0.2325 
Industry Consumer 0.0764 0.5235 
Industry Staples 0.0030 0.0189 
Industry Energy 0.2504 1.7153* 
Industry Financials 0.1133 0.7827 
Industry Health 0.0242 0.1650 
Industry Industrial -0.0123 -0.0849 
Industry Technology 0.3203 2.1475** 
Industry Materials 0.0586 0.4121 
Industry Communications 0.0420 0.2493 
   
Adjusted R2 7.114%  
* - Significant with 90% level of confidence 
** - Significant with 95% level of confidence  
*** - Significant with 99% level of confidence 
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The results of Regression 1a indicate that family firms have lower earnings 
management, with a Modified Jones’ Absolute-value Abnormal Accrual (AAA) 
coefficient of -0.083, than non-family firms within a 95% level of confidence. As 
discussed in Section 3.4.1, these accrual measures underpin the level of earnings 
management within firms (Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995). These 
findings are consistent with the outcome of non-parametric testing as presented in 
Appendix 3. Further, as a substitute for a hypothetical truth-inducing contract, earnings 
management reflects the level of information asymmetry within a firm (Ronen & Yaari, 
2007; Ari, Glover & Sunder, 1998; Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2005). Subsequently, these 
results suggest that family firms have lower information asymmetry vis-à-vis non-family 
firms. Thus, Regression 1a provides an empirical validation of Hypothesis 1a. 
Among the independent control variables, Firm Size was shown to be a negative 
and significant determinant (-0.045) of earnings management within a 99% level of 
confidence. This result is in agreement with earlier empirical findings (Dhaliwal, 
Salomon & Smith, 1982; Warfield, Wild & Wild, 1995). Chaney and Jeter (1992) 
provide a plausible interpretation of this result by suggesting that larger firms have more 
relevant accounting disclosures and hence, lower earnings management, due to an 
increased market scrutiny over their accounting choices vis-à-vis smaller firms (Warfield, 
Wild & Wild, 1995). 
4.3.3 Stage 2b: Testing Hypothesis 1b 
Hypothesis 1b tests for the moderating effect of family firm managerial 
ownership on earnings management. As described in Section 3.2.1, empirical testing is 
conducted through the cross-sectional OLS Regression equation 1b: 
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Earnings Management = β0 + β1Family*Governance + β2Age + β3Size + β4Asset_  
Tangibility + β5Industry_Consumer + β6Industry_Staples + β7Industry_Energy + 
β8Industry_Financials + β9Industry_Healthcare + β10Industry_Industrials + 
β11Industry_Information Technology + β12Industry_Materials + β13Industry_Telecom + 
β14Industry_Utilities + ε 
 
The results of the above regression equation are presented in Table 4.9: 
Table 4.9 Results of Regression 1b 
Dependent Variable : AAA 
 Hypothesis 1b: O-M Family Firms 
 Coefficient T-Statistic 
   
Intercept 0.8813 4.7935*** 
Family*Governance -0.0892 -2.1242** 
Age 0.0230 1.5585 
Size -0.0452 -6.6024*** 
Tangibility -0.0147 -0.2160 
Industry Consumer 0.0715 0.4902 
Industry Staples -0.0017 -0.0106 
Industry Energy 0.2467 1.6896* 
Industry Financials 0.1097 0.7578 
Industry Health 0.0184 0.1255 
Industry Industrial -0.0161 -0.1110 
Industry Technology 0.3189 2.1382** 
Industry Materials 0.0574 0.4036 
Industry Communications 0.0434 0.2577 
   
Adjusted R2 7.0779%  
* - Significant with 90% level of confidence 
** - Significant with 95% level of confidence  
*** - Significant with 99% level of confidence 
 
These results show that owner-manager led family firms have lower levels of 
Modified Jones’ Absolute-value Abnormal Accrual (-0.089) than other firms within a 
95% level of confidence. Moreover, the presence of managerial ownership in family 
firms lead lower levels of Modified Jones’ Absolute-value Abnormal Accrual (-0.089) 
than that of the levels of Modified Jones’ Absolute-value Abnormal Accrual (-0.083) 
brought about by the presence of family firms in general (Table 4.8). The outcome of 
non-parametric testing, as presented in Appendix 3, confirms these findings. Thus, the 
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results of Regression 1b suggest that, as a confirmation of Hypothesis 1b, owner-manager 
led family firms have lower earnings management vis-à-vis other types of family firms.  
Similar to Regression 1a, among control variables, Firm Size was shown to be a 
negative and significant (-0.45) determinant of earnings management within a 99% level 
of confidence. Subsequently, this result can be interpreted in a similar fashion with that of 
Regression 1a. 
4.4 Testing for Capital Structure Variation 
Empirical tests on capital structure variation require a two-stage procedure. 
Initially, the proxy optimal capital structure level is calculated from industry and market 
averages and individual variations of firm capital structure levels are obtained. After 
these variation data are calculated, they can be used as the dependent variables for 
hypotheses testing purposes. 
4.4.1 Stage 1: Acquiring Varida and Varmda 
A firm’s capital structure variation is measured in two alternate ways: (1) the 
difference between a firm’s debt-to-asset ratio and the industry average (Varida), and (2) 
the difference between a firm’s debt-to-asset ratio and the market average (Varmda). As 
described in Section 3.4.2, the optimal capital structure level is measured via industry and 
market arithmetic means of the debt-to-asset ratio. The measurement yielded the 
following results: 
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Table 4.10 Average Debt-Asset Level by Industry and Market 
Optimal Capital Structure: Average Debt-to-Asset Level 
Industry Consumer 25.1% 
Industry Staples 33.8% 
Industry Energy 7.3% 
Industry Financials 16.4% 
Industry Health 10.5% 
Industry Industrial 19.1% 
Industry Technology 16.1% 
Industry Materials 8.1% 
Industry Communications 12.6% 
Industry Utilities 32.0% 
Market Average 14.4% 
 
Consequently, as discussed in Section 3.4.2, Varida and Varmda data for each 
individual firm can be obtained via the following equation:  
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4.4.2 Stage 2a: Testing Hypothesis 2a 
Post compilation of Varida and Varmda data, Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b 
can then be tested via cross-sectional OLS regression outlined in Section 3.2.2. 
Hypothesis 2a tests the dependency of Varida and Varmda on family involvement as 
presented in the OLS Regression equation 2a: 
Capital Structure Variation = β0 + β1Family + β2Age + β3Size + β4Asset_  Tangibility + 
β5Industry_Consumer + β6Industry_Staples + β7Industry_Energy + 
β8Industry_Financials + β9Industry_Healthcare + β10Industry_Industrials + 
β11Industry_Information Technology + β12Industry_Materials + β13Industry_Telecom + 
β14Industry_Utilities + β15Profitability + β16Operating Risk + β17Non-Debt Tax Shield + 
β18Effective Tax Rate + ε 
 
where Varida and Varmda are applied as the data for Capital Structure Variation 
alternately. The results of the above regression equation are presented in Table 4.11: 
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Table 4.11 Results of Regression 2a 
Dependent Variable: Varida (Industry vs. Firm D/A) Varmda (Market vs Firm D/A) 
 Hypothesis 2a: Family Firms Hypothesis 2a: Family Firms 
 Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
     
Intercept 0.4766 1.4421 0.5160 1.5462 
Family 0.1197 1.8018* 0.1178 1.7566* 
Age 0.0230 0.8664 0.0225 0.8380 
Size -0.0253 -2.0576** -0.0256 -2.0639** 
Tangibility 0.1522 1.2436 0.1529 1.2368 
Operating Risk -0.0610 -1.6128 -0.0629 -1.6461 
Profitability -4.02e-7 -0.0234 -5.90e-7 -0.0340 
Effective Tax Rate -0.0168 -0.3795 -0.0191 -0.4289 
Non-Debt Tax Shield -6.91e-6 -0.0364 -6.81e-6 -0.0356 
Industry Consumer -0.0436 -0.1663 -0.0628 -0.2371 
Industry Staples -0.0282 -0.0997 -0.0217 -0.0759 
Industry Energy -0.1121 -0.4273 -0.1392 -0.5253 
Industry Financials -0.0112 -0.0430 -0.0413 -0.1572 
Industry Health -0.0895 -0.3398 -0.1199 -0.4505 
Industry Industrial -0.0921 -0.3541 -0.1207 -0.4596 
Industry Technology 0.2090 0.7801 0.1778 0.6574 
Industry Materials -0.0961 -0.3763 -0.1240 -0.4810 
Industry Communications -0.1114 -0.3679 -0.1423 -0.4655 
     
Adjusted R2 0.4771%  0.4663%  
* - Significant with 90% level of confidence 
** - Significant with 95% level of confidence  
*** - Significant with 99% level of confidence 
 
Table 4.11 shows that family firms have greater capital structure variation than 
non-family firms. Specifically, they are +0.12 within 90% level of confidence for 
variations from the industry mean (Varida), and +0.118 within 90% level of confidence 
for variations from the market mean (Varmda). These findings are consistent with the 
outcome of non-parametric testing as presented in Appendix 3. As discussed in Section 
3.4.2, capital structure variation provides a measure of non-economic objectives (Berger, 
Ofek & Yermack, 1997). The results of Regression 2a suggest that, as posited in 
Hypothesis 2a, family firms have a greater level of non-economic objectives than those of 
non-family firms. 
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Among the independent control variables, Firm Size was shown to be a negative 
and significant determinant of capital structure variation. For both Varida and Varmda 
measures, the coefficient of Firm Size (-0.252 and -0.253 respectively) was significant at 
a 95% level of confidence. Intuitively, this suggests that larger firms have the benefit of 
economies-of-scale, allowing them greater access to capital structure management tools 
that enable them to optimize their capital structure decisions, thus reducing capital 
structure variation. This is consistent with studies that show firm size as a salient feature 
of capital structure decisions since larger firms have lower external financing costs 
(Chittenden, Hall & Hutchinson, 1996; Romano, Tanewski & Smyrnios, 2000). 
4.4.3 Stage 2b: Testing Hypothesis 2b 
Hypothesis 2b tests for the moderating effect of family firm managerial 
ownership on capital structure variation. As described in Section 3.2.2, empirical testing 
is conducted through the cross-sectional OLS Regression equation 2b: 
Capital Structure Variation= β0 +β1Family*Governance + β2Age + β3Size + β4Asset_  
Tangibility + β5Industry_Consumer + β6Industry_Staples + β7Industry_Energy + 
β8Industry_Financials + β9Industry_Healthcare + β10Industry_Industrials + 
β11Industry_Information Technology + β12Industry_Materials + β13Industry_Telecom + 
β14Industry_Utilities + β15Profitability + β16Operating Risk + β17Non-Debt Tax Shield + 
β18Effective Tax Rate + ε 
 
where Varida and Varmda are applied as the data for Capital Structure Variation 
alternately. The results of the above regression equation are presented in Table 4.12: 
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Table 4.12 Results of Regression 2b 
Dependent Variable: Varida (Industry vs. Firm D/A) Varmda (Market vs Firm D/A) 
 Hypothesis 2b:O-M Family Firms Hypothesis 2b: O-M Family Firms
 Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
     
Intercept 0.4608 1.3942 0.5012 1.5014 
Family * Governance 0.1630 2.1624** 0.1580 2.0753** 
Age 0.0241 0.9058 0.0235 0.8760 
Size -0.0247 -2.0095** -0.0251 -2.0189** 
Tangibility 0.1510 1.2341 0.1516 1.2272 
Operating Risk -0.0623 -1.6502* -0.0642 -1.6828* 
Profitability -2.43e-7 -0.0141 -4.37e-7 -0.0252 
Effective Tax Rate -0.0165 -0.3748 -0.0189 -0.4238 
Non-Debt Tax Shield -6.46e-6 -0.0341 -6.46e-6 -0.0338 
Industry Consumer -0.0422 -0.1611 -0.0610 -0.2306 
Industry Staples -0.0228 -0.0807 -0.0163 -0.0571 
Industry Energy -0.1063 -0.4054 -0.1335 -0.5041 
Industry Financials -0.0069 -0.0264 -0.0369 -0.1407 
Industry Health -0.0806 -0.3061 -0.1111 -0.4179 
Industry Industrial -0.0877 -0.3373 -0.1163 -0.4431 
Industry Technology 0.2079 0.7765 0.1770 0.6545 
Industry Materials -0.0938 -0.3675 -0.1218 -0.4726 
Industry Communications -0.1201 -0.3969 -0.1505 -0.4922 
     
Adjusted R2 0.5816%  0.5555%  
* - Significant with 90% level of confidence 
** - Significant with 95% level of confidence  
*** - Significant with 99% level of confidence 
 
The above results indicate that owner-managed family firms have greater capital 
structure variation than other firms. Specifically, family firms are +0.163 within 95% 
level of confidence for variations from the industry mean (Varida), and +0.158 within 
95% level of confidence for variations from the market mean (Varmda). Moreover, the 
presence of managerial ownership in family firms lead greater capital structure variation 
(+0.163 and +0.158 for Varida and Varmda, respectively) than that of the capital 
structure variation (+0.12 and +0.118 for Varida and Varmda, respectively) brought 
about by the presence of family firms in general (Table 4.11). The outcome of non-
parametric testing, as presented in Appendix 3, partially confirms these findings. Hence, 
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the results of Regression 2b indicate that owner-manager led family firms have a greater 
presence of non-economic objectives than those of other family firms. The results 
provide empirical confirmation of Hypothesis 2b. 
 
Similar to Regression 2a, Firm Size was shown to be a negative and significant 
determinant of capital structure variation among control variables. For both Varida and 
Varmda measures, the coefficient of Firm Size (-0.247 and -0.25 respectively) was 
significant at a 95% level of confidence. Thus, this result can be interpreted in a similar 
manner with that of Regression 2a. Among debt-related control variables, the firm’s 
Operating Risk was shown to be a negative and significant determinant of capital 
structure variation within a 90% level of confidence for both Varida (-0.062) and Varmda 
(-0.064) measures. High operating risks may affect the risk wherein owner-managers are 
exposed to, and hence may influence managerial decision-making (Crutchley & Hansen, 
1989; Mishra & McConaughy, 1999). When operating risks are high, managers may 
avoid utilizing leverage. Thus, this limits the range of internal and external financing 
options available to these firms, and consequently, may explain why capital structure 
variation is lower.  
4.5 Testing for Firm Performance 
Firm performance is operationalized in two alternate measures, Tobin’s Q (Q) and 
Return on Assets (ROA). Data for these dependent variables are obtained by the 
following ratios, as described in Section 3.4.3: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=  
A
 LTD + STD + MVEQ , and 
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⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
A
 INROA  
Subsequently, these data are utilized in OLS regressions for hypotheses testing. 
4.5.1 Testing Hypothesis 3a 
Cross-sectional OLS regression, as outlined in Section 3.2.3, is used to test for 
Hypothesis 3a. Hypothesis 3a provides an empirical measure of the interdependency of Q 
and ROA on family involvement. This is presented in the OLS Regression equation 3a: 
Firm Performance = β0 + β1Family + β2Age + β3Size + β4Asset_  Tangibility + 
β5Industry_Consumer + β6Industry_Staples + β7Industry_Energy + 
β8Industry_Financials + β9Industry_Healthcare + β10Industry_Industrials + 
β11Industry_Information Technology + β12Industry_Materials + β13Industry_Telecom + 
β14Industry_Utilities + ε 
 
where Q and ROA are applied as the data for Firm Performance alternately. The results 
of the above regression equation are presented in Table 4.13: 
Table 4.13 Results of Regression 3a 
Dependent Variable: Q ROA 
 Hypothesis 3a: Family Firms Hypothesis 3a: Family Firms 
 Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
Intercept 4.0050 6.4972*** -1.9161 -9.2683*** 
Family  0.3188 2.5709** 0.0967 2.3243** 
Age -0.0029 -0.0587 -0.0045 -0.2715 
Size -0.1323 -5.7695*** 0.0981 12.757*** 
Tangibility -0.0117 -0.0512 -0.0497 -0.6480 
Industry Consumer 0.1914 0.3908 0.0946 0.5758 
Industry Staples -0.1525 -0.2885 -0.0055 -0.0311 
Industry Energy 0.5205 1.0622 0.0825 0.5018 
Industry Financials -0.0548 -0.1128 0.1052 0.6459 
Industry Health 1.0405 2.1148** -0.2619 -1.5869 
Industry Industrial 0.2545 0.5239 0.1309 0.8034 
Industry Technology 0.3441 0.6875 -0.0168 -0.0999 
Industry Materials 0.5549 1.1635 0.0510 0.3188 
Industry Communications 0.8166 1.4438 0.0200 0.1057 
     
Adjusted R2 8.8346%  18.5457%  
* - Significant with 90% level of confidence 
** - Significant with 95% level of confidence  
*** - Significant with 99% level of confidence 
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These results indicate that family firms have greater firm performance than non-
family firms. Specifically, Family firms are +0.319 within 95% level of confidence for 
approximate Tobin’s Q (Q) efficiency measure, and +0.097 within 95% level of 
confidence for return-on-assets (ROA) performance measure. These findings are 
consistent with the outcome of non-parametric testing as presented in Appendix 3. Thus, 
the results of Regression 3a are consistent with Hypothesis 3a. Further, these Australian 
results are consistent with previous family business performance studies on large firms 
from other countries (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Mishra, Randoy & Goel, 2001; Randoy & 
Goel, 2003; McConaughy, Matthews & Fialko, 2004; Lee, 2004; Ng, 2005; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006).  
Among the independent control variables, Firm Size was shown to be (1) a 
negative significant determinant (-0.132) of approximate Tobin’s Q within a 99% level of 
confidence, and (2) a positive significant determinant (0.098) of ROA within a 99% level 
of confidence. As discussed in Section 4.2.2, this curious result may stem from a 
difference in orientation of these performance measures. Further, these results are 
consistent with extant family literature. On one hand, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and 
Randoy and Goel (2003) find that firm size to be a negative determinant of market 
measures of performance (Tobin’s Q), which suggests that markets may expect larger 
firms to have lower or diminishing rates of growth and efficiency in asset utilization. On 
the other hand, Anderson and Reeb (2003), 8 and Randoy and Goel (2003) find firm size 
to be a positive determinant of return on assets (ROA). This may suggest that larger firms 
                                                 
8 Anderson & Reeb (2003) find a positive and significant relationship between EBIDTA-measured ROA 
and firm size. 
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have economies-of-scale that enable them to maximize their efficiency in utilizing 
existing assets (Dalton, Daily, Johnson & Ellstand, 1999). 
4.5.2 Testing Hypothesis 3b 
Hypothesis 3b tests for the moderating effect of family firm managerial 
ownership on firm performance. As described in Section 3.2.3, empirical testing is 
conducted through the cross-sectional OLS Regression equation 3b: 
Firm Performance = β0 + β1Family*Governance + β2Age + β3Size + β4Asset_  
Tangibility + β5Industry_Consumer + β6Industry_Staples + β7Industry_Energy + 
β8Industry_Financials + β9Industry_Healthcare + β10Industry_Industrials + 
β11Industry_Information Technology + β12Industry_Materials + β13Industry_Telecom + 
β14Industry_Utilities + ε 
 
where Q and ROA are applied as the data for Firm Performance alternately. The results 
of the above regression equation are presented in Table 4.14: 
Table 4.14 Results of Regression 3b 
Dependent Variable: Q ROA 
 Hypothesis 3b:O-M Family Firms Hypothesis 3b: O-M Family Firms
 Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
     
Intercept 3.9556 6.4206*** -1.9208 -9.2803*** 
Family * Governance 0.4545 3.2301*** 0.1015 2.1470** 
Age 6.84e-5 0.0014 -0.0037 -0.2252 
Size -0.1306 -5.6955*** 0.0983 12.7653*** 
Tangibility -0.0147 -0.0644 -0.0510 -0.6653 
Industry Consumer 0.1924 0.3937 0.1007 0.6131 
Industry Staples -0.1380 -0.2614 -3.74e-5 -0.0002 
Industry Energy 0.5362 1.0959 0.0868 0.5278 
Industry Financials -0.0443 -0.0913 0.1095 0.6719 
Industry Health 1.0646 2.1670** -0.2552 -1.5459 
Industry Industrial 0.2658 0.5480 0.1354 0.8306 
Industry Technology 0.3397 0.6796 -0.0150 -0.0893 
Industry Materials 0.5613 1.1785 0.0524 0.3272 
Industry Communications 0.7898 1.3980 0.0189 0.0993 
     
Adjusted R2 9.0888%  18.4984%  
* - Significant with 90% level of confidence 
** - Significant with 95% level of confidence  
*** - Significant with 99% level of confidence 
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Table 4.14 indicates that owner-manager led family firms have greater firm 
performance than other firms. Specifically, the results show coefficients of +0.455 within 
95% level of confidence for approximate Tobin’s Q efficiency measure, and +0.102 
within 95% level of confidence for Return-on-assets performance measure. Moreover, the 
presence of managerial ownership in family firms lead greater firm performance (+0.455 
and +0.102 for approximate Tobin’s Q and Return-on-assets, respectively) than that of 
the firm performance measures (+0.319 and +0.0967 for approximate Tobin’s Q and 
Return-on-assets, respectively) brought about by the presence of family firms in general 
(Table 4.13). These findings are confirmed by the outcome non-parametric testing, as 
presented in Appendix 3. The results of Regression 3b suggest that, consistent with 
Hypothesis 3b, owner-manager led family firms outperform other forms of family firms. 
Similar to Regression 3a, among the independent control variables, Firm Size was 
shown to be (1) a negative significant determinant (-0.132) of approximate Tobin’s Q 
within a 99% level of confidence, and (2) a positive significant determinant (0.098) of 
approximate Tobin’s Q within a 99% level of confidence. This result may be consistently 
interpreted likewise with that of Regression 3a. 
4.6 Robustness Checks on OLS Techniques 
The above empirical assessments were undertaken using cross-sectional OLS 
regressions on ex-post data. To ensure the robustness of the statistical techniques 
employed, the models are tested for OLS assumptions of non-multicollinearity, non-
autocorrelation, homoskedasticity and normality. 
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4.6.1 Multicollinearity Tests 
Multicollinearity refers to the degree in which two or more independent variables 
are correlated with each other. Deleterious levels of multicollinearity may affect OLS 
regressions by producing inefficient results. Utilizing Marquard’s (1970) variance 
inflation factors as a technique in identifying harmful multicollinearity in our sample 
yields the following results: 
Table 4.15 Test for Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity Test: Variance Inflation Factors 
 Family and 
Controls 
Family*Governance 
and Controls 
Family 1.0396  
Family * Governance  1.0379 
Age 1.0952 1.0953 
Size 1.3772 1.3793 
Tangibility 1.2362 1.2360 
Operating Risk 1.0206 1.0198 
Profitability 2.4795 2.4796 
Effective Tax Rate 2.4870 2.4869 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 1.0261 1.0259 
 
Variables with a variance inflation factor of 10 or greater, by rule-of-thumb, are 
deemed to have serious multicollinearity issues. Table 4.15 illustrates that there is no 
inherent problem of multicollinearity among the independent variables. 
4.6.2 Autocorrelation Tests 
A high degree of correlation among residuals of the regressions’ datasets may 
produce inefficient results. As such, the presence of serial correlation among the OLS 
regressions is checked using Durbin and Watson’s (1950, 1951) test statistic. This 
resulted in the following: 
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Table 4.16 Test for Serial Correlation 
OLS Regression Dependent Variable Durbin-Watson Statistic
Regression 1a AAA 2.0500 
Regression 1b AAA 2.0522 
Regression 2a Varida 2.0008 
Regression 2b Varida 1.9935 
Regression 2a Varmda 2.0003 
Regression 2b Varmda 1.9932 
Regression 3a Tobin’s Q 1.9736 
Regression 3b Tobin’s Q 1.9755 
Regression 3a ROA 1.8504 
Regression 3b ROA 1.8519 
Legend : AAA – Earnings Management via Absolute-Value Abnormal Accruals; Varida – Industry Mean Debt-to-Asset 
Variation; Varrmda – Market Mean Debt-to-Asset Variation; Q – Approximate Tobin’s Q; ROA – Return on Assets 
 
A commonly used benchmark in identifying no serious serial correlation is 
between a Durbin-Watson Statistic of 1.5 and 2.5. Therefore, Table 4.16 shows that the 
OLS regressions are free from problematic autocorrelation problems. 
4.6.3 Tests for Heteroskedasticity 
Standard OLS regression procedure assumes that the residual variance of a 
variable is constant. If this assumption is violated (a condition called heteroskedasticity) 
inefficient results may arise. White’s (1980) test shows whether this condition is present 
among the OLS regressions, as shown in Table 4.17:  
Table 4.17 White Test for Heteroskedasticity 
OLS Regression Dependent Variable White Residual Test 
Regression 1a AAA 0.7396 
Regression 1b AAA 0.7248 
Regression 2a Varida 1.0553 
Regression 2b Varida 1.1223 
Regression 2a Varmda 1.0592 
Regression 2b Varmda 1.1252 
Regression 3a Tobin’s Q 2.8593*** 
Regression 3b Tobin’s Q 3.1241*** 
Regression 3a ROA 2.0313*** 
Regression 3b ROA 2.0084*** 
Legend : AAA – Earnings Management via Absolute-Value Abnormal Accruals; Varida – Industry Mean Debt-to-Asset 
Variation; Varrmda – Market Mean Debt-to-Asset Variation; Q – Approximate Tobin’s Q; ROA – Return on Assets 
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The above table suggests that Regression 3a and 3b, either using Tobin’s Q or ROA as 
dependent variables for firm performance, have heteroskedastic residuals. Consequently, 
these results may be inefficient.  
As shown in Table 4.18 and Table 4.19, these regressions can be adjusted using 
White’s procedure to account for the presence of heteroskedasticity. After adjusting for 
heteroskedasticity, the new regressions do not provide any contradictory results from that 
of Table 4.14 and Table 4.15. Thus, heteroskedasticity does not affect the conclusions 
derived from the earlier results. 
Table 4.18 White-Adjusted Regression 3 (Tobin’s Q) 
Dependent Variable : Firm Performance (Approximate Tobin’s Q) 
White Heteroskedasticity Adjusted 
 Regression 3a: Family Firms Regression 3b: O-M Family Firms
 Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
     
Intercept 4.0050 8.3213*** 3.9556 8.2497*** 
Family 0.3188 1.9091*   
Family * Governance   0.4545 2.1636** 
Age -0.0029 -0.0625 6.84e-5 0.0015 
Size -0.1323 -5.4849*** -0.1306 -5.4536*** 
Tangibility -0.0117 -0.0710 -0.0147 -0.0893 
Industry Consumer 0.1914 0.7100 0.1924 0.7120 
Industry Staples -0.1525 -0.5618 -0.1380 -0.5073 
Industry Energy 0.5205 1.9060* 0.5362 1.9558* 
Industry Financials -0.0548 -0.2097 -0.0443 -0.1685 
Industry Health 1.0405 3.3926*** 1.0646 3.4469*** 
Industry Industrial 0.2545 0.9413 0.2658 0.9778 
Industry Technology 0.3441 1.0962 0.3397 1.0777 
Industry Materials 0.5549 2.1562** 0.5613 2.1679** 
Industry Communications 0.8166 1.1767 0.7898 1.1435 
     
Adjusted R2 8.8346%  9.0888%  
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Table 4.19 White-Adjusted Regression 3 (ROA) 
Dependent Variable : Firm Performance (Return on Assets) 
White Heteroskedasticity Adjusted 
 Regression 3a: Family Firms Regression 3b: O-M Family Firms
 Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
     
Intercept -1.9161 -9.5083*** -1.9208 -9.4909*** 
Family 0.0967 2.5859***   
Family * Governance   0.1015 2.2985** 
Age -0.0045 -0.3433 -0.0037 -0.2853 
Size 0.0981 8.6943*** 0.0983 8.6847*** 
Tangibility -0.0497 -1.0759 -0.0510 -1.1017 
Industry Consumer 0.0946 1.5517 0.1007 1.6574* 
Industry Staples -0.0055 -0.0775 -3.74e-5 -0.0005 
Industry Energy 0.0825 1.4435 0.0868 1.5159 
Industry Financials 0.1052 1.8810* 0.1095 1.9606* 
Industry Health -0.2619 -3.2512*** -0.2552 -3.1685*** 
Industry Industrial 0.1309 2.3179** 0.1354 2.3965** 
Industry Technology -0.0168 -0.1293 -0.0150 -0.1157 
Industry Materials 0.0510 0.9139 0.0524 0.9377 
Industry Communications 0.0200 0.2006 0.0189 0.1887 
     
Adjusted R2 18.5457%  18.4984%  
 
4.6.4 Tests for Normality 
Hypothesis testing based on OLS regression results assumes that residuals follow 
a normal distribution. In order to test the robustness of this assumption, the probability 
distribution of each OLS regression residual is modeled, and appropriate critical values 
(in place of the t-test critical values) selected. The relationship between dependent and 
independent variables can then be tested using this simulated function.  
The probability distribution of the regression residuals is generated using a Monte 
Carlo simulation (Metropolis & Ulam, 1949). Specifically, the following steps are 
undertaken to perform a bootstrapping technique (Efron, 1981): 
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• Model the OLS regression equation under the null hypothesis and 
randomly generate one thousand (1,000) sample data for the dependent 
variable; 
• Obtain the t-statistics for the re-modeled equation; 
• Repeat steps 1 and 2 one thousand (1,000) times; 
• Arrange the estimated t-statistic values from step 2 in ascending order; 
• Obtain the appropriate critical value from the range of t-statistic values. 
Appendix 2 provides a summary of the results of the bootstrapping exercise. The 
significant results from the bootstrapping exercise are consistent with earlier results based 
on the normality assumption. Therefore, the robustness checks utilizing the above 
bootstrapping technique confirm earlier conclusions established based on these 
assumptions. 
4.7 Summary of Results 
Table 4.20 provides a summary of the empirical results discussed from Section 
4.3 to Section 4.5. 
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Table 4.20 Summary of Empirical Results 
Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable 
 
Description Expectations 
Significant? 
Reject 
Null? 
Hypothesis 1a AAA Family Firms have lower earnings 
management than other firms 
 
H1aa: β1 < 0 
 
Yes Yes 
H1ba: β1 < 0 
 
Yes Hypothesis 1b AAA OM Family firms have lower 
earnings management than other 
family firms 
 
H1ba:β1 < β1(H1a) Yes 
Yes 
Hypothesis 2a Industry vs. 
D/A Var. 
Family firms have greater capital 
structure variation than other firms 
 
H2aa: β1 > 0 
 
Yes Yes 
H2ba: β1 > 0 
 
Yes Hypothesis 2b Industry vs. 
D/A Var. 
OM Family firms have greater 
capital structure variation than other 
family firms 
 
H2ba:β1 > β1(H2a) Yes 
Yes 
Hypothesis 2a Market vs. 
D/A Var. 
Family firms have greater capital 
structure variation than other firms 
 
H2aa: β1 > 0 
 
Yes Yes 
H2ba: β1 > 0 
 
Yes Hypothesis 2b Market vs. 
D/A Var. 
OM Family firms have greater 
capital structure variation than other 
family firms 
 
H2ba:β1 > β1(H2a) Yes 
Yes 
Hypothesis 3a Tobin’s Q Family firms outperform non-family 
firms 
 
H3aa: β1 > 0 Yes Yes 
H3ba: β1 > 0 
 
Yes Hypothesis 3b Tobin’s Q Owner Managed Family firms 
outperform other family firms 
 
 
H3ba:β1 > β1(H3a) Yes 
Yes 
Hypothesis 3a ROA Family firms outperform non-family 
firms 
 
H3aa: β1 > 0 Yes Yes 
H3ba: β1 > 0 
 
Yes Hypothesis 3b ROA Owner Managed Family firms 
outperform other family firms 
 
 
H3ba:β1 > β1(H3a) Yes 
Yes 
 
Based on these empirical results, the following observations can be made for 
family firms: 
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• Family firms have significantly lower earnings management than non-
family firms;  
• Family firms have significantly greater capital structure variation than 
non-family firms;  
• Family firms have significantly greater Tobin’s Q valuation and return on 
assets than non-family firms. 
Further, based on these results, the following observations can be made for 
owner-manager led family firms: 
• Owner-manager led family firms have lower earnings management than 
other family firms; 
• Owner-manager led family firms have greater capital structure variation 
than other family firms; 
• Owner-manager led family firms have significantly greater Tobin’s Q 
valuation and return on assets than non-family firms. 
Finally, the robustness checks on these empirical results show that the statistical 
issues of multicollinearity, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and normality of 
residuals do not pose a serious threat to the conclusions established above. 
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Chapter 5. Discussions and Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five summarizes the thesis and presents the observations and analyses of 
the research. Further, this chapter highlights the potential limitations of the research, and 
discusses the specific implications of the study. 
Chapter Five proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 provides a summary of the research 
objectives, methodology, analysis, discussion and conclusions. Section 5.3 addresses the 
potential internal and external validity limitations of the research and suggests possible 
directions in future research. Section 5.4 presents the potential practical, regulatory, 
educational and research implications of this study. Finally, Section 5.5 provides a 
concluding outline of the chapter. 
5.2 Summary of the Research 
The objective of this research is to investigate the application of agency theory in 
family business studies, provide a theoretical framework that is sympathetic to and 
improves existing research in this area, and find empirical verification for this framework. 
The research asks the question: 
What are the unique agency dynamics that differentiate family firms from non-family 
firms, how do they affect firm performance, and how does managerial ownership 
moderate this relationship?  
This study is motivated in two ways. First, extant literature in agency theory 
studies in family businesses paint a conflicting picture (McConaughy, Matthews & Fialko, 
2001; Chrisman, Chua & Sharma, 2005; Dyer, 2006), wherein one school of thought 
suggests that there are fewer agent-principal problems associated with family firms 
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(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Daily & Dollinger, 1992), while another school believes that 
family firms incur greater costs from these aforesaid problems (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino 
& Buchholtz, 2001; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001). Second, 
advancements on the theoretical foundations in family business studies has led to a 
greater recognition by leading researchers on the need to unify the frameworks of agency 
theory and resource-based (RBV) theory in explaining the family firm phenomenon 
(Chrisman, Chua & Sharma, 2005; Habbershon, 2006). Consequently, this study aims to 
unify both schools of family business agency theorists, and provide a link between family 
business agency theory and the resource-based framework. In doing so, this research 
aspires to benefit researchers, educators, regulators, practitioners and investors. 
Research into the family business phenomenon suggests that family firms are 
indelibly characterized by the qualities of personalism and particularism (Carney, 2005; 
Chrisman, Steier & Chua, 2006). Personalism refers to the incorporation of organization 
authority towards the dominant family coalition, while particularism refers to altered 
decision criteria employed by the dominant family coalition arising from the 
personalization of authority (Carney, 2005). These two qualities foster the necessary 
conditions that impact principal-agent relationships in family firms. Within the context of 
the separation of ownership and control, agency costs arise from information asymmetry 
and misalignment of objectives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 
1988; Healy & Palepu, 2001). Thus, this research seeks to provide a better understanding 
of the influence of family firms, driven by personalism and particularism, on their agency 
frameworks. This is achieved by disentangling the principal-agent relationship into two 
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distinct and measurable attributes: the agency relationship’s level of information 
asymmetry and the alignment of objectives.  
5.2.1 Convergence of Information Asymmetry in Family Firms 
Extant literature suggests that personalism and particularism promote conditions 
that may reduce the level of information asymmetry within family businesses (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). For instance, personalism inspires a long-term perspective and strategic 
coherence in family firms (Kelly, Athanassiou & Crittenden, 2000; Mishra, Randoy & 
Jenssen, 2001; Le-Breton Miller & Miller, 2006), while particularism fosters trust, 
symmetric altruism and relational governance within the business (Steier, 2001; 
Mustakallio, Autio & Zahra, 2002; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003; Chrisman, Chua & 
Sharma, 2005). Lower levels of information asymmetry promote direct and indirect cost-
savings to the family firm (Lev, 1989; Wang, Swift & Lobo, 1994; Ali & Hwang, 1995; 
Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005). Proposition 1 posits that family firms have lower 
levels of information asymmetry, hence attain unique agency cost-savings (termed as 
family gains) vis-à-vis non-family firms. This proposition is empirically tested under 
Hypothesis 1a. 
Hypothesis 1a employs earnings management as a measure of the level of 
information asymmetry between family firms and non-family firms (Ronen & Yaari, 
2007; Ari, Glover & Sunder, 1998; Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2005). Concurrently, the 
degree of earnings management within the firm is also indicative of the severity of 
agency costs within the firm (Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005; Ronen & Yaari, 2007). 
The results reported in Section 4.3 provide observable evidence to show that family firms 
have lower earnings management than non-family firms. Based on our selected sample, it 
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is possible to validate Proposition 1 and conclude that family firms have a lower level of 
information asymmetry than non-family firms, hence engendering family gains.  
5.2.2 Divergence of Objectives in Family Firms 
Prior studies suggest that personalism and particularism within a family firm may 
empower the dominant family coalition to pursue their own family-centric non-economic 
objectives (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 2001; Morck 
& Yeung, 2003; Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2004). Personalism may translate into 
entrenchment and subsequent hold-up, moral hazard and adverse selection problems that 
accompany that situation (Carney, 2005; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003; Gomez-Mejia, 
Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001). Particularism may breed asymmetric altruism and 
likewise result in moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Carney, 2005; Chrisman, 
Chua & Sharma, 2005; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003; Lubatkin, Durand & Ling, 
2007). From a business perspective, the presence of non-economic objectives diverts 
limited resources away from the business’ economic goals of maximizing firm value, and 
increases the dominant family coalition’s perception of risk.  Consequently, these factors 
contribute directly and indirectly to agency costs unique to family firms (Mishra & 
McConaughy, 1999; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001). Proposition 2 
posits that family firms have a greater presence of non-economic objectives, hence attain 
unique agency costs (termed as family costs) vis-à-vis non-family firms. This proposition 
is tested under Hypothesis 2a. 
The presence of non-economic objectives implies that family firms make 
idiosyncratic capital structure decisions which deviate from optimal levels and ultimately 
lead to unique agency costs (Stultz, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1988; Mishra & McConaughy, 
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1999; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001). Thus, Hypothesis 2a employs 
capital structure variation as an indicator of non-economic objectives within a firm. The 
results of the test for Hypothesis 2a is reported in Section 4.4. These indicate that family 
firms do have greater capital structure variations than non-family firms. The empirical 
results support the notion, based on Proposition 2, that family firms have unique agency 
costs from a greater presence of non-economic objectives than that of non-family firms, 
hence incur family costs. 
5.2.3 Moderating Effects of Managerial Ownership 
Owner-manager led firms represent a polar extreme in a firm’s choice of 
governance and management. Moreover, these firms are more likely to be family 
controlled, (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999). As an extreme case of principal-agent 
relationships, managerial ownership may provide a foundation for family business 
agency studies. Specifically, they may be an indicator of a high degree of family 
involvement in family firms (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; Ng, 2005). Thus, this 
research evaluates the relative effects of family gains and family costs within family firms 
by analyzing the relative characteristics of owner-manager led family firms.  
Managerial ownership magnifies the positive effects of personalism and 
particularism such that decision-making, strategic control, relational monitoring and 
managerial flexibility is optimized within family firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Daily 
& Dollinger, 1992; James, 1999; Lee, 2004). Proposition 3 posits that information 
asymmetry is lowest, hence family gains are greater, in owner-manager led family firms 
as compared to other types of family firms. Hypothesis 1b extends Hypothesis 1a by 
specifically analyzing the level of earnings management within owner-manager led 
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family firms. The regression test of Hypothesis 1b reveal that owner-manager led family 
firms have lower levels of earning management than other types of family firms. 
Consequently, the results suggest that owner-manager led family firms have lower levels 
of information asymmetry, hence greater levels of family gains, than other types of 
family firms. These provide empirical validation for the aforementioned proposition.  
On the other hand, managerial ownership amplifies the negative effects of 
personalism and particularism such that entrenchment and asymmetric altruism problems 
are potentially maximized (Mishra, Randoy & Jenssen, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 
2003). These problems represent non-economic objectives that, from a business 
perspective, reduce the overall efficiency and value generation of the firm (McMahon & 
Stanger, 1995; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling & Dino, 2005). Proposition 3 posits that the 
presence of non-economic objectives is most prominent, hence family costs are greater, in 
owner-manager led family firms vis-a-vis other types of family firms. Hypothesis 2b 
extends Hypothesis 2a by specifically analyzing the capital structure variation within 
owner-manager led family firms. Results from Hypothesis 2b reveal that owner-manager 
led family firms have greater levels of capital structure variation than other types of 
family firms. Consequently, the results suggest that owner-manager led family firms have 
more non-economic objectives, hence greater levels of family costs, than other types of 
family firms. These results are consistent with Proposition 3. 
5.2.4 Firm Performance of Family Firms 
The prior empirical tests for Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a are consistent with 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 respectively. This indicates that family firms have family 
gains and family costs vis-à-vis non-family firms. From a resource-based perspective 
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(Barney, 1991; Habbershon & Williams, 1999), family gains and family costs represent 
intangible, rare and dynamic resources unique to family firms that may promote 
sustainable competitive advantages and disadvantages, respectively. It is theorized that a 
trade-off between family gains and family costs occur within family firms since family 
firms will not undertake any actions that are detrimental to the economic objectives of the 
business, unless there are sufficient incentives for the family’s non-economic objectives 
to do so. Thus, the question now becomes: is the trade-off between these unique agency 
cost-savings and agency costs significant enough to materially impact firm performance? 
Proposition 4 suggests that the sustained trade-off between family gains and family costs 
results in either competitive advantages or disadvantages for family firms. Since, under 
conditions of market competition, competitive disadvantages are not expected to 
perpetuate (Jensen, 2001; Fama, 1980), it is posited that family firms would exhibit 
competitive advantages (from surfeit family gains) over non-family firms. Post-empirical 
tests of Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a, the conditional Hypothesis 3a posits that 
family firms outperform non-family family. Results from OLS regression from two 
measures of firm performance (Approximate Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets) affirm this 
hypothesis. 
5.2.5 Moderating Effects of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance 
Results from Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2b provide support for Proposition 3. 
This shows that family gains and family costs are more pronounced in owner-manager led 
family firms than in other types of family firms. Further, it is posited that the resultant 
trade-off is most prominent under conditions of managerial ownership (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Steier, 2001; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Proposition 5 suggests that the 
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trade-off between family gains and family costs, along with their resulting influence on 
firm performance, diminish as family involvement in the firm decreases. Hypothesis 3b 
test this proposition via performance measures of Approximate Tobin’s Q and Return on 
Assets, and find that owner-manager led family firms do indeed outperform other forms 
of family firms. This presents support for the above-mentioned proposition. 
5.2.6 Concluding Remarks 
This research demonstrates that family firms have lower information asymmetries 
than non-family firms. Hence, family firms achieve unique agency cost-savings (family 
gains). Further, family firms were found to have a greater presence of non-economic 
objectives than non-family firms. Thus, family firms accrue unique agency costs (family 
gains). Interestingly, this suggests that the two schools of family business agency 
theorists discussed earlier do not in fact directly conflict with each other. Rather, our 
research show these two schools refer to two differing dynamics within agency theory, 
the level of information asymmetry and the misalignment of goals between principal and 
agent. As such, this study provides a bridge that reconciles both schools of thought. 
Further, the identification of family gains and family costs within family firms lends 
support to the notion that these idiosyncratic dynamics may be cultivated into sustainable 
competitive advantages. From this, an Agency Trade-off Model, wherein the trade-off 
between family gains and family costs within a family firm determines its relative 
agency-based competitive advantage over other firms, is proposed. Moreover, these 
agency dynamics represent resources that link agency theory to the resource-based view 
in family business studies. Empirically, it was observed that family firms outperform 
non-family firms, which suggests that the trade-off between family gains and family costs 
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result in competitive advantages. Finally, it was found that managerial ownership within 
family firms magnifies family gains and family costs. Empirically, these results show that 
owner-manager family firms outperform other forms of family firms. This suggests that 
the trade-off between these abovementioned agency dynamics provides a greater net gain 
arising from greater family involvement and influence. Table 5.1 provides an integrated 
summary of the findings for this study’s propositions and hypotheses. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of Findings 
Proposition Dependent 
Variable 
 
Hypothesis Results 
Proposition 1: Family firms have lower 
information asymmetry; hence attain family 
gains vis-à-vis non-family firms, ceteris 
paribus. 
AAA Hypothesis 1a: Family firms 
positively influence family gains 
from lower earnings management 
than that of non-family firms. 
 
Table 4.8 
Hypothesis 
supported 
Proposition 3: Family gains and family 
costs are greater in family firms under 
managerial ownership vis-à-vis other family 
firms, ceteris paribus. 
AAA Hypothesis 1b: Family firms under 
managerial ownership have greater 
family gains from lower earnings 
management than other family 
firms. 
 
Table 4.9 
Hypothesis 
supported 
Industry vs. 
D/A Var. 
Table 4.11 
Hypothesis 
supported 
Proposition 2: Family firms have greater 
divergence in firm objectives; hence attain 
family costs vis-à-vis non-family firms, 
ceteris paribus. Market vs. 
D/A Var. 
Hypothesis 2a: Family firms 
positively influence family costs 
from higher capital structure 
variation than that of non-family 
firms. 
Table 4.11 
Hypothesis 
supported 
Industry vs. 
D/A Var. 
Table 4.12 
Hypothesis 
supported 
Proposition 3: Family gains and family 
costs are greater in family firms under 
managerial ownership vis-à-vis other family 
firms, ceteris paribus. Market vs. 
D/A Var. 
Hypothesis 2b: Family firms under 
managerial ownership positively 
influence family costs from higher 
capital structure variation than that 
of other family firms. 
Table 4.12 
Hypothesis 
supported 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Table 4.13 
Hypothesis 
supported 
Proposition 4: The trade-off between the 
family gains and family costs of a family 
firm results in competitive advantages or 
disadvantages against rival firms, ceteris 
paribus. 
ROA 
Hypothesis 3a: Family firms have 
higher performance measures than 
non-family firms, consistent with 
the outcome of Hypotheses 1a and 
2a. 
 
Table 4.13 
Hypothesis 
supported 
Tobin’s Q Table 4.14 
Hypothesis 
supported 
Proposition 5: Sustained competitive 
advantages from the trade-off between 
family gains and family costs diminish as 
family ownership and/or family 
management in the firm decrease. 
ROA 
Hypothesis 3b: Family firms under 
managerial ownership have higher 
performance measures than other 
forms of family firms, consistent 
with the results of Hypotheses 1b 
and 2b. 
 
Table 4.14 
Hypothesis 
supported 
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5.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research  
As with any academic undertaking, this research potentially contains limitations 
that must be recognized. This section discusses these potential limitations as relating to 
either internal validity or external validity (Iselin, 1988; Campbell & Stanley, 1963). 
Furthermore, the issue of reliability is briefly discussed. Finally, it is noted that the 
limitations discussed below may provide future research opportunities for academics and 
students interested in the topic. 
5.3.1 Internal Validity 
Internal validity refers to the certainty with which conclusions about the causal 
relationship between different variables can be drawn from the research (Iselin, 1988; 
Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Specifically, the research seeks to identify the causal 
relationship between various dependent variables (information asymmetry, non-economic 
objectives and firm performance) and independent variables (family firms and owner-
manager led family firms). Control variables are included to ensure that extraneous 
factors do not moderate the causal relationships established in experimental testing. The 
following threats to internal validity are highlighted. 
5.3.1.1 Selection Bias 
This research endeavored to use all available ex-post facto data to reduce the 
potential effects of selection bias on the internal validity of the results. However, 
limitations on available data and restrictions on accrual testing constrain the temporal 
scope of the study to within the contemporaneous financial year of 2006. As a future 
research opportunity, this study may be expanded to observe whether or not these 
conclusions, on publicly listed Australian firms, hold true through past and future periods.  
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The issue of selection bias is also salient in the discussion of firm performance. 
As discussed in Section 2.4.7, this study assumes a mean-reversion of agency trade-offs 
(ie. in the long run, it is posited that family firms which have negative agency trade-offs 
would have to either close down or adopt measures to transform them into non-family 
firms). This mean-reversion implies that family firms with negative trade-offs are 
removed from the sample, hence it implicitly acknowledges that the threat of selection 
bias may affect the internal validity of this study’s results. Hence, it is possible that these 
conclusions do not actually suggest that family firms outperform non-family firms, but 
rather successful, long-lasting family firms have managed to maximize their family gains 
to compensate for family costs. As such, this research encourages further studies on ways 
to identify and maximize these family gains and minimize family costs. 
Finally, the issue of selection bias is important in the adoption of this thesis’ 
definition of what constitutes a family firm. Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester and 
Cannella (2007) argue that findings from earlier family business studies are extremely 
sensitive to the way in which family businesses are defined. Thus, it is possible that in the 
future, when a consensus for empirically defining family firms is better established 
within the research community, this study may be refined even further. 
5.3.1.2 Mortality Effects 
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, 87 firms were disqualified from the sample pool. 
Among these, 25 samples were eliminated since their data was either incomplete or they 
were identified outliers in subsequent statistical testing 9 . These eliminated samples 
represent only a minute (1.7%) faction of the sample pool. Thus, it is not expected that 
                                                 
9 Another sixty-two (62) sample firms were removed since these trusts and funds which, as discussed in 
Section 4.2.1, were inconsistent with the research objectives. 
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these omitted data will materially affect the statistical results of the study. Nevertheless, 
the mere removal and subsequent absence of the data indicates that it is not possible to 
fully discount mortality effects on the internal validity of the study. 
5.3.1.3 Instrumentation and Statistical Effects 
The effectiveness of instruments and statistical techniques utilized in testing may 
have major implications with the internal validity of the results. Based on the results of 
Section 4.6, no significant deleterious statistical effect has been detected. Moreover, from 
the simultaneous use of two alternate statistical packages as discussed in Section 5.3.3, it 
is expected that instrumentation effects are minimal.  
Within the context of this research, the utilization of cross-sectional linear 
regression study raises the issue of endogeneity bias. Nevertheless, the utilization of non-
parametric testing and the consistency of this research’s results with that of other 
empirical findings in extant literature helps diminish support the conclusions derived 
from the linear regression analyses. In the future, researchers may further explore the 
relationships outlined within this thesis by utilizing of time-series analysis and, for the 
study of firm performance, path analytical techniques. 
5.3.1.4 Moderating Effects 
Section 3.4.5 outlines the control variables utilized to extricate potential 
moderating effects from the empirical research. Firm lifecycle, scale, industry and 
tangibility effects are accounted for in the research. Moreover, the study into capital 
structure variation takes into account the moderating effects of operating risk, tax shields, 
tax rates and profitability.  
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It is important to note that this study in owner-manager led family firms do not 
account for the effects of family lifecycles. This study’s data indicate that a majority 
(approximately 85%) of owner-manager led family firms in the sample are first 
generation family firms. Existing research suggests that family lifecycles may have a 
moderating effect on family firm performance (Moores & Mula, 2000; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006; Blanco-Magazatos, De Quevedo-Puente & Castrillo, 2007). This effect may 
intersect with the effect observed from managerial ownership. Unfortunately, the sample 
pool from this research does not contain sufficient observations to warrant statistical 
testing. Thus, a suitable opportunity for future research is to determine whether family 
lifecycles have a moderating effect among publicly-listed owner-managed family firms in 
Australia. 
5.3.2 External Validity 
External validity refers to the extent with which findings from the research can be 
used to infer causal relationships across alternative types of independent and/or 
dependent variables, and across alternative or broader settings and populations (Iselin, 
1988; Campbell & Stanley, 1963). While care has been made to maximize available data, 
the representativeness of the sample period and sample selection procedure undertaken in 
Section 3.3 reduces the external validity of the study.  
This study focuses on contemporaneous data on publicly-listed Australian firms. 
It is interesting to study whether similar results and conclusions can be observed from (1) 
private firms within Australia and/or (2) private and public firms outside Australia. 
Further, question on the consistency of this study’s findings across alternative 
populations may be enhanced by studying them across different time periods. These 
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limitations on the temporal and physical scope of the study present an opportunity for 
future research. Nevertheless, the consistency of this study’s results with past research 
into family firm performance suggests that this study, or at the very least, the results on 
family firm performance, has a high degree of generalizability. 
Further, this study is conducted with the assumption that family businesses are 
restricted to the definition as outlined in Section 1.4.1. It may be possible that in rare 
cases, there are non-family firms that exhibit characteristics that may mimic family gains 
and family costs. In the event such occurs, the external validity of this dissertation’s 
findings must be re-evaluated. Further research, in order refine the implications of this 
study, may be warranted. 
This research also face limitations in translating the family gains and family costs 
constructs in practical terms. As indicated by the sample data, the idiosyncratic nature of 
family gains and family costs among various family firms suggests that these constructs 
may represent gestalts of differing family-driven resources and competencies. As 
Chrisman, Chua and Steier (2006) states, “paradoxically, some family firms do well, and 
some family firms don’t.” The topic of identifying what specific resources influences or 
is comprised within which agency construct gestalt is a broader question not addressed 
within this research. For instance, the way in which family firms’ entrepreneurial 
orientation, organizational learning, tacit knowledge, informal governance, and patient 
capital, among others, influence family gains and family gains, which in turn, serve as 
catalysts for superior performance, represent exciting research opportunities for the future.   
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5.3.3 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the consistency of empirical data and measures undertaken 
within the context of the research method. This study assumes that data gathered from 
Huntley-Aspect and Osiris databases are reliable. On some measures which are co-
reported, cross-checking of the output from both databases did not reveal any reliability 
issues. Moreover, this study uses two statistical packages, SPSS version 13.0 and E-
Views version 5.0, simultaneously to ensure the reliability of measurement results. 
Generally, the results between these two statistical packages are consistent and reliable. 
5.4 Contributions and Implications of the Research 
Despite the limitations outlined above, this study contributes to the current 
literature on the role of agency relationships in family businesses. Specifically, this 
research provides a unique contribution in several ways: 
• The study provides a platform of unifying conflicting literature in family 
business agency theory by identifying family gains and family costs as 
separate yet interacting agency dynamics. 
• The study into the idiosyncratic nature of the trade-offs between family 
gains and family costs represent an opportunity to bridge the agency 
theory framework and the resource-based view in family firms. 
• The study shows that the degree of family involvement, represented by the 
presence of managerial ownership, materially affects family gains and 
family costs. 
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• The research pioneers the use of earnings management as a tool to 
measure information asymmetry within family firms and within owner-
manager led family firms. 
• The research pioneers the use of capital structure variation as a proxy to 
operationalize the influence of non-economic objectives within family 
firms and within owner-manager led family firms. 
• The thesis is the first to show that family firms outperform non-family 
firms, in conjuction with lower information asymmetries, and spite of the 
presence of non-economic objectives. 
• The study provides a contemporary verification that large, publicly-traded 
Australian family firms, consistent with findings from other countries, 
outperform their non-family counterparts. 
Subsequently, this study’s implications to researchers, educators, regulators, 
practitioners and investors are outlined as follows: 
5.4.1 Research Implications 
Generally, this research provides a better understanding of the agency 
relationships within family firms and owner-manager led family firms. By providing an 
empirical link between agency theory and resource-based framework in family business 
studies, and by reconciling the conflicting schools of thought in family business agency 
theory, this research updates extant literature and establishes new ground for future 
research. Moreover, by highlighting the effects of managerial ownership within family 
firms, this study provides a bridge for researchers in the field of managerial ownership 
and researchers in the field of family business to compare notes and share their respective 
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wealth of literature. In addition, this research extends the external validity of existing 
family business studies to include publicly-listed Australian family firms. Finally, the 
discussion of results and limitations provide new opportunities and topics for future 
research.  
5.4.2 Educational Implications 
As this thesis provides a deeper understanding of the role of agency relationships 
within family firms, such refinements may be incorporated within family business texts. 
Moreover, this study provides new information that may fuel classroom discussion and 
case studies on family business topics that may range from agency theory, resource-based 
view, firm performance, information asymmetry, firm objectives, managerial ownership 
and family involvement, among others. Further, students may, in the future, use this 
research as a guide for replication studies and observe its external validity. 
5.4.3 Practical Implications 
This research suggests that family firms should ideally maximize their advantages 
from lower information asymmetries and minimize their disadvantages from diverging 
corporate and family interests. Thus, this study provides a blueprint for family firms to 
maximize their potential and avoid detrimental pitfalls. 
Likewise, non-family firms may use this knowledge to attempt to emulate the 
practices and characteristics of family firms that allow them to enjoy lower information 
asymmetries. Moreover, non-family firms may formulate strategies that enable them to 
take advantage of the weaknesses, represented by diverging corporate and family 
interests, within family firms. 
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Finally, the study of family gains and family costs provides an additional tool for 
investors to analyze the performance implications of governance and management 
decisions among family and non-family firms. Thus, results from this study may enhance 
investors’ ability to make correct investment decisions and judgments. 
5.4.4 Regulatory Implications 
This study uses Australian Stock Exchange data, hence contains salient 
information that may be helpful for Australian regulators and authorities within the 
corporate arena. Moreover, as discussed in Section 1.3.3, Current Australian regulations 
discourage managerial ownership among publicly-listed firms (Colliers, 2002). Selection 
bias notwithstanding, this study’s results indicate that managerial ownership, particularly 
for family firms, may in fact be beneficial in certain conditions. Therefore, this research 
may provide the onus for future regulatory changes that provide for the beneficial nature 
of managerial ownership in family firms. 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents a summary of the motivations, objectives, propositions, 
empirical findings and conclusions of the study. Furthermore, the limitations pertaining 
to internal validity, external validity and reliability of the findings were discussed. Finally, 
the contributions and implications of the research for practitioners, regulators, researchers 
and educators were highlighted. 
This research specifically addresses the following questions as summarized in 
Section 5.2: 
What are the unique agency dynamics that differentiate family firms from non-family firm? 
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Family firms exhibit personalistic and particularistic behaviors that differentiate 
them from non-family firms. These behaviors influence agency dynamics such that on 
one hand, information asymmetries are lower, and on the other hand, non-economic 
objectives are more prominent, within family firms vis-à-vis non-family firms. 
Consequently, the unique agency cost-savings (termed as family gains) and agency costs 
(termed as family costs) arising from these agency dynamics differentiate family firms 
from non-family firms. 
How do these dynamics affect firm performance between family and non-family firms? 
 
In highly competitive environments, a negative net trade-off between family gains 
and family costs cannot be sustained indefinitely. If firms with net negative trade-offs are 
unable to eliminate this disadvantage within a family business context, market 
competition dictates that they must either close down or mutate into firms that more 
closely resemble non-family firms. This implies that surviving family firms manage to 
maintain a positive net trade-off between family gains and family costs. These net 
positive trade-offs represent resources that sustain competitive advantages within family 
firms. Thus, as the results suggest, and consistent with other extant literature, family 
firms tend to outperform non-family firms. 
How does managerial ownership moderate this relationship? 
 
The degree of family involvement varies from one family firm to another. This 
gives rise to differing levels of personalism and particularism, and hence, idiosyncratic 
levels of family gains and family costs, amongst family firms. Generally, the more the 
dominant family coalition undertakes major roles within the business, the more involved 
and influential they become. Thus, the presence of managerial ownership within a family 
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firm may indicate high degrees of family involvement. The empirical results suggest that 
managerial ownership, representative of a greater degree of family involvement, results 
in lower information asymmetries (hence, greater family gains) and greater presence of 
non-economic objectives (hence, greater family costs). Moreover, this study’s findings 
indicate that the trade-off from these agency dynamics result in an overall net gain. 
Section 5.3 suggests that limitations may persist within the study, specifically 
with issues regarding selection bias, mortality of data, omitted variables and external 
validity. Despite these issues, Section 5.4 suggests that the study provides salient 
contributions to the field of family business research and present significant implications 
for practitioners, educators, researchers and regulators. 
Overall, the conceptual framework posited within this thesis is based upon the 
foundation of extant literature and current wisdom within the family business sphere. The 
empirical results delivered by this thesis are reinforced within a multi-method approach, 
as illustrated within Chapter 3 and Appendix 3. Coming full circle, the empirical results 
from multi-method testing are shown to be consistent with empirical results and 
conceptual propositions from extant family business literature. It is hoped that this 
dissertation provides some answers to key questions within the family business literature 
and provides incremental growth of knowledge in the academic field.  
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Appendix 1. Two-period Consumption Model for the Non-family Firm 
For a non-family firm, the two-period utility maximization model is given as 
(James, 1999):  
Given: U(C1,C2) utility function for consumption (C) in period 1 (now) and 2 
     (future); 
 W  wealth; 
 K  investment in firm; 
 W-K   consumption; 
 F(K)  return on investment; 
 (1+d)  subjective discount factor; 
 (1+r)  market discount factor; 
 u1/u2  slope of owner’s preference to consume now and in the  
    future. 
Under normal circumstances, the owner’s utility function is modeled as: 
 
d)(1
u(C2)  u(C1)  C2)U(C1, ++=     (equation 1.1) 
This equation is maximized subject to a budget constraint: 
 
r)(1
F(K) K - W 
r)(1
C2  C1 ++=++     (equation 1.1a) 
Taking the Lagrangian process for the choice variables: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛
+−+−++−++= r)(1
F(K) K  W 
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C2  C1
d)(1
u(C2)  u(C1)
K),C,(C 21 λl (equation 1.2) 
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Taking first order conditions 
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Taking first order conditions 
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Combining the terms in the investment equations (equation 1.2a), (equation 1.2b) and 
(equation 1.2c): 
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Results in: 
d)(1
u
uF
2
1
k +=       (equation 1.3) 
Note that when d=0, the manager does not prefer to consume today or in the future: 
r)(1
u
uF
2
1
k +==       (equation 1.4) 
Equation 1.4 illustrates that investment is optimal relative to the market 
investment rule. Therefore, the optimal choice in consumption between both periods (C1 
and C2) maximizes both utility and firm profits together. Under perfect capital markets, 
Fisher’s (1930) separation theory suggest that consumption decisions are separate from 
the investment maximization decisions, since owners can borrow from capital markets to 
fund their consumption preferences.  
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Appendix 2. Bootstrapping Results 
 
Section 4.6.4 details the utilization of the bootstrapping technique (Efron, 1981) 
to test the robustness of the research method under conditions of non-Normality. A 
simulated distribution function for each research equation was generated using Monte 
Carlo simulation (Metropolis & Ulam, 1949). The following sample results are based 
upon one-thousand (1,000) replications of the bootstrapping process. In general, all 
regression results, post-bootstrapping simulation, appear to be consistent with earlier 
empirical findings. As such this robustness test reveals no inherent statistical problems 
with the conclusions derived from the research method. The sample results are 
summarized as follows: 
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A.2.1 Testing for Earnings Management 
Table A2.1 presents the simulated results for Regression 1a and Regression 1b. 
These are consistent with the results reported in Section 4.3. 
Table A2.1 Results of Regression 1 
Dependent Variable : Earnings Management  
Test Distribution via Monte-Carlo Simulation 
 Regression 1a: Family Firms Regression 1b: O-M Family Firms
 Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
     
Intercept 0.62701 3.421815*** 0.987548 5.383211*** 
Family -0.080531 -2.18478**   
Family * Governance   -0.121468 -2.898900*** 
Age 0.005559 0.377002 0.024798 1.681381* 
Size -0.035933 -5.27036*** -0.050063 -7.334801*** 
Tangibility 0.021958 0.323279 -0.054986 -0.809350 
Industry Consumer 0.188642 1.295579 0.092374 0.634636 
Industry Staples 0.075666 0.481505 0.065905 0.419336 
Industry Energy 0.404602 2.777748*** 0.240329 1.649484* 
Industry Financials 0.266812 1.848235* 0.084271 0.583661 
Industry Health 0.140624 0.961481 0.013827 0.094513 
Industry Industrial 0.11198 0.775405 -0.062784 -0.434681 
Industry Technology 0.476958 3.205601*** 0.249286 1.675039* 
Industry Materials 0.188672 1.330858 0.051279 0.361599 
Industry Communications 0.200787 1.194258 -0.019182 -0.114025 
     
Adjusted R2 7.7291%  8.0222%  
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A.2.2 Testing for Capital Structure Variation 
Tables A2.2 (Varida) and A2.3 (Varmda) present the simulated results for 
Regression 2a and Regression 2b. These are consistent with the results reported in 
Section 4.4. 
Table A2.2 Results of Regression 2 (Varida) 
Dependent Variable : Capital Structure Variation (Industry vs. Debt-to-Assets) 
Test Distribution via Monte-Carlo Simulation 
 Regression 2a: Family Firms Regression 2b: O-M Family Firms
 Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
     
Intercept 0.639162 1.939254* 0.436221 1.320705 
Family 0.116334 1.755855*   
Family * Governance   0.147461 1.957223* 
Age -0.003829 -0.144405 0.018686 0.703681 
Size -0.029178 -2.379835** -0.023650 -1.924862* 
Tangibility 0.099502 0.814960 0.093543 0.765185 
Operating Risk -0.013261 -0.351610 -0.049786 -1.318814 
Profitability -1.04E-06 -0.060710 9.46E-07 0.055153 
Effective Tax Rate -0.024584 -0.557910 0.001237 0.028040 
Non-Debt Tax Shield -3.43E-05 -0.181387 -1.30E-05 -0.068407 
Industry Consumer -0.072815 -0.278477 0.005009 0.019144 
Industry Staples -0.062957 -0.222960 -0.031668 -0.112018 
Industry Energy -0.157097 -0.600306 -0.096785 -0.369352 
Industry Financials -0.061715 -0.238035 -0.023254 -0.089586 
Industry Health -0.154250 -0.586965 -0.076139 -0.289366 
Industry Industrial -0.161969 -0.624607 -0.080772 -0.311111 
Industry Technology 0.126667 0.474103 0.228647 0.854709 
Industry Materials -0.064452 -0.253161 -0.028639 -0.112337 
Industry Communications -0.161947 -0.536411 -0.061272 -0.202617 
     
Adjusted R2 0.2991%  0.4326%  
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Table A2.3 Results of Regression 2 (Varmda) 
Dependent Variable : Capital Structure Variation (Market vs. Debt-to-Assets) 
Test Distribution via Monte-Carlo Simulation 
 Regression 2a: Family Firms Regression 2b: O-M Family Firms
 Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
     
Intercept 0.349496 1.053127 0.190723 0.575214 
Family 0.265376 3.977924***   
Family * Governance   0.390509 5.163229*** 
Age -0.008111 -0.303764 0.003135 0.117617 
Size -0.014591 -1.181949 -0.004807 -0.389760 
Tangibility 0.062610 0.509284 0.053427 0.435351 
Operating Risk -0.037237 -0.980539 -0.089245 -2.354975 
Profitability -1.43E-05 -0.831199 4.09E-06 0.237445 
Effective Tax Rate -0.017572 -0.396041 -0.011220 -0.253331 
Non-Debt Tax Shield -0.000130 -0.683967 1.32E-05 0.069217 
Industry Consumer -0.070837 -0.269056 -0.146649 -0.558289 
Industry Staples -0.013418 -0.047193 -0.018147 -0.063946 
Industry Energy -0.142506 -0.540819 -0.130275 -0.495246 
Industry Financials 0.125448 0.480541 0.077634 0.297931 
Industry Health -0.141044 -0.533039 -0.078863 -0.298569 
Industry Industrial -0.100639 -0.385438 -0.136487 -0.523690 
Industry Technology 0.213121 0.792227 0.163374 0.608361 
Industry Materials -0.096260 -0.375509 -0.130976 -0.511789 
Industry Communications -0.155254 -0.510720 -0.250160 -0.824062 
     
Adjusted R2 1.6693%  2.4183%  
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A.2.3 Testing for Firm Performance 
Tables A2.4 (Q) and A2.5 (ROA) present the simulated results for Regression 3a 
and Regression 3b. These are consistent with the results reported in Section 4.5. 
Table A2.4 Results of Regression 3 (Q) 
Dependent Variable : Firm Performance (Approximate Tobin’s Q) 
Test Distribution via Monte-Carlo Simulation 
 Regression 3a: Family Firms Regression 3b: O-M Family Firms
 Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
     
Intercept 3.633427 5.921470*** 4.894121 7.984615*** 
Family 0.294414 2.385248**   
Family * Governance   0.437283 3.123425*** 
Age 0.088075 1.783871* -0.041298 -0.838057 
Size -0.136408 -5.974685*** -0.150669 -6.606766*** 
Tangibility 0.211298 0.928998 0.073624 0.324343 
Industry Consumer 0.279899 0.574063 -0.461274 -0.948489 
Industry Staples -0.195795 -0.372077 -0.787612 -1.499868 
Industry Energy 0.542138 1.111490 0.014857 0.030518 
Industry Financials 0.170595 0.352898 -0.354966 -0.735810 
Industry Health 1.161387 2.371312** 0.432255 0.884333 
Industry Industrial 0.622418 1.287067 0.083605 0.173241 
Industry Technology 0.330738 0.663812 -0.101835 -0.204796 
Industry Materials 0.787176 1.658163* -0.035984 -0.075943 
Industry Communications 1.167408 2.073560** 0.260384 0.463253 
     
Adjusted R2 8.6412%  8.946%  
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Table A2.5 Results of Regression 3 (ROA) 
Dependent Variable : Firm Performance (Return on Assets) 
Test Distribution via Monte-Carlo Simulation 
 Regression 3a: Family Firms Regression 3b: O-M Family Firms
 Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
     
Intercept -1.926226 -9.384416*** -1.878455 -9.119594*** 
Family 0.082984 2.009815**   
Family * Governance   0.120495 2.561147** 
Age -0.039743 -2.406320 0.001729 0.104411 
Size 0.105392 13.79970*** 0.102990 13.43858*** 
Tangibility -0.040148 -0.527674 -0.112036 -1.468718 
Industry Consumer 0.099085 0.607509 -0.053867 -0.329603 
Industry Staples -0.301811 -1.714558* -0.101772 -0.576721 
Industry Energy 0.027720 0.169892 0.010822 0.066150 
Industry Financials 0.099734 0.616759 -0.122638 -0.756481 
Industry Health -0.229167 -1.398783 -0.347133 -2.113333** 
Industry Industrial 0.133323 0.824157 -0.031223 -0.192528 
Industry Technology -0.084025 -0.504148 -0.206429 -1.235347 
Industry Materials 0.026688 0.168060 -0.029443 -0.184912 
Industry Communications -0.005922 -0.031444 -0.105722 -0.559715 
     
Adjusted R2 20.224%  17.89%  
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Appendix 3. CEO Compensation Study using Non-Parametric Design 
Empirical results from this thesis reveal that the agency dynamics of (1) family 
gains from lower information asymmetry, and (2) family costs from diverging firm 
objectives, differentiate family firms from non-family firms, and owner-managed family 
firms from other family firms. While it is difficult to individually measure family gains 
and family costs idiosyncratic within each firm in the sample, Appendix 3 extends the 
breadth and scope of this study by focusing on a particular aspect of agency cost-saving - 
CEO compensation. CEO compensation contracts are important governance mechanisms 
that alleviate or reduce agency problems within companies (Ali & Chen, 2006).  Given 
that family firms have lower levels of information asymmetry, and since CEOs within 
family firms have greater incentive to pursue non-economic objectives favourable to their 
own, it is logical to infer that family firms should provide lower CEO compensation than 
non-family firms (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana & Makri, 2003). Likewise, the same 
agency mechanism exists between owner-managed family firms and non-owner-managed 
family firms. Thus, it can be inferred that owner-managed family firms would provide 
lower CEO compensation than non-owner-managed family firms.  
Carney’s (2005) view of parsimony as a driver of competitive advantage within 
family firms is conceptually compatible with the notion of family firms providing lower 
executive compensations than their non-family counterparts. Carney (2005) suggests that 
parsimony is dependent on the dominant family group’s ability to influence strategic 
decision-making within the family firm. This study implies that this ability to influence 
strategic decision-making is affected by the presence of family gains and family costs, 
brought about by personalism and particularism (Carney, 2005) within the firm. This is 
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consistent with the findings of Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri (2003) and Ali 
and Chen (2006), among others. While the earlier empirical findings outlined in this 
dissertation provides the fundamental groundwork that links to the concept of agency 
dynamics within family firms, this empirical study on relative CEO compensation 
structures amongst our sample provides a practical picture of the difference between 
family firms vis-à-vis non-family firms, and owner-managed family firms vis-à-vis non-
owner-managed family firms. Hence, this section seeks to provide a practical link 
between the study’s earlier empirical findings that imply the presence of Carney’s (2005) 
notion of personalism and particularism within family firms, with that of Carney’s (2005) 
concept of parsimony within family firms. 
Furthermore, this section utilizes an alternative data collection and statistical 
testing method so that empirical results from this section’s study may be compared 
against our earlier empirical findings. Jointly, this multi-method approach seeks to bolster 
the conclusions derived from the abovementioned earlier empirical results. 
A3.1 Research Design 
As discussed above, the following hypotheses can be inferred: 
Hypothesis 4a: Family firms have lower CEO compensation than non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 4b: Owner-managed family firms have lower CEO compensation than other 
family firms. 
These hypotheses are tested using an alternative, univariate, non-parametric 
statistical technique, the Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked Test. This test was selected because: 
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• It is an acceptable alternative to parametric Student’s t-tests (as used in 
regression analysis above) as means for empirical comparison 
(McConaughy, Matthews & Fialko, 2001); 
• As means for empirical comparison, it sidesteps statistical issues of 
sphericity that may plague conventional parametric tests (McConaughy, 
Matthews & Fialko, 2001); 
• It being a non-parametric test, provides a contrast to earlier parametric 
testing utilizing OLS regression analysis and present future studies and 
replications alternative ways of testing the thesis; 
• If the results from this test are consistent with earlier regression analyses, 
the conclusions from this thesis are reinforced when the results from both 
tests are viewed collectively. 
Subsequently, this study defines CEO compensation as: 
SharesOptionDirComSuperNCAllowSalaryCEO ++++++=  
Where: 
CEO refers to CEO compensation for the 2006 financial year; 
Salary refers to the CEO’s salary for the 2006 financial year; 
Allow refers to various cash allowances allocated to the CEO for the 2006 
 financial year; 
NC refers to non-cash entitlements allocated to the CEO for the 2006 financial 
 year; 
Super refers to superannuation contributed to the CEO for the 2006 financial year; 
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DirCom refers to directors’ and committee fees of the CEO for the 2006 financial 
 year; 
Option refers to the in-the-money value of options exercised by the CEO for the 
 2006 financial year; 
Shares refer to the value of shares allocated to the CEO for the 2006 financial 
 year. 
To enhance the validity of this study, and to provide a link to this study’s earlier 
regression analyses, the variables for earnings management (AAA), capital structure 
variation (Varida and Varmda), and firm performance (Q and ROA) are also tested using 
the Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked Test. The results are compared with earlier regression results 
(as discussed in Chapter 4) and checked for consistency. 
A3.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
Samples for comparison using the Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked Technique are obtained 
using a matched-sampling procedure on data from Australian Stock Exchange listed 
firms in 2006, as described in Section 3.3. Samples are matched in the particular order of 
(1) industry sector affiliation, (2) firm size, and (3) firm age. These variables, as 
described in Section 3.4, control for the moderating effects of industry affiliation, 
economies-of-scale, and firm life-cycle. While this sample selection procedure is subject 
to selection bias issues, it becomes less of a concern when the results of the non-
parametric test are viewed concurrently with the results from the regression analyses. 
As described in Section 3.3.3, data for earnings management (AAA), capital 
structure variation (Varida and Varmda), and firm performance (Q and ROA) are 
collected from Aspect/Huntley Financial Analysis and Data Analysis databases. 
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Moreover, CEO compensation data are collected from 2006 Annual Reports published in 
Aspect/Huntley Data Analysis and Annual Reports Online databases. Thirty-two (32) 
matched samples for family vs. non-family firm comparison, and thirty-two (32) matched 
samples for owner-manager vs. non-owner-manager family firm comparison were 
obtained. 
A3.3 Results: Family vs. Non-Family Firms 
The descriptive statistics and Wilcoxon Test Z-Scores for the 32 samples of 
family firms matched against a control set of 32 samples of non-family firms are 
presented in Table A3.1.  
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Table A3.1 Comparison between Family Firm vs. Non-Family Firm 
Family 
 Mean Median S. Deviation 
Size 17.95 17.54  
Age 2.50 2.67  
CEO 632,613.41 363,815.00 638,782.94 
AAA 0.11 0.05 0.15 
Varida 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Varmda 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Q 2.79 1.98 2.37 
ROA 0.05 0.08 0.21 
N 32   
    
Non-Family 
 Mean Median S. Deviation 
Size 17.96 17.38  
Age 2.68 2.86  
CEO 1,272,199.53 621,166.50 1,445,625.31 
AAA 0.30 0.23 0.28 
Varida 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Varmda 0.02 0.01 0.04 
Q 2.05 1.84 1.20 
ROA (0.25) 0.01 0.53 
N 32   
    
Difference (Family – Non-Family) 
 Mean Median Wilcoxon Z 
CEO (639,586.13) (257,351.50) (3.59)*** 
AAA (0.20) (0.17) (4.00) *** 
Varida 0.01 0.01 1.98** 
Varmda 0.01 0.01 2.65*** 
Q 0.74 0.14 1.68* 
ROA 0.30 0.07 3.09*** 
N 32   
Legend : AAA – Earnings Management via Absolute-Value Abnormal Accruals; Varida – Industry Mean 
Debt-to-Asset Variation; Varrmda – Market Mean Debt-to-Asset Variation; Q – Approximate Tobin’s Q; 
ROA – Return on Assets; Age – Logarithmic Firm Age; Size – Logarithmic Firm Asset Size; CEO – CEO 
compensation; * - Significant with 90% level of confidence; ** - Significant with 95% level of 
confidence ; *** - Significant with 99% level of confidence. 
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Table A3.1 shows that CEO compensation for family firms are lower than in non-
family family firms within the matched samples, with an average difference of 
$639,586.13 and median difference of $257,351.50. Wilcoxon tests indicate that this 
difference is significant within a 99% level of confidence. This result provides support 
for Hypothesis 4a. 
Moreover, the above table shows that earnings management (AAA) for family 
firms are lower than non-family family firms within the matched samples, with an 
average difference of 0.20 and median difference of 0.17. Wilcoxon tests indicate that 
this difference is significant within a 99% level of confidence. This result provides 
support for Hypothesis 1a and is consistent with the results of the regression analysis as 
described in Section 4.3.2. 
Likewise, Table A.3.1 shows that capital structure variation for family firms are 
greater than non-family firms within the matched samples, with an average and median 
difference of 0.10, for both Varida and Varmda. Wilcoxon tests indicate that this 
difference is significant within a 95% level of confidence for Varida, and 99% level of 
confidence for Varmda. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 2a and is consistent 
with the results of the regression analysis as described in Section 4.4.2. 
Finally, the above table shows that family firms have greater firm performance 
than non-family firms within the matched samples. The average difference for the 
matched samples is 0.74 for approximate Tobin’s Q (Q) and 0.30 for return-on-assets 
(ROA). Further, the median difference for the matched samples is 0.14 for approximate 
Tobin’s Q (Q) and 0.07 for return-on-assets (ROA). Wilcoxon tests indicate that this 
difference is significant within a 90% level of confidence for Q, and 99% level of 
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confidence for ROA. These results provide support for Hypothesis 3a and are consistent 
with the results of the regression analysis as described in Section 4.5.1. 
A3.4 Results: Owner-Manager Family vs. Other Family Firms 
Table A3.2 presents the descriptive statistics and Wilcoxon Test Z-Scores for the 
32 samples of owner-managed family firms matched against a control set of 32 samples 
of non-owner-managed family firms.  
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Table A3.2 Comparison between OM Family Firm vs. Non-OM Firm 
Owner-Managed Family 
 Mean Median S. Deviation 
Size 17.38 17.30  
Age 2.48 2.60  
CEO 418,200.63 299,269.00 405,584.46 
AAA 0.12 0.05 0.18 
Varida 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Varmda 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Q 3.13 2.67 2.55 
ROA 0.03 0.09 0.33 
N 32   
    
Non-Owner-Managed Family 
 Mean Median S. Deviation 
Size 17.99 17.53  
Age 2.64 2.77  
CEO 850,780.13 553,465.50 896,244.31 
AAA 0.17 0.06 0.28 
Varida 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Varmda 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Q 2.12 1.66 1.35 
ROA (0.01) 0.06 0.17 
N 32   
    
Difference (OM Family – Non-OM Family) 
 Mean Median Wilcoxon Z 
CEO (432,579.50) (254,196.50) (3.55)*** 
AAA (0.05) (0.00) (1.76)* 
Varida 0.01 0.02 2.43** 
Varmda 0.01 - 1.26 
Q 1.02 1.01 2.00** 
ROA 0.03 0.02 2.24** 
N 32   
Legend : AAA – Earnings Management via Absolute-Value Abnormal Accruals; Varida – Industry Mean 
Debt-to-Asset Variation; Varrmda – Market Mean Debt-to-Asset Variation; Q – Approximate Tobin’s Q; 
ROA – Return on Assets; Age – Logarithmic Firm Age; Size – Logarithmic Firm Asset Size; CEO – CEO 
compensation; * - Significant with 90% level of confidence; ** - Significant with 95% level of 
confidence ; *** - Significant with 99% level of confidence. 
 
Table A3.2 shows that CEO compensation for owner-managed family firms are 
lower than other family firms within the matched samples, with an average difference of 
Agency Trade-offs in Family Firms: Theoretical Model, Empirical Testing and Implications 
Mark Yupitun 11089061 169
$432,579.50 and median difference of $254,196.50. Wilcoxon tests indicate that this 
difference is significant within a 99% level of confidence. This result provides support 
for Hypothesis 4b. 
Furthermore, the above table shows that earnings management (AAA) for owner-
managed family firms are lower than other family firms within the matched samples, with 
an average difference of 0.05. Wilcoxon tests indicate that this difference is significant 
within a 90% level of confidence. This result provides support for Hypothesis 1b and is 
consistent with the results of the regression analysis as described in Section 4.3.3. 
Likewise, Table A.3.2 shows that capital structure variation for owner-managed 
family firms are greater than other family firms within the matched sample group with an 
average difference of 0.10 for both Varida and Varmda. The median difference for the 
matched samples is 0.01 for Varida, while there is no median difference for Varmda. 
Wilcoxon tests indicate that this difference is significant within a 95% level of 
confidence for Varida. On the other hand, Wilcoxon tests indicate no significant 
difference for Varmda. These results provide a partial support for Hypothesis 2b. Further, 
results on the Wilcoxon test for Varida is consistent with the results of the regression 
analysis as described in Section 4.4.3. 
Finally, the above table shows that owner-managed family firms have greater firm 
performance than other family firms within the matched samples. The average difference 
for the matched samples is 1.02 for approximate Tobin’s Q (Q), and 0.03 for return-on-
assets (ROA). Further, the median difference for the matched samples is 1.01 for 
approximate Tobin’s Q (Q) and 0.02 for return-on-assets (ROA). Wilcoxon tests indicate 
that this difference is significant within a 95% level of confidence for both Q and ROA. 
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These results provide support for Hypothesis 3b and are consistent with the results of the 
regression analysis as described in Section 4.5.2. 
A3.5 Discussion 
Results of the Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked Tests on CEO compensation among the 
matched samples indicate that family firms have significantly lower CEO compensation 
than non-family firms with an average of $632,613.41 as against to $1,272,199.53 
respectively. Moreover, empirical testing on the matched samples revealed that family 
firms under managerial ownership had significantly lower CEO compensation than other 
types of family firms, with an average of $418,200.63 as against to $850,780.13 
respectively. These results suggest that family firms have considerable agency cost-
savings in terms of lower contractual operating costs (thus, have family gains) when 
compared against non-family firms. Concurrently, these results suggest that owner-
managed family firms have considerable agency-cost savings, hence greater family gains, 
than other forms of family firms. 
Meanwhile, when viewed under the assumption that the market for managerial 
talent is highly competitive (Fama, 1980), such a significant shift in CEO compensation 
structure among the test groups implies that family firm CEOs (vis-à-vis non-family firm 
CEOs) and owner-managers of family firms (vis-à-vis non-OM CEOs of family firms) 
must make up the difference in their compensation packages through other non-financial 
means within the company. Ironically, the literature review in Chapter Two suggests that 
personalism and particularism enables family managers to achieve these non-economic 
incentives much more readily than their non-family counterparts (Morck & Yeung, 2003; 
Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Guttierez, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 
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2001; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003; Carney, 2005). Consequently, this implies that 
family firms may have a greater divergence in firm objectives, hence leading to greater 
family costs, than non-family firms. Further, the findings imply that owner-manager led 
family firms have a greater divergence in firm objectives, hence leading to greater family 
costs, than other forms of family firms. 
It is necessary to note that the Wilcoxon Sign Ranked Test does not establish a 
causal arrow between family firms (and O-M family firms) with lower CEO 
compensation (McConaughy, Matthews & Fialko, 2001). Nevertheless, this test distinctly 
illustrates that the possibility of a causal relationship highly exists. Moreover, the above 
findings are consistent with the thesis’ propositions, which suggest that (1) family firms 
have unique family gains and family costs that differentiate them from non-family firms, 
and (2) owner-manager led family firms have greater family gains and family costs than 
other forms of family firms. In fact, these results are consistent with empirical findings of 
extant literature in family business (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana & Makri, 2003; Ali 
& Chen, 2006). More importantly, results on the supplementary Wilcoxon tests 
comparing earnings management (AAA), capital structure variation (Varida and Varmda) 
and firm performance (Q and ROA) among family vs. non-family firms and owner-
managed vs. non-owner-managed family firms, are all consistent with the results of 
earlier regression analyses. Specifically, the above tests show that family firms have 
significantly lower earnings management (hence, lower information asymmetries), 
significantly greater capital structure variation (hence, greater divergence in firm 
objectives) and significantly greater performance, than their non-family counterparts. 
Similarly, family firms under managerial ownership have significantly lower earnings 
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management (hence, lower information asymmetries), significantly greater capital 
structure variation (hence, greater divergence in firm objectives) and significantly greater 
performance, than other family firms. Thus, when viewed collectively, the results of these 
tests strengthen the findings and conclusions of the thesis. 
Finally, not only does this appendix show, through illustrative measures, the 
robustness of the previous tests within this research, it also highlights the presence of 
parsimony (Carney, 2005) within family firms. Parsimony manifests itself, in this case, as 
cost-savings arising from the lower CEO compensation costs among family firms vis-à-
vis non-family firms, and among owner-manager led family firms vis-à-vis other family 
firms.  
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